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ABSTRACT 
My thesis studies the changing competitive structure of the Canadian auditing industry 
during the period 1987 to 1992. Two mergers took place over this period among four 
large Canadian accounting firms. I assess whether market power is likely to become a 
problem with already high, and possibly increasing levels of concentration in the audit 
industry. 
Using data from several sources, I examine those characteristics that affect the likelihood 
that high concentration facilitates market power. I then apply the official standards 
(Merger Guidelines) for Canadian merger analysis to data on audit services. Because the 
Merger Guidelines expressly do not permit the authorities to oppose a merger merely on 
structural grounds, I supplement my structural analysis with a review of studies which 
examine whether audit fees are influenced upward by high concentration. 
Overall, I found the industry more competitive in the post merger period. 
iv. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Merger talks and activity among firms in the accounting industry were at an all time high 
in 1989. Discussions and rumors regarding proposed mergers for six of the top eight 
international firms (commonly called the 'Big Eight") abounded in financial circles. 
When the dust cleared, four firms were involved in two mergers, creating the 'Big Six'. 
Yet until now, no large scale assessment has been made of the changed structural and 
competitive dynamics of this industry in Canada. 
Mergers of significantly large firms are subject to review under the Canadian 
Competition Act and guided by the Merger Guidelines. The two mergers, between 
Thorne Ernst & Whinney and Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co. to create Peat Marwick 
Thorne, and between Deloitte Haskins & Sells and Touche Ross & Co. to create Deloitte 
Touche, were examined and allowed to proceed by the Director of Investigation and 
Research after a cursory two day review. 
It is the accounting industry's importance to the overall health of the Canadian economy 
as an independent assessor of financial details through the audit service which demands a 
further examination of these merger cases. The potential for significant detrimental 
effects, due to possible increases of market power in the newly merged firms, is too large 
to ignore. These effects could include increased prices, loss of audit independence, and a 
reduction in audit quality. I therefore review the mergers in this thesis, using Canada's 
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Merger Enforcement Guidelines (hereafter called the Guidelines) to determine whether 
the decision by the Director was appropriate ex post. 
To make this determination, I examine the relevant characteristics of the audit market that 
affect the likelihood that high concentration facilitates market power. The purpose is to 
build up a picture of the potential for market power in the face of undoubted, and possibly 
rising concentration. Few studies of this type exist for Canada, especially as compared to 
the U.S. where the volume of information is large. For example, the literature in this 
area has examined: switching experience among auditors (Carpenter and Strawser, 1971) 
(Danos and Eichenseher, 1981, 1982, 1986), (Johnson and Lys. 1990), (McConnell, 
1984); signalling by peer review (Bremser, 1986); specialization of auditors by industry 
category (Zeff and Fossum, 1967); low-ball pricing (Francis, 1984), (Francis and Simon, 
1987), (DeAngelo, 1981); reputation differentials (Shockley and Holt, 1983); direct 
quality measurement (Angellini, Hutton, Copeland, 1994); and transparency (Bruton 
1989). 
Furthermore, merger analysis (as directed in the Guidelines) requires a definition of 
market based on product and geographic dimensions. I therefore examine several 
characteristics of the auditing market for large client firms along these dimensions. This 
includes audit firm specialization in 41 different industry categories, the ratio of auditors 
to clients in these industry categories, client size, the effect of parent client's auditor 
choice on its subsidiary's auditor choice, the breakdown of auditor concentration by 
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province, a comparison of auditor concentration in regulated and non-regulated 
industries, and finally switching behavior. I also include information regarding the 
number of audit firms, size of audit firms based on employee numbers, payroll, income 
levels for professionals, and number of employed for the whole industry, not limiting this 
information to the large client market. 
My thesis provides information not only about two merger instances, but examines the 
audit market for large client firms over a period of numerous changes. Some of these 
changes are endogenous to the market. For example, one major merger fell through while 
several smaller (yet significant) mergers advanced. Broader, exogenous changes such as 
increased globalization and an increased demand for services impact the whole economy. 
I explore these changes in the remainder of the introduction under the sub-sections: 
Merger and Identity Changes; The Changing Variety of Accounting Services; The Service 
Economy; Global Economy, Canadian Autonomy, Consumer Welfare. 
4 
MERGERS AND IDENTITY CHANGES 
The Chairman of Price Waterhouse World Firm, Joseph E. Connor, and the Chief 
Executive of Arthur Anderson, Lawrence A. Weinbach, stated jointly that merger 
discussions were underway, and their proposed union was in the works: 
"to benefit from the continuing rapid globalization of the world economies, the 
accelerating pace of technological change, and the broad based need for new 
services and investments. These developments are creating a demand for 
increased worldwide professional and financial resources with which to serve 
clients' needs" (Jeffrey, 1989a). 
The merger between Price Waterhouse and Arthur Anderson did not proceed. The 
Bottom Line (Jeffrey, 1989a) reported that the potential for anti-competitive acts, and the 
possible detrimental effects to the accounting profession and industry because of conflicts 
of interest, caused American regulatory bodies to unofficially discourage the merger.1 It 
was suggested that without considerable changes to one or the other firm or both firms, 
the merger would be challenged by the U.S. Government.2 The merger discussions 
between the Canadian affiliates of these firms ceased immediately. 
At the same time, in Canada and abroad, two other high profile mergers in the 
"Reported rumors in financial circles suggested the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)would not 
allow a merger that would create a firm that on one hand installed computer systems from IBM (Arthur 
Anderson), and on the other hand audited IBM (Price Waterhouse) (Jeffrey, 1989a). 
'Minyard and Tabor (1991) also suggested that the proposed merger between Arthur Anderson and 
Price Waterhouse would not meet the approval of American antitrust regulators. They state that the role of the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Congress is unknown in the breakdown of merger discussions 
between the two firms. They also state that two other large mergers did occur during the same period. The 
conflict of interest problems experienced by this merger, as explained above, may have been sufficient reason 
to block the merger. 
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The Director examined these mergers, and after the mandatory two-day examination 
did not pursue further investigation and closed the files (Director, Annual Report, 
1990).4 This allowed the mergers to take place without further regulatory review. 
In addition to the merger activity, several name and organizational changes have taken 
place. Clarkson Gordon changed its name to Ernst & Young, taking on its international 
3In addition to these mergers many other smaller structural changes took place. They include: 
• Wm Eisenberg broke up in 1989 among Arthur Anderson, Touche Ross, and Ernst & Whinney. 
(Jeffrey, 1989) 
• Collins Barrow splits up and partners in the Toronto area merge with Emst & Young; Quebec City 
with Peat Marwick Thome; Thetford Mines to Raymond, Chabot, Martin, Pare & Associes/Doane 
Raymond; Granby with Samson Belair Deloitte Touche. (Jeffrey, May 15,1990) 
• Le Groupe Mallette merged with Maheu Noiseux. (Matusky, 1990) 
• Laventhol & Horwath (Toronto and Vancouver) joined Price Waterhouse. (Jeffrey, August, 1990) 
• Doane Raymond Associates and Pannell Kerr MacGillivray merged to create Doane Raymond 
Pannell Associates, keeping both pre-merger international affiliations (Grant Thornton and Pannell 
Kerr Forster). (Jeffrey, 1991) 
• Thorne Riddell merged with Ernst & Whinney creating Thorne Ernst and Whinney. This was prior 
to the larger merger it was involved in 1989. 
4Any merger or proposed merger that prevents of lessens, or is likely to prevent or lessen, competition 
substantially is reviewable by the Tribunal (Section 92(1) of The Competition Act). The focus of the Act is 
thus on the effect of the merger. To ensure that both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of a matter are 
considered, the Competition Act provides a list of factors which the Tribunal may consider in determining 
whether the merger prevents or lessens or is likely to prevent or lessen competition substantially. 
Parties are encouraged to approach the Director early in the process to determine if there are potential 
competition concerns, and if so, to determine if they can be resolved without heavy legal cost. Parties are 
requested to provide information concerning the merger. In addition to the Director's staff, outside consultants 
may be employed to assist in the competition assessment of the proposed merger. 
accounting industry did proceed. Thorne Ernst & Whinney merged with Peat Marwick 
Mitchell & Co. to create Peat Marwick Thorne, and Deloitte Haskins & Sells merged 
with Touche Ross & Co. to create Deloitte Touche (Financial Post. April 12,1990; 
Director, Annual Report, 1990).3 
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?KPMG is the world's largest accounting network servicing almost one-fifth of the world market. 
Servicing is based on overall fees. (Worldwide, 1992) 
''KPMG (formerly KPMG Peat Marwick Thome) is Canadian owned and managed. It has 4,800 
employees across Canada. Its affiliate KPMG International, operates in 140 countries. 
7The use of merger in the accounting industry is prevalent. Documented histories (such as The History 
of the Firm: 1864-1964, Clarkson Gordon & Co., by A. J. Little [1964]) report significant merger activity by 
accounting firms. Arnett and Danos (1979) also provide evidence of the prevalence of mergers by accounting 
and auditing firms in the United States. 
affiliate's name (Jeffrey, Peat, 1989). Very recently (July 3, 1996) The Globe and Mail 
reported that another long established Canadian accounting firm, Peat Marwick 
Thorne, changed its name to the name of its international affiliate, KPMG. 
(Accounting, 1996). The worldwide affiliation operates under KPMG in many 
countries.5 According to the company, this change reflects the attempt to provide 
seamless professional services under one name worldwide. The Canadian firm now 
called KPMG has been in Canada since 1840, when it started as Macintosh Robinson 
and Paterson in Montreal. Since this time over 90 Canadian accounting firms have 
been absorbed into what is now recognized as KPMG. 6 7 
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THE CHANGING VARIETY OF ACCOUNTING SERVICES 
In addition to the structural changes occurring in the accounting industry, the make-up of 
services that accounting firms provide has also undergone considerable change. Audit 
(or attestation) was once the cornerstone of the accounting firm. Now, the bottom line of 
the accounting firm is heavily dependent on other services. Wyatt (1984) lists the variety 
and intent of services currently available: 
"Audit divisions in major firms are offering services such as internal control 
reviews, profitability studies, merger and acquisition assistance, litigation support, 
insurance claims development and review, bankruptcy and liquidation services.... 
and.... An expanded scope of services for some firms includes actuarial services, 
plant layout, executive recruiting, acting as a broker or dealer in securities, 
investment banking, and retail outlets for computer software .... The future is 
likely to see an increase in accountant association with forecast or forward 
looking information" (p. 111). 
The expanded scope of services throws the independence of the accounting firm into 
question. Independence is considered by many to be important to the audit service. The 
accounting profession mitigates agency costs8 between owners, represented by 
shareholders and other creditors, and managers. This role places their members in 
positions of authority and trust. Any damage to that trust relationship causes hardship 
to investors and other constituents with a stake in the business. In some cases, a poor 
audit might damage a broader cross section of society, as happenened in the 1980's 
""An agency relationship is a contract under which one or more principals engage another person as 
their steward (Agent) to perform some service on their behalf, the performance of which requires the 
delegation of some decision making authority to the steward." (Wallace, 1980, p. 12) Agency costs are those 
costs related to this relationship. They may be viewed by the principal to supervise the agent, and/or by the 
agent to certify performance to the principles. 
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when Northlands and Canadian Commercial Banks collapsed (Canadian Auditors 
1986). 
After the failure of the Northland Bank and Canadian Commercial Bank (CCB), their 
auditors were chastised by the Estey Commission for failing in their duties as auditors. 
The following quote from the Estey Commission Report suggests, mildly, that experience 
may have prevented some of the problems encountered with the audits of these two 
banks: 
"As was the case with the auditors of CCB, Northland's auditors, as individuals, 
had never undertaken a bank audit before their engagement with this bank. They 
communicated with other offices within their firm where bank audits were 
performed to obtain information and to build up an experience base" (Canadian 
Auditors, 1986, p. 4). 
It follows that many groups are concerned about the potential for erosion of quality in 
audit services. The increased variety of accounting firm services only pushes these 
concerns to the forefront. Possible conflicts of interest, and the impairment of 
independence affecting performance as accounting firms supply various services are 
serious concerns for regulators, clients, and users of audit information. 
Understanding the structure of the accounting industry and profession, and the impact 
of the pivotal change currently affecting it, is one crucial step in determining if the 
often expressed concerns about accounting industry performance justify public policy 
intervention. 
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The pressure to compete and succeed has increased the pressure to provide more non-
audit services. Russel Palmer, the Dean of The Wharton School of Business, 
University of Pennsylvania, makes a salient point about accounting firms and their 
product mix. 
"Consulting will-and ought—to continue to play a major role. But it is 
important for accounting firms to remember that, in this area, they are 
competing in a different marketplace. Yes they are vying with one another. 
But, more significant, they are competing against nonaccounting firms that have 
been specializing in consulting for a long time. Accounting firms are not 
embracing consulting because they are necessarily best at it, although it is quite 
possible in certain areas they are or could be. What has forced many of them to 
turn to consulting for growth has been the maturation of the auditing business" 
(Palmer, 1989, p. 85-86). 
''Business services are one of the fastest growing segments of the Canadian economy. There are 
84.394 companies in this sector as of March 1994, with 90% of them having revenues under $2 million 
annually, and two-thirds having fewer than five employees (Harris, 1995) See GRAPH 1 (again). The fastest 
growing segment has been computer services. 
THE SERVICE ECONOMY 
The increased role of service products9 in the economy has left analysts grappling with 
the issues of regulation, credentialization, and quality assessment. These problems are 
not necessarily unique to the goods that the accounting industry and its professionals 
provide. Many of these problems are endemic to service goods. Lessons learned from 
the changes in the audit and accounting service market may have application to the 
broad and growing range of services. 
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GLOBAL ECONOMY, CANADIAN AUTONOMY, CONSUMER WELFARE 
These mergers, potential mergers, and domestic firm absorption into their worldwide 
affiliates' identity raise a number of public policy issues. The influence of international 
forces on the Canadian industry call into question the independence and power of 
Canadian regulators in a global economy. The mergers in this industry are only the tip 
of the iceberg. With the continuing globalization of the world's economies, are 
Canadian regulators able to make decisions that are beneficial to [most] Canadians 
despite bigger pressures? Specifically, in direct reference to the issue in my thesis, was 
the Director influenced to allow massive mergers in the Canadian accounting industry 
because of parallel U.S. mergers or, did he act out of a conviction that the mergers 
failed to substantially lessen competition in Canada. 
The regulatory framework by which policy analysts and others assess change is placed 
under the microscope. After all, it is the ability to deal with change and deal with it 
effectively, which determines a country's -o r a firm's— competitive advantage. 
Impeding change because of outdated domestic policy mandates is not productive. It 
hinders growth and development of firms and industries within a country, and on a global 
scale. 
The increasingly international scope of accounting also raises public policy issues. 
George Addy, the then Director of Investigation and Research, Competition Bureau 
states, 
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"The trend towards internationalization of competition law activities is definitely 
growing and evolving. We will be devoting time and focusing resources on 
developing the tools we need to continue to deal effectively in that area, especially 
in cross-border issues" (Director, Annual Report, 1996, p.36). 
Canada has entered into trade agreements with her major trading partners. Accountants, 
along with other professionals, now have increased freedom of movement within the U.S. 
and Mexico. 
In the U.S. and elsewhere, large accounting firms operate under the umbrella of 
worldwide affiliations. Canadian accounting firms are no exception. The example of 
KPMG changing its name in Canada to reflect its global partner is case in point. 
Similarly, as demonstrated by the name changes from Table 1 to Table 2, accounting 
firms are emphasizing their international scope. Additionally, Canadian accounting firms 
are more likely to be part of a worldwide affiliation. 
The accounting industry is providing a broader range of services in addition to the 
audit. At the same time, the service industry on the whole is rapidly expanding. These 
two sources of growth demand that Canadian policies address not only a global 
economy but the resulting global firm. Large Canadian accounting firms, in addition 
to being under a global umbrella, service large international clients. An important 
question arises out of this situation. At what point, if any, does business grow beyond 
domestic borders and policies? Although this question is outside the scope of my 
thesis, I suggest that my review of the issues provides a framework for examining the 
12 
TABLE 1 
Top 15* Accounting Firms' International Connections 1990 
Peat Marwick Thorne Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG) 
Deloitte & Touche DRT International 
Ernst & Young Ernst & Young 
Price Waterhouse Price Waterhouse World Firm Limited 
Coopers & Lybrand Coopers & Lybrand 
Doane Raymond Pannell Grant Thornton international & Pannell Kerr Forster Worldwide 
BDO Ward Mallette BDO Binder 
Arthur Anderson & Co Arthur Anderson & Co 
Dunwoody & Company Dunwoody Robson McGladrey & Pullen 
Collins Barrow Moores Rowland International 
Richter, Usher & Vineberg Clark Kenneth Laventhal 
Zittrer, Siblin, Stein, Levine Summit International Associates, Inc. 
Fuller Jenks Landau McKay & Partners HLB International 
Schwarz, Levitsky, Feldman GMN International 
Evancic Perrault Robertson none 
* Ranking based on firm revenue. 
Adapted F rom: The Bottom Line, April 1991. 
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TABLE 2 
Top 15 Accounting Firms' International Connections 1995 
KPMG Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG) 
Deloitte & Touche Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu International 
Ernst & Young Ernst & Young International 
Price Waterhouse Price Waterhouse World Firm Limited 
Coopers & Lybrand Coopers & Lybrand International 
Doane Raymond Grant Thornton Grant Thornton International 
BDO Dunwoody BDO Binder 
Anderson Worldwide Arthur Anderson & Co S.C. 
Collins Barrow Moores Rowland International 
RSM Fuller Jenks Landau McKay & Partners HLB International 
Meyers Norris Penny & Co. Associated Accounting Firms International 
Schwarz, Levitsky, Feldman GMN International 
Evancic Perrault Robertson Morison International 
Soberman Isenbaum & Colomby BKR International 
Mintz & Partners Nexia International 
Adapted From: The Bottom Line, April 1996 
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role of services and the role of global firms within domestic borders and the difficult 
policy choices large mergers may create. 
So far, some necessary changes have been made to Canada's Competition Act to address 
the increasing role of services in the economy and provide legislation with teeth. The 
inclusion of services as a reviewable product ensures that the Competition Act applies to 
the fastest growing segment of Canada's economy, of which accounting and auditing 
services are a part [See Graph 1]. After 25 years of trying to revise the anti-trust laws in 
Canada, comprehensive legislation, namely the Competition Act, finally passed in the 
House of Commons in 1986. The new legislation is likely to bring more Government 
scrutiny to mergers and other competition practices of firms (Mathewson, 1990). In the 
case of the two large mergers I examine, it is not clear if the new legislation provoked 
more scrutiny. I only examine if the decisions by the Director were appropriate. 
The remainder of the thesis is structured in the following way. Chapters 2 and 3 review 
the government inquiries, accounting industry commissions, and audit fee, concentration 
and merger research. Chapter 4 reviews issues relevant to the Guidelines. The 
methodology is explained in Chapter 5, while my findings are integrated into a 
framework of market characteristics and presented in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 provides an 
summary of the results and Chapter 8 concludes the thesis. 
Graph 1: Types of Business Services 
* Distribution of Sork-cEitahlithnKnu 
Adapted from Canadian Banker Magazine, May 1995 
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Evidence to support these claims was presented by several government studies. Formal 
inquiries of the high concentration of the Big Eight12 were first made in the United 
"This was established in both Canada and the U.S. 
"Concentration is measured by either a 'concentration ratio' (CR4), which is the sum of the market 
shares of the top 4 or 8 (usually 4 or 8 is used, but other numbers may be useful) firms in a market, or the 
Herfindahl Index (HHI) which is the sum of the market shares squared of the firms in the market. 
HHI= 1 «2, 
1 = 1
 Where n=the number of firms in the market, and « = the market share. 
1 2
 The 'Big Eight' has commonly been used as a term to name the largest accounting partnerships 
in the United States. The term now has worldwide implications. Since the merger activity the term 'Big Six' 
has replaced 'Big Eight'. At the time of this study, the Big Eight were: Arthur Andersen, Arthur Young, 
Coopers and Lybrand, Deloitte Haskins and Sells, Ernst & Whinney, Peat Marwick Mitchell, Price 
Waterhouse, and Touche Ross. 
CHAPTER 2 : HISTORY OF INFLUENTIAL GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY INQUIRIES 
Although the merger provision of the Competition Act is a recent addition, political 
interest has been focussed on the accounting industry and profession for some time. In 
the sixties and seventies, the audit market for the largest client firms was already highly 
concentrated10. Standard industrial organization thinking of the time took 'high 
concentration' to mean that monopolistic or oligopolistic power was necessarily 
exploited by a small number of large accounting firms.11 Many argued that the 
structure of the audit market would allow the few suppliers of the audit service to 
explicitly or implicitly collude and influence standards, price, and the supply of audits 
and qualified auditors, and that audit quality and auditor independence would be 
jeopardized. 
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States (US. Senate, 1976). The Metcalf Committee, as it was commonly called, alleged 
that the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), and the profession itself were controlled by the 
Big Eight. Evidence to support this allegation was that the Big Eight audited 92% of 
the listings on the New York Stock Exchange, and 76% of the listings on the American 
Stock Exchange. The study therefore relied on audit service concentration data solely to 
determine that the accounting industry and profession were monopolized by the Big 
Eight.1 3 1 4 
Another U.S. government Committee was studying the accounting industry at the same 
time (United States, House of Representatives, 1976). A committee of the House of 
Representatives, headed by Chairman Moss, suggested that the Security Exchange 
Commission (SEC) should set both accounting principles and auditing standards. 
The AICPA struck the Cohen Commission15 in 1974 to investigate the scope and 
organization of auditors' responsibilities. They suggested that competitive, rather than 
"The Committee also made recommendations. One of the recommendations most pertinent to the 
content of this thesis is that the Metcalf Committee suggested that Certified Public Accounting firms (CPA), 
divest themselves of all operations not relating to audit. (These operations are commonly called Management 
Advisory Services.) 
l4Spence (1979) reviewed the findings of the Metcalf Report and found it to be "one-sided and 
probably unfair". Further, he states, "The part I have difficulty with is the proposition that the Big Eight 
are out for themselves and their clients. This may be true, but it seems to me not to have been proved. The 
documentation of the increasing concentration is interesting, and a matter of concern." (Appendix, p. 2) 
"The Commission's official name was, 'The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities'. 
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collusive, pricing existed and recommended improving self-regulation of the profession, 
maintaining auditor independence, and broadening the audit function beyond the 
financial statements. The Commission also defined the responsibilities of the 
independent auditor. 
The recommendations made in the U.S. eventually influenced the AICPA to eliminate 
restrictions on fee bidding, advertising, and direct solicitation of clients. Similar 
changes, with the exception of the direct solicitation of clients, were made by the 
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) (Simunic and Stein, 1995). 
These commissions were not precipitated by changes the industry and profession had 
experienced, but were politically motivated in order to satisfy the public that the 
government- and the industry—were truly looking out for the good of the consumer. 
Since that flurry of political and regulatory examination and intervention, a significant 
volume of academic research has been dedicated to industrial organization issues 
pertinent to the accounting industry. 
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l6There is no legal requirement for audited firms, or auditors, to disclose fees in Canada. The U.S. 
has similar laws, but the U.K. Australia, New Zealand, and some Pacific Rim countries require fee disclosure. 
Studies on audit fees in the U.S. and Canada must use surveys, or other methods, to procure fee information 
from willing participants. 
CHAPTER 3: DIRECTION OF RESEARCH ON THE ACCOUNTING INDUSTRY 
The industry is typically studied in two ways, either through market structure or through 
audit fees. The first looks into market structure and observes whether observable 
indicators of inter-firm rivalry are consistent with monopoly or competition. For 
example, one could examine whether clients use the same or different suppliers over time 
(switching), or if suppliers try to specialize and create a niche market (specialization), or 
if firms impede potential competitors from entering the market. This structural tradition 
supplements direct market share and concentration measures by looking at relevant 
characteristics of the audit market that affect the likelihood that high concentration 
facilitates market power. The other way is to examine audit fees directly. In contrast 
with the structural tradition, audit fee studies attempt to ascertain directly whether the 
major firms charge higher fees and whether those increased fees can be attributed to 
market power. 
My thesis fits into the structural tradition because of the absence of data to examine the 
second.16 However, both approaches influence each other and documentation of 
concentration is a starting place for studying potential market power. Therefore, I present 
an extensive critical review of the literature in both traditions. 
DIRECT STUDIES OF AUDIT FEES 
Simunic (1980) published the classic paper in this genre, and his work has been 
frequently used as a model for later research, Unfortunately, however, there has been 
little improvement in methodology beyond Simunic's path-breaking paper. Controversy 
continues because studies in different times and places reach different conclusions about 
the relationship between auditor size and/or status and prices. I examine Simunic's paper 
later on in this chapter. 
Studies that measure price relationships directly, collect data on auditor fees for a sample 
of clients. Each client's audit is characterized by descriptive accounting data. Bruton's 
(1989) study is typical of the genre. She reports that 91.3% of the variation in audit fees 
among clients is explained by a log-linear model incorporating the following independent 
variables: inventory, accounts receivable, current assets, long term assets, book rate of 
return, a dummy for whether the audit opinion was qualified or unqualified, year end and 
days to report. All but the last two variables were significantly different from zero, and 
had the correct sign. That i s , the elasticity of audit fee in response to the change in the 
assets among clients is positive with respect to each independent variable except for firm 
risk (rate of return), for which it is negative17. 
The dependant variable in Bruton's analysis is the price of the audit and is typically 
measured by the ratio of fee revenue from the audit divided by the square root of the 
assets of the client firm. Sometimes, instead of the square root of assets, assets or 
"Bruton uses a different measure of firm risk (rate of return). It is converse to the investor definition of exposure 
wher a high rate of return is more risk. She states," The risk associated with a high rate of return is systmatic risk which is 
different from audit risk." (p. 25) 
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"Simunic reports that asset size is a very significant determinant of the audit fee. His equasion was 
FEE/ASSETS 0 5 = b 0 + b, SUBS + b, DIVERS + b, FORGN + b, RECV + INV +1* PROFIT + b, LOSS 
+ b 8 SUBJ + b, TIME + b l 0 AUDITOR + u 
1
'Wallace (1984) and found that internal audit can replace and/or augment external audit, and 
therefore can reduce the overall cost of an audit. Chung and Lindsay (1988) found the internal audit to be 
a substitute for external audit, while Anderson and Zeghal (1994) found the internal audit to be a complement 
to the external audit. These last two studies are Canadian. 
revenues are used to scale fees. However, both Elliott and Korpi's (1978) and Simunic's 
(1980) papers, reported a strong linear relationship between the fee and the square root of 
assets over a wide range of assets.18 
Clearly, asset size is not the sole measure of audit complexity. Two clients with the same 
assets may require different auditing effort. Additional independent variables in the 
pricing equation represent aspects of a firm's circumstances that a priori are thought to 
alter the complexity of the audit and affect the cost of the audit. For example, the 
excellent fit of Bruton's equation (1989), confirm that selected accounting measures 
capture the important elements of complexity that affect audit costs. The fit of Bruton's 
equation is surprisingly good since there are several theoretical considerations that are not 
well handled in most such studies. The most prominent of these issues is the role of the 
internal audit. Some authors observe that the internal audit is a substitute for external 
auditing while others find it a complement.19 Therefore, if the relationship between 
internal and external audits cannot be established conclusively, one can have little 
confidence in the price equation that excludes an internal audit expense variable among 
the independent variables. Since that data is often unavailable to the researcher there 
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20Additional comments about Bruton's paper are made later on in the chapter. 
remain questions about what the coefficients of the price equation actually measure.2 0 
Having established a price equation it is feasible to speak of the price of an audit as a 
linear equation of the square root of assets, other things being equal. The effectiveness of 
the equation is often examined by using it to predict the audit fee for audit cases left out 
of the sample. 
However, even a perfect price equation is not sufficient to make any firm conclusions 
about the degree of an audit firm's market power. The price equation is an indirect 
measure of how the cost of audits vary with different characteristics of the firm being 
audited. However, since the analysis is not an engineering or activity-based study, it 
necessarily confounds several market characteristics, chief of which are the degree of 
market power, the extent and direction of economies of scale and scope, if any, and 
reputation effects and product differentiation. Market power is a feature of the 
marketplace, economies of scale and scope are characteristics of the production function, 
and reputation effects and product differentiation involve demand characteristics, 
signaling techniques and a host of agency and information asymmetry issues. However, 
all three of the above listed factors will influence observed prices in the market place, the 
single variable isolated in pricing studies. 
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Since the above factors operate simultaneously on price and cannot be observed directly, 
every statistical examination of audit pricing for the purpose of evaluating the presence, 
or otherwise, of market power simultaneously tests several other hypotheses and typically 
maintains several hypothesis as self-evident. Since market power is generally the public 
policy concern, the research strategy involves finding means of isolating the other factors. 
It is Simunic's insight and strategy which makes him the paramount contributor to this 
field of research. His strategy involves separating the sample of client firms into large 
and small clients. He assumes that competition prevails for small clients. One rationale 
is that there is less concentration among auditors serving the smaller client segment of the 
business. Other rationales are that for the smaller client group the complexity of audits 
will be more homogeneous, and that the range of parties interested in the audit 
information will be lower. 
In this separated small client sample (where competition is presumed) and with an 
estimated pricing equation, the researcher looks at how audit fees differ from the generic 
equation's forecast for several subsets of the sample. For example, by adding to the 
independent variables in the pricing equation a measure of the size of the audit firm, one 
measures how fee revenue fluctuates depending upon the size of the auditor. Simunic 
(1980) finds seven of the Big Eight's fees lower than non-Big Eight, while Francis (1982) 
found a price premium for Big Eight audits. Frances and Stokes (1985) examined this 
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discrepancy and surmised that smaller clients were paying premium fees to Big Eight 
auditors, but Big Eight fees were competitive overall. 
Other researchers have examined audit fees in the Simunic tradition. Taffler and 
Ramalinggam (1982) and Francis (1984) found that large audit firms did charge higher 
fees for an audit. On the contrary, Firth (1985) found no statistically significant 
evidence of the larger auditing firms charging more for their services. Firth concluded 
there appeared to be no price premium for the major six auditing firms in New 
Zealand.2 1 
If Simunic's hypothesis of competition in the market for small clients is assumed, then it 
is useful to examine the market circumstances that permit larger firms to charge higher 
prices to smaller clients. Moreover, since competition is presumed to prevail in the 
smaller client market, market power is eliminated as a factor. By elimination therefore, if 
prices increase with auditor size in the small firm sample, the researcher concludes that 
clients must be paying for a benefit that only the larger auditor offers. The extent of that 
quality differential is unclear however, because economies of scale and scope may 
prevail. In a competitive market economies of scale will push prices down as the audit 
firm expands. Most research has skirted the commingling of the effects of product 
differentiation and economies of scale on the price of the audit. 
"The New Zealand market for audit services only contained six of the eight Big Eight accounting 
firms. 
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DeAngelo (1981a) attacks the 'commingling' issue by theorizing that auditor size is 
positively related to auditor reputation and quality. She argues "that audit quality is not 
independent of audit firm size, even when auditors initially possess identical 
technological capabilities", (p. 183) Further, auditors with more clients (hence larger) 
have more to lose if they do not maintain audit quality.22 
With start-up and transactions costs present, the auditor-client relationship is sometimes 
considered a bilateral monopoly. There are strong incentives for both parties to remain 
in the relationship to avoid the costs of terminating it. The auditor's insulation from 
client switching gives the incumbent auditor the ability to earn quasi-rents. There 
should be an inverse relationship between the magnitude of start-up/transactions costs 
(hence, client-specific quasi-rents) and auditor turnover.23 Following from this 
suggestion, there is incentive to attract business using tactics such as lowballing. And 
there is incentive to keep clients, even if this requires lowering the cost—and/or quality-
-of the audit. 
The rational client will want to obtain a high quality audit to mitigate agency costs. 
^This supplants the assumption of homogeneous audit products across firms. DeAngelo's paper was 
motivated by the Derieux Committee Report (The AICPA Special Committee on Small and Medium Size 
Firms, 1980) which found that size is an "arbitrary yet overwhelming factor" in the client's criteria for 
choosing an auditor, and suggested educating the public to not use size as a selection factor for finding a 
CPA. 
"Danos and Eichenseher (1982) argue that evidence that auditors in regulated industries maintain a 
tighter grip on their contracts may be proof of DeAngelo's theory because there is more specialized knowledge 
needed to audit regulated firms. 
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"Simunic found no evidence of market power in the large sample because there was no premium 
charged by the Big Eight firms. Although Simunic states the 90 percent of the large client category are serviced 
by Big Eight firms and therefore useful to test his hypothesis. His $125 million cutoff between small and large 
firms was arbitrary. Other researchers have used similar arbitrary cutoffs. In the case of Francis (1984), the 
cutoff created a contrary result to Simunic's. Francis and Stokes (1986) investigated these differing results 
attributing the size of the firms in the large and small categories as having an effect on the result for the 
Australian market. 
Thus the auditor has incentive to specialize to enhance audit quality and ensuring the 
audit is independent. This would require that the auditor have sufficient clientele (or in 
other words is large enough), that losing one client would not impair its ability to carry 
on business. DeAngelo asserts that the potential of losing several clients, because of 
being caught producing a poor quality audit for another client, acts as a 'collateral 
bond' or disincentive to cheat. 
Before examining the issues of product differentiation and economies of scale in detail, 
recall that research findings assume that competition prevails for small clients. 
According to Simunic that analysis is a baseline which permits one to evaluate market 
power in the large client sample. In that sample, market power cannot be ruled out. 
However, from the small sample, the researcher reaches conclusions about product 
differentiation and economies of scale which are carried over to the analysis of the large 
sample.24 
Simunic found that the market was competitive. Seven of the Big Eight auditors charged 
lower fees than small audit firms charged for similar audits (consistent with large-firm 
27 
economies of scale); however, there was no difference in fees between large and small 
audit firms after controlling for other client characteristics. 
Anderson and Zeghal investigate the hypothesis that audit services are not homogeneous 
but are instead characterized by product differentiation among auditors using Canadian 
data. Product differentiation applied to auditing services means that firms offer different 
qualities of service, even though the inputs appear to be similar. If so, it should be no 
surprise to find that audit fees per unit of standardized service (measured here primarily 
by the assets of the audited firm but also measured by the square root of the assets) vary 
among firms. Using assets as a measure of size of the audit focuses attention on the size 
of the client as a measure of the scope of the auditor's task. Other dimensions of auditor 
output variation across audits are complexity and risk. Evidently, there are significant 
difficulties in establishing a standard output unit of audit service. 
Product differentiation complicates the analysis as the value of the audit to the client will 
differ even if the audit effort appears the same. The possibility of product differentiation 
and the problems of determining a standard unit of output makes it awkward (although it 
is often done) to infer an absence of competition in the accounting services market from 
merely observing differential pricing. 
Assets measure the size of the client firm, but assets fails to measure complexity. 
Complexity is measured here by "the number of operating industries, number of 
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subsidiaries and die proportion of assets in receivables and inventories." (Anderson and 
Zeghal, p. 196) 
Product differentiation is measured by two proxies - the size of the auditor and the status 
as a Big Eight firm. The first measure is rationalized by DeAngelo's size hypothesis 
(described above). She argues that this quality difference is directly related to the size of 
the audit firm. DeAngelo's thesis, as articulated by the Anderson and Zeghal, suffers 
from an inherent circularity. She is said to argue that in a competitive market, persistent 
price differences must be due to quality differences. She observes that audit prices rise 
with the size of the firm and therefore infers that quality is also positively proportional to 
size. Though possible, size may also reflect larger market share and the market power of 
the large firms in a concentrated business. Therefore the DeAngelo's thesis may not be 
used as a joint assumption with a market power thesis. This is overcome by applying 
Simunic's strategy to restrict the analysis to the small client sample. In that sample, it is 
reasonable to assume that market power is absent. 
There is necessarily some ambiguity here because the evidence on whether audit fees rise 
in proportion to the size of the auditor is not confirmed in all pricing studies. For 
example, Simunic found lower fees in the large audit sample. Moreover, if there are 
economies of scale in the audit delivery industry, larger firms would tend to grow bigger 
under price competition, with or without differential qualities. 
To the extent that larger firms increase faster than smaller firms because of economies of 
scale, concentration will necessarily increase: and it is not clear how the dynamics 
introduced by economies of scale can be separated from DeAngelo's formulation of the 
quality dimension without having direct, instead of proxy, measures of quality. 
The authors recognize these issues and assert that the economies of scale prevail among 
firms serving large clients, or those firms specializing in certain industries. They follow 
Simunic, and argue that service to the small client is assuredly competitive. Therefore 
they separate large and small client markets, even though all auditor firms may compete 
in both market segments. Their test is based on this market segmentation hypothesis, but 
as is explained below, their test does not inspire confidence in their conclusions. 
In essence, Anderson and Zeghal juxtapose Klein and Leffler's (1981) and DeAngelo's 
hypotheses for product differentiation. Klein and Leffler's brand name hypothesis of 
quality differentiation is an application of the standard economic analysis of reputation. 
In that model, the firm invests in reputation either through substance or through 
advertising, in order to signal to the user the firm's commitment to quality (Dixit and 
Norman, 1978). The brand name hypothesis applied to accounting services explains the 
success of the Big Eight accounting firms at the expense of smaller and medium-sized 
firms, by the fact that these firms invest in brand name development. That investment 
includes hiring, apparently, the most competent employees, developing the best possible 
computer systems and training programs, and paying above standard salaries to 
employees and partners. This high cost approach is said to build credibility, convincing 
clients and users of audit information that the auditor can be trusted. That trust comes 
from the realization that the reputable firm has a lot to lose from error or poor outcomes 
that reduce its reputation capital. Since confidence in the credibility of the auditor is a 
key quality dimension, especially for those firms seeking outside funding,25 the reputation 
model might explain why such firms switch to Big Eight audit firms despite the increased 
fee. 
The brand name hypothesis is also therefore an alternative for any 'conspiracy' or 
'concentration' theory for price differentials and for the increasing shift of large firm 
business to larger auditors. 
Anderson and Zeghal obtained complete responses to a survey instrument and collected 
additional data from 172 firms for the years 1980,1982, and 1984.2 6 This period is 
described by the authors as an especially interesting one because at the time Canadian 
authorities reduced restrictions on advertising and in some jurisdictions extended to 
CGA's the right to undertake audits. 
Their survey collected data from a sample of firms on the name of the auditor, the 
external audit fee, and the dollar value of the costs incurred by the firm for the internal 
2 5
 As demonstrated in Teoh and Wong, (1993) and in Carpenter and Strawser (1971). 
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audit.2 7 The sample was divided into large and small client firms at a break-off point of 
$100 million (Canadian) in total assets. A binary indicator (dummy) variable designated 
Big Eight and non-Big Eight auditor classifications. 
Using multiple regression, Anderson and Zeghal determined that the independent 
variables with the most explanatory power in relation to the audit fee across groups were 
total assets (not the square root of total assets, as others have found), percentage of assets 
in receivables and inventory, and the number of subsidiaries in that order respectively. 
Anderson and Zeghal argue that in their data the size variable is a metric for quality as in 
DeAngelo's analysis. Their argument is that the 'size of auditor' measure is a significant 
and positive determinant of auditor revenues among small clients (t=2.76) and is 
insignificant in the sample of large clients. But their argument must be considered weak, 
because it rests on an untested assumption that among large clients the reputation benefits 
of size just exactly offset the economies of scale that otherwise are available for large 
firms auditing large clients, but are unavailable for large firms auditing small clients. 
Their argument is therefore suspect, and is weak material from which to construct the 
'size-quality' link and to reject the 'reputation' model. 
2 7
 The survey data was supplemented by additional information that was obtained from public 
sources. This information included: total assets, net income, accounts receivable, inventories, SIC, 
subsidiaries. Auditor revenues (from all sources) were also obtained. 
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The interesting finding here is that the Big Eight firms' actual fee structure seems to 
conform with their reputations in the industry as high fee firms or as aggressive price 
cutters. Therefore, the authors argue that the Big Eight group cannot be viewed as a 
proxy for 'reputation.' This seems more than a trifle cavalier. Of course, the reputation 
hypothesis would not assert common prices among the Big Eight firms, since reputations 
are not necessarily homogeneous within the group. The Big Eight reputation differential 
may nevertheless persist for the group and each firm in the group in comparison with 
non-Big Eight firms, which is a more intuitive way of stating the hypothesis. 
An unaccountable weakness in the study is that the authors fail to distinguish between 
Quebec and other parts of Canada. In Quebec, some regional firms continue to maintain 
their reputations and to audit firms that are typically clients of the Big Eight firms 
elsewhere in Canada. 
Nevertheless, the authors do seem to have identified that audit fees are aligned with the 
value of each Big Eight firm's reputation. Competition between Big Eight firms takes the 
form of competition for reputation (quality) rather than direct price competition. 
As a side issue, Anderson and Zeghal observe that in their sample, expenditures on 
internal and external auditing services are positively correlated. Thus internal and 
external auditing appears to be complementary rather than substitutes, other things being 
equal. This is a highly counter-intuitive observation, and disagrees with Wallace's (1984, 
1986) evidence for the U.S. market, and Chung and Lindsay's (1988) Canadian evidence. 
It seems more likely that "other things are not equal," and that the 'internal' audit 
measure is highly correlated with the business type and complexity of the client. For 
example, financial institutions likely spend more on internal audits than do firms in non-
financial industries. 
I present Bruton's (1989) study here in some detail because the research successfully 
distinguishes between two classes of auditors - Big Eight and others. She asserts that 
relying on a single price equation from a sample that includes both categories of firms 
misstates audit pricing behaviors. Bruton examined whether a single model applies for 
the pricing of audits for both the Big Eight and non-Big Eight. She also examined 
whether large non-Big Eight firms are better classified in the Big Eight group or in the 
others category. 
Her sample consists of 328 client firms of which 205 used a Big Eight auditor and 123 
used a non-Big Eight auditor. The data was collected from 1984 United Kingdom annual 
reports.28 She estimated two regressions, one for Big Eight client firms and one for the 
non-Big Eight client firms, (p. 2) An F test (Chow test) indicates that the regressions 
from the two samples are from different populations. 
"The use of U.K. data does not require the use of a survey to obtain audit fees. Disclosure of audit 
fees is required. 
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Bruton suggests there are two distinct markets for accounting services based on her price 
data. She found a significant difference between audit fees charged by the Big Eight and 
those charged by the non-Big Eight, and suggested that the Big Eight price premium 
other researchers found may have no relation to market power. 
She also discovered that the difference in the audit fee charged has two components. The 
difference in the constant terms between the two equations reflects a difference in the fee 
charged by Big Eight compared to other firms and that is independent of the size of the 
clients. The coefficient of the independent variable, (assets) is a linear measure of the 
audit fee per unit of service. That price also differs between the two groups. 
The fit of Bruton's equation is so amazingly good, one suspects she has uncovered a 
pricing algorithm used by the firms, rather than having measured the result of an 
equilibrium process that adjusts prices charged through trial, error and rivalry. If true, the 
analysis of fees in relation to size and quality (or other features) may not capture the way 
in which market power is maintained. 
The transparent29 nature of U.K. fee data may have a hand in her success. Recall, fee data 
is revealed in the U.K., and thereby provides information to all interested parties. The 
possibility of collusion is higher when prices (fees) are well known, and the detection of a 
"Clear and obtainable (to knowledgeable buyers and sellers) information is considered transparent. 
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3 0A cheater in this sense, is the firm or seller which wishes to maximize his own profit to the detriment 
of others in the oligopoly or cartel, by price cutting. A transparent market allows all parties to observe the 
price cutting. 
31Simunic (1980) made the same assumption. 
3 2They based this assumption on Simunic (1980) and Wallace (1984). Since then Wallace (1986) 
found more evidence of the substitutive nature of internal and external audit. In contrast, Anderson and Zeghal 
(1994) found a complimentary relationship using Canadian data. 
cheater30 is easier. Even Bruton suggests this possibility, but she touts product 
differentiation as the most likely scenario because the Big Eight may have had a different 
bundle of services with a different cost function than non-Big Eight auditors. 
Relating back to the issue of price competition, Chung and Lindsay (1988) replicated 
Simunic's (1980) study using Canadian data. Their data is from a survey answered by 
228 firms. All firms were listed on either the Toronto or Montreal stock exchange on 
December 31,1980. The sample includes 107 large clients and 121 small clients based 
on a dividing line of $100 million in total assets. Chung and Lindsay follow Simunic by 
assuming competition exists in the market for small clients31, and that internal audit is a 
substitute for external audit.32 
Importantly, Chung and Lindsay find strong evidence for a linear relationship between fee 
revenues and the square root of assets. Chung and Lindsay found that client firm size 
(measured by the square root of total assets33) was a significant determinant of the 
external audit fee. 
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Their results confirm that variables measuring number and presence of subsidiaries, 
foreign activities, receivables and inventory are statistically significant determinants of 
auditor fees and with the expected signs. They also found no evidence of systematic 
differences in fees among auditing firms. On the face, because the mean fee per unit 
square root of asset varies from 11.24 for Price Waterhouse to 6.01 for Peat Marwick 
Mitchell, one would think the fees charged are different. However, the standard deviation 
of fees per unit audit for each [audit] firm across clients is very high. Therefore, the 
researchers rejected the hypothesis that large audit firms charge different fees. 
Based on the small/large client categorization, Chung and Lindsay found that small 
clients are charged higher fees than are large clients, when contracting a Big Eight 
auditor.34 They concluded that small clients were willing to pay a higher price to the Big 
Eight for their services. Large clients do not pay a premium for Big Eight audit services. 
Small clients must be paying for additional qualities that large audit firms provide, 
otherwise these clients would always choose small audit firms because of the price 
difference. 
3 3Elliot and Korpi (1978) found that audit fees are a linear function of the square root of 
assets or sales. Since then, most others have used this relation as a proxy for audit fees. 
MThis is consistent with Francis and Stokes (1985). 
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"Based on three hundred and sixty-one usable responses from her survey. 
Palmrose (1986) tested for a systematic relation between audit firms size and audit 
fees. 3 5 The results indicate a positive relation between size and fees based on a Big 
Eight /non Big Eight dichotomy. Palmrose also tested for an association between audit 
fees and industry specialization of the auditor, but she failed to find a statistically 
significant result. 
Her research also attempted to distinguish if the Big Eight price premium was a result 
of higher quality services or monopoly pricing by the largest suppliers. To distinguish 
between the two competing hypotheses, a research method similar to Simunic's (1980) 
was used that assumed pricing was competitive in the small client segment of the 
market. Prices across small and large clients were compared. The results were 
consistent with competition and the Big Eight having differentiated products. She also 
found diseconomies to large clients using non-Big Eight auditors. When large audit 
firms audit large clients fees are at their lowest, and when small audit firms audit small 
clients, fees are also at their lowest. 
I wrap up this section with some remarks on audit fee data. Many studies on audits used 
audit fee data to infer the competitiveness of the market. Fee data does not provide a 
direct examination of auditor effort, or inputs. It only provides information about 
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revenues, not information about expenses. For example, an audit may be produced by 
several different tiers of labor. Large audit firms can use this mechanism to lower costs 
and exploit economies of scale36 by assigning the most appropriate labor, at the most 
effective cost, to the different activities that comprise the production of an audit. 
Not only does audit fee data fail to provide information about labor inputs, observed audit 
fee differences may reflect variances in the nature of audit clients. Economies of scale 
accruing to a large audit firm is another possible reason for an observed fee difference, 
which also may be (more) apparent during a period of auditor restructuring. Higher audit 
quality may also induce higher fees.37 
In addition, some basic methodological issues are at hand. As I have mentioned before, 
the disclosure of audit fees is not required in Canada or the U.S. Therefore, surveys and 
proxies are typically used to gather information about audit fees. Methodological 
difficulties with surveys are numerous and include non-response bias, interpretation 
errors and responses from inappropriate individuals.3 8 
In addition to the difficulties inherent in using audit fee data, considerable obstacles are 
"Reductions in the average cost of a product in the long run, which result from an expanded level of 
output. 
"O'Keefe, Simunic and Stein (1994) provide some insights to audit cost data, and discuss the inherent 
difficulties in using fee data to link observed differences in fees to costs. 
38Simon (1969) thoroughly details the difficulties in using surveys. 
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encountered in establishing the nature and characteristics of a service, and an audit in 
particular. In the next section I will review the structural literature. 
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"Zeff and Fossum also outline the significant problems that this analysis encounters, such as size of 
sample, use of two or more accounting firms for one client firm, ranking of client firms based on revenues. 
They concede that the only weakness that they could control is the size of sample. They used a list of the top 
500 industrials. 
4
°Schiff and Fried (1976) and Rhode, Whitsell and Kelsey (1974) also published accounting firm 
concentration studies. These two papers are primarily an update of the Zeff and Fossum work. 
4 lThe Big Eight at the time of this study were: Arthur Anderson & Co.; Arthur Young & Company; 
Ernst & Ernst; Haskins & Sells; Lybrand, Ros Bros. & Montgomery; Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.; Price 
Waterhouse & Co.; and Touche, Ross, Bailey & Smart. 
4 2Zeff and Fossum broke the data into 38 industry categories. 
CONCENTRATION STUDIES 
Zeff and Fossum ( 1967) published the seminal paper on the concentration of large U . S . 
public accounting firms.39 4 0 The study found that the Big Eight*1 performed 9 2 . 7 % of 
audits based on number of audits and 9 4 . 8 % based on percentage of revenues. 
To understand the strengths and weaknesses of an audit firm's expertise, the 
researchers hypothesized that audit firms may audit the majority of firms in an industry. 
The client firms were sorted into industry categories. Zeff and Fossum found strong 
leader audit firms in many of the industry categories.42 In those categories that did not 
have one particular leader, two or three firms enjoyed prominence. Zeff and Fossum 
found a high concentration of auditors in many categories. For example, in tobacco, 
three audit firms account for 9 5 percent of the aggregate revenues. 
Dominance of an accounting firm in a category was attributed to the client firm's 
dominance in the category. Therefore, the client firm determined the auditor's apparent 
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"Only ordinal classifications were made, and no statistical comparison to the Zeff and Fossum study 
was attempted. Differences in the sampling method caused the authors to treat the data in this way. It was 
noted that large audit firms dominated the market. 
"The industry categories were industrials, finance, public utilities, mines, and oils. 
market power. This finding reflects the indivisibility of audits. 
The baseline Canadian study on market concentration was performed by Shaw and 
Archibald as they extended Zeff and Fossum's (1967) study. Their sample contained 
927 firms for fiscal 1968.4 3 Each firm had issued securities publicly and had assets 
over $5 million. The data set included the firm, its auditor, its total assets, gross 
revenue, and net income. The data was classified by industry categories44 and audit 
firm. 
Auditors were ranked on the basis of total assets audited, for each industry and overall. 
In the overall analysis, 145 auditors were listed. Of these, 85 auditors had only one 
client in the sample. The top three auditors had 381 clients. Shaw and Archibald 
reported that Price Waterhouse audited a larger dollar value of assets than any other 
auditor, but Clarkson Gordon & Co. and Thorne, Gunn, Helliwell & Christenson each 
had a greater number of audits. 
In the industry categories, Shaw and Archibald ranked the top ten firms in each of five 
industries. Of these 50 positions, only sixteen different auditors were ranked. 
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Furthermore, Shaw and Archibald reported that the top eight firms held 38 of those 50 
positions. Additionally, each of these eight firms was present in at least four of the five 
industrial categories. 
Shaw and Archibald compared their analysis with Zeff and Fossum's and report that the 
top audit firms held a similar percentage of the audits. The leading firm in both the 
U.S. and Canada was Price Waterhouse. 
In 1968, 88.2 percent of the population of client firms was audited by the top eight 
Canadian audit firms. The top three audit firms held 67.8% of the audits based on 
number of audits, and 67.7% of the audits based on total assets.45 The Canadian 
market was considered concentrated and was dominated by a few large audit firms. 
Campbell and McNiel examine whether an increase in concentration46 of auditors could 
be attributed to stochastic (random) forces instead of the more typically argued market 
power thesis. The stochastic model4 7 states that if the rule of growth is proportional and 
stochastic, over time growth will favour large over small firms. The hypothesis does not 
4 5The CR4 is 73.7% based on audit numbers, and 73.7% based on total assets. 
^Concentration is measured by concentration ratios for top four (CR4) and top eight (CR8) firms 
based on client firm size. 
4 7 The model is attributed to Gibrat, R. (1931). Les inegalites economiques. Paris. This was later 
introduced in the English language by M. Kalecki, "On the Gibrat Distribution," Econometrica, April 1945, 
p. 161-170. The computer simulation in Campbell and McNiel's paper was based on Gibrat's work. 
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'^Reputation models examine how a firm's reputation is formed (under various conditions). Further 
readings on reputation models include, Kreps and Wilson (1982), Milgrom and Roberts(1982), and Shapiro 
(1980, 1982, and 1983). 
4 9The model predicts concentration figures in the 65 percent range (CR4) and 95 percent range (CR8) 
for years past 1978. 
help in any way to explain the initial size distribution of firms. Nor, is there any reason to 
argue that the dynamics of growth are driven by a constant growth rate (plus a random 
error: white noise). The model may have little direct intuitive appeal, but it seems to have 
considerable descriptive merit. Therefore, theorists have sought explanations for the 
strong empirical observation. For example, Demsetz argues that it confirms his view that 
large firms grow because of economies of scale. 
Campbell and McNiel suggested that large audit firms may have had a cost advantage and 
created the high and increasing concentration of auditors for large clients in the U.S. 
More important, this is a true size based model rather than DeAngelo's which is a 
reputation48 model in drag. 
Campbell and McNiel simulate firm and industry dynamics to determine the growth rate 
and concentration of audit firms. They made their projections using growth rates based 
on annual rates of growth (or decay), mean and deviations of growth from the mean. The 
simulation forecasted concentration measures for the years 1964 to 2004 4 9, and actual 
data from 1964,1971, and 1978 was compared to the projections. 
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The simulation scenario projected large auditors increasing in size and small auditors 
declining in size. Yet, the simulation under-reports concentration when compared to the 
actual figures. Since their model captures only random forces, Campbell and McNiel 
suggest that the difference is due to non-random forces. Therefore, they concluded, 
stochastic and non-stochastic forces both contributed to the concentration of auditors. 
The authors use a poor choice of words in distinguishing stochastic from non-stochastic 
forces. The stochastic model assumes a constant rate of growth with stochastic error. If 
the rate of growth is constant over time and with error, there will be a drift towards large 
firms growing faster than small ones. The reason for that is that when there is a 
stochastic up-tick, the constant rate of growth continues to expand it. With a random 
down-tick, the constant rate of growth is moderated. Over time, the up-ticks outgrow the 
down-ticks. 
Campbell and McNeill find that the constant rate of growth with random variation fails to 
completely describe the historical data. Growth among large firms is systematically 
greater, meaning that a constant rate of growth model fails to describe history. Actual 
growth is greater than the model describes. But some other more complex growth model 
might still interact with random error to generate a different growth path. 
Danos and Eichenseher (1982) suggest that the survival of suppliers in a market is 
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primarily a function of firm size. They base their theory on Stigler's50 survivorship 
approach to the detection of economies of scale. They determine if audit firm size and 
industry specialization in regulated industries (as regulatory requirements 5 1 may create 
scale economies in audit production) are related to maintaining market share. 
They examined a sample of 1229 client firms in 33 industry categories at the beginning 
and end of a seven year period (1972 - 1979) using ANOVA.5 2 The square root of the 
asset size of the client divided by the sum of the square roots of all client firms was 
used to determine the market share of the auditor in each industry. A four-firm 
concentration ratio was calculated for each industry. 
They report that economies of scale in the production of audits, and overall, non-
industry-specific scale effects in the production of audit services, existed. CPA firms 
involved in regulated client industries maintained market share over time, while CPA 
firms with very large market shares in non-regulated client industries experienced a 
decline of their market shares over time. 
"Changes in CPA firm market share were dependent on audit firm intra industry 
MStigler, G.J. (1958, October). The economies of scale. Journal of Law and Economics, p. 54-71. 
The 'Survivor' principle suggests that the existence of supplier economies of scale imply an optimal firm size 
in a competitive market. The profit maximizing firm will produce at the level of minimum long-run average 
cost, avoid incurring losses and tend to survive. 
5
'Carpenter and Strawser (1971) stated that management looked to regulatory expertise in the choice 
of an auditor. 
5 2
 They used a binary variable for regulated or non-regulated industries. 
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market shares, overall market shares and the regulatory nature of the client 
industry" (1982, p. 615). 
Danos and Eichenseher found scale effects favoured large CPA firms, even if the 
auditor had a low market share in an industry. They suggest that clients may wish to 
engage auditors who do not deal with their competitors.53 An alternative explanation, is 
risk mitigation by auditors.5 4 
Danos and Eichenseher (1986) examined the issue of auditor switching and regulated 
and non-regulated industries. They report that competition among the Big Eight is 
increasing for non-regulated firms. I provide Canadian evidence supporting this theory 
in Chapter 6, under Specialization. 
Taken together, the concentration studies demonstrate that there is high concentration in 
the audit market in the United States. Despite this fact, the market is considered to be 
competitive because there is little evidence of market power accruing to any or several 
auditors. The only evidence of market power seems to be for auditors in regulated 
industries, which may be due to the auditor's expertise (and sunk costs) in regulatory 
and filing requirements. 
"My thesis examines this issue using the auditor-client ratio. 
"This theory is attributed to Simunic in Lindsay (1989). The theory suggests that auditors may want 
to lower their risk by dispersing their contracts over several industries, rather than holding all the audits in an 
industry. 
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"This study was not available for inspection, despite numerous attempts to find an available copy. 
From my search, I found only two copies in existence, both of which were inaccessible. The purchase cost of 
the study exceeded $1500.00, which I declined to commit to. All the information contained herein is from 
news clippings, which were probably generated from news releases from the publisher. (The Bottom Line, July 
1992; Certified Accountant) 
MERGER STUDIES 
After the merger activity which turned the Big Eight into the Big Six, three published 
studies examined the effects or possible effects of these mergers. Two were based on U.S. 
data and one examined the effects in the European Union. 
The European Union wished to determine if the 'Big Six' acted as a cartel. In Belgium, 
Italy, and the Netherlands, the Big Six audit almost 100% of the top 200 firms. High 
concentration was also found in other EU member countries55. 
The EU study found little uniformity in audit fees from country to country, which 
implied collusion was not likely. The researchers suggested that although the Big Six 
dominated the European market for audit services that the group did not form a cartel. 
More than half of the clients reported that over 80% of their spending on other services 
went to their incumbent auditor. The Big Six used management consulting and tax 
advice services (MAS) to replacing falling incomes from audit and accounting fees. 
Audit firms were relying heavily on their audit clients for non-audit income. (Big Six, 
1992) 
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Although the EU study apparently ruled out a cartel, the authors made suggestions that 
the Big Six may have other opportunities to gain an unfair advantage. The first is the 
possible lack of independence, as reported in the previous paragraph. The second is 
what the clippings called a barrier to entry, where the Big Six impede entrance of 
middle size accounting firms to lucrative consulting business. This should not be 
considered a barrier to entry if the advantage is obtained through developing expertise 
and having the size and ability to service the client. Rather, it is a competitive 
advantage generated by earlier investment. 
Several other researchers have used concentration as a means of examining the changing 
audit market. It is often noted in concentration literature that the choice variable 
employed to calculate the market share has an effect on the findings. Tomczyk and Read 
(1989) found that total revenues produced lower market share ratios than using fees or fee 
proxies. Unfortunately, the product mix of audit firms cannot be assumed to be constant 
(over time or among firms), although for the majority of firms it is. 5 5 Therefore, using 
total revenues as a measure of market share ignores many of the issues associated with 
market share and market power. Although these authors suggest that a broadly based 
concentration measure based only on audit firms' revenues may "be of interest to policy 
makers" (p. 105), I suggest that very little is gleaned about the audit and accounting 
industry from these measures. 
^Tlie Bottom Line provides product mix breakdowns based on revenue. This information is released 
by the firms, and is not required. In recent years, the majority of large auditors have not revealed this 
information. 
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Wootton, Tonge and Wolk (1994) examined issues raised by the auditor merger activity 
in the United States.57 They examined the effects of the mergers on the concentration 
of companies listed on either the NYSE, AMEX and OTC. Concentration ratios and 
Herfindahl indices were calculated based on number of companies audited, the square 
root of client revenues58 and 'audit fees' (which are simply the auditor revenues using 
the same method as Tomczyk and Read). 5 9 
Wootton, Tonge and Wolk report that Ernst & Young's merger gave the firm a slight 
increase in market share, from a pre-merger combined market share of 18.4% to a post-
merger market share of 18.9% (based on number of audits). Its market share based on 
(audit) firm revenues decreased from 22.7% to 21.2%. On the other hand, the merger 
of Deloitte & Touche caused a decrease in market share based on number of audits 
(15.9% to 15.3%) or client revenues (16.4% to 15.9%), but an increased market share 
based on (audit) firm revenues (19.4% to 19.6%). 
These researchers reported the new firms have increased their standing among the 
major audit firms, while the industry appears to be better balanced among the players as 
the market share has evened out. No concentration measures based on industries were 
"Copley (1993) examined the potential effects of the mergers on municipal audits. He examines the 
availability of auditors in several cities in the United States. 
58The square root of client revenues was used to reduce bias imposed by large clients. 
'The data consisted of 3,962 companies for fiscal year end 1988 and 5,777 companies for fiscal year 
end 1991. 
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reported. 
To round out the background before I present my methods and results, I remain on the 
topic of merger in the next chapter and present issues specific to merger analysis. The 
Guidlines establish a framework upon which I build up a picture of the relevant market to 
determine if market power is present in the face of high concentration. 
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CHAPTER 4: MERGER ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES 
PART 1: Merger Definition 
Section 91 of the Competition Act defines a merger as: 
"...the acquisition or establishment, direct or indirect, by one or more persons, 
whether by purchase or lease of shares or assets, by amalgamation or by 
combination or other-wise of control over or significant interest in the whole or a 
part of a business of a competitor, supplier, customer or other person. " 
'Control' is defined in section 2(4) of the Act, and confines its interpretation to the 
owner's ability to appoint or elect directors by holding at least 50 percent of the voting 
shares. The Act does not define 'significant interest.' The Bureau of Competition 
Policy60 takes the position that significant interest is held "when one or more persons 
have the ability to materially influence the economic behaviour61 of that business or a part 
of that business" (Director, 1991, p. 1). 
The definition of 'significant interest' is important to the application of the Competition 
Act. If a transaction between two (or more) parties does not fall under the scope of 
section 91, it is "not subject to merger provisions of the Act" (Director, p. i). 
There is little question that the transactions between Thorne Riddell and Peat, Marwick, 
Mitchell, and of Deloitte, Haskins, Sells and Touche Ross, to create Peat Marwick 
"Bureau of Competition Policy, Consumer and Corporate Affairs. 
6 1
 Economic behaviour refers to decisions relating to the firm, such as production, distribution, 
investment, acquisitions or sales.) 
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"Mergers are classified as either horizontal, vertical or conglomerate. Horizontal 
mergers are those between firms servicing the same market. Vertical mergers are 
those between firms which handle the same good at different stages in the 
production process; an example would be a merger between a forestry company 
and a lumberyard. Conglomerate mergers are those between companies whose 
product lines are not related. A merger between two large corporations with many 
product lines may have elements of all three kinds of merger" (Jackson & 
Poschmann, 1989, p. 4 ) . 
The mergers in question are horizontal.63 6 4 For the purposes of my thesis, I assume that 
the firms serviced the same market. In addition, I assume they provided the same services 
at the same stages of production, and that they had similar product lines. (For clarity, I 
will term the market under review the 'audit market.') 
I am careful to admit the shortcomings of these assumptions. Throughout the next 
section, Part 2,1 discuss these assumptions and the market definition in depth. I also 
provide evidence in Chapter 6 that supports these assumptions. 
6 2
 Each was reviewed by the Bureau as a merger. The parties negotiated the merger. The worldwide 
affiliates proceeded with merger activity, prompting the Canadian structural changes. In addition, the media 
reported the high volume of merger activity in this industry. 
"There is no reason to believe that the mergers under question would be considered vertical. This 
is not to rule out the possibility of such mergers in the future. 
"Section 91 covers all three types of mergers. 
Thome and Deloitte Touche respectively, constituted mergers.62 
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MThe use of'firms', in the plural, is not in error. The facilitation of collusion is an important aspect 
of merger policy. (Collusion is an agreement [tacitly or otherwise] between firms to co-operate to their mutual 
benefit.) Historically, the emphasis was on the dominant firm. (Hovenkamp, 1991) 
"The difficulties of price analysis in the accounting industry are numerous. Chapter 3 discusses these 
in more detail. 
PART 2: The Anticompetitive Threshold 
The Competition Tribunal under section 92(1) of the Competition Act, may make an 
order in respect of a merger where it finds "the merger prevents or lessens, or is likely to 
prevent or lessen, competition substantially." (Director, p.3, emphasis added) 
The ability to prevent or lessen competition is tied to the ability to exercise market power 
-either on one's own, or with others. Therefore, the merger that comes under question is 
the one that provides the merging firms more market power. 
Market power is the ability of firms65 to influence profitably any one or several aspects of 
business such as quality, service, variety, advertising, innovation, price, or other 
dimensions of competition (Director, 1991). Yet, the focus of any investigation is 
generally only on the price dimension of competition. Market power is considered to be 
established if the selling price would be five percent higher in a relevant market for a 
sustained period, if the merger were to proceed.66 
I think even under the simplest of situations the measurement of market power is fraught 
with difficulties. Numerous problems arise with assumptions and conceptual definitions. 
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"Brenner (1991) proposes (based on historical data) that the interpretation of market power, and what 
is too much market power, has the ability to interfere with innovation and progress. He sites cases of 
detrimental application of anti-trust laws in the United States to firms that had significant market power 
because of technological development. 
Stigler states that market definition "has remained an undeveloped area of economic 
research at either the theoretical or empirical level" (1982). 
Hovenkamp (1991) addresses the problems inherent in defining market power, measuring 
it, and applying the concept to real world situations to make judgements. He asks three 
questions that poignantly outline the issue: "What is market power? When is market 
power excessive? How should market power be measured?" (p. 43). 
The Merger Enforcement Guidelines answer the first question: Market power is the 
ability of firms to profitably influence any one or several aspects of business.67 The 
difficulty arises from the interpretation and application of the definition. 
"The policy maker must make some kind of assessment about how much market 
power is too much. Importantly, not only is there no objective answer to that 
question, but there is ample reason for thinking that the socially undesirable 
amount varies from one industry to another. In....industries subject to substantial 
scale economies we might wish to tolerate considerably more market power..." 
(Hovenkamp, p.45). 
"Market power is excessive when it is not worth its costs" (Hovenkamp, p.45). 
I quote the above statements to make several points about the difficulties market power 
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assessment creates. Important considerations regarding the business environment are 
part and parcel of the assessment. But identifying what is socially desirable is more a 
question of politics than of economics. The involvement of government regulators, and, 
in the case of accounting, the professional bodies also impact market power. 
If a country has several large influential firms controlling an industry (in other words 
exercising market power) there is potential for the misuse of influence. Large accounting 
firms have been accused of using their influence to direct the change in standard setting 
and to obtain unfair advantage in other policy matters. The Metcalf Committee (U.S. 
Senate, 1976) examined the high concentration of the Big Eight68 and alleged this group 
of firms had market power. 6 9 
In the analysis of market power for merger cases, a considerable amount of emphasis has 
been placed on the Concentration Doctrine. This tenet asserts that the market share of a 
few leading firms is a significant measure of their market power. Empirical work by Bain 
(1951) and others claimed the evidence bore out the link between market share and 
market power. 
According to the Concentration Doctrine, when a small number of leading firms together 
M
 The 'Big Eight' is commonly been used to name the largest accounting partnerships in the United 
States. The term now has worldwide implications. 
6 9
 The Metcalf Committee relied solely on concentration data to determine that the accounting 
industry and profession were monopolized by the Big Eight. 
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''"The Report of the Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration (1978), restrains the use of the 
Concentration Doctrine, suggesting concentration is a necessary but not sufficient condition for anticompetitive 
acts in the market. The Report stresses the importance of market power, and reject the structural approach by 
stating, "In oligopolistic industries, however, the link between conduct or behavior and structure is no longer 
determinant The essential difference among firms in monopolistic, oligopolistic and competitive industries 
is the discretion they have to behave anticompetitively. This varies with the degree of their market power." 
"Demsetz (1974) is credited with this hypothesis. 
has a high market share of a well defined market, the industry is necessarily oligopolistic 
(possibly monopolistic) and likely inefficient. 
The allegations made by the Metcalf Committee, supported by evidence of high 
concentration and argued from the perspective of the Concentration Doctrine, suggested 
that audit firm concentration lead to high prices and abnormal profits in the industry.70 
By contrast, Eckbo (1990) observes that even if the correlation between industry 
concentration and industry profits is found to be positive, as it was by the Metcalf report, 
it fails to discriminate between the Concentration Doctrine and a competing hypothesis. 
This competing hypothesis according to Eckbo is that larger firms increase their market 
share because they are more efficient.71 Schmalensee (1987) reminds us of the 
consensus view that horizontal mergers have only a small probability of raising prices 
and that many have positive efficiencies. 
"High levels of concentration may be necessary for effective collusion but the 
empirical literature suggest that high concentration is certainly not sufficient" 
(P-43). 
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Many economists have rejected the Concentration Doctrine on several grounds. The role 
of entry-barriers72 to the Doctrine has eroded.73 Traditionally, sunk costs and size were 
considered barriers to new entrants, and were considered to exist in the accounting 
industry. Meanwhile, current thinking suggests that in the accounting industry, the ability 
of suppliers to move into new market segments is generally not impeded, and neither is 
the ability of buyers to switch to other similar products. Moreover, large initial 
investments to establish a reputation for quality are not a barrier to entry 
(VonWeizsacker, 1980). They are a social mechanism for ensuring the supply of quality. 
These considerations magnify the complexity in the process of identifying the relevant 
market. 
Considerations regarding the competitive threshold include the ability of a merger to 
lessen competition. This includes the ability of the new firm to raise prices unilaterally or 
to influence an increase in price. More commonly, a group of firms acts jointly to exploit 
shared market power. Of relevance to the accounting industry is the possibility of 
shirking to go unnoticed. An audit firm could use a non-price aspect of the audit 
relationship to shirk and therefore gain rent at the expense of his partners in collusion.74 
72Entry-barriers are factors which place new entrants to a disadvantage as compared to established 
firms within the industry. A more detailed discussion of the role of entry barriers is in Chapter 6. 
"The Contestability School (Baumol, Panzar, and Willig, 1982) argue that entry barriers are rare. The 
usefulness of the contestable market theory to this analysis is limited, as accounting services are 
characteristically long term investments in people and reputation. A more detailed discussion of the role of 
entry barriers in the accounting industry follows. 
"Economic rent is a payment to a factor in excess of what is necessary to keep it to its present 
employment. In this example, the accounting firm is using fewer inputs, therefore incurring lower costs. At 
(continued...) 
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''(...continued) 
the same time the firm's fee is constant. The increase in profit is rent, as the lower costs have provided the firm 
with excess payment. 
"The introduction of Chapter 3 discusses this issue. 
7eLowballing (using a lower than cost fee to attract a new client) in the industry is rampant 
(DeAngelo, 1982), and is considered a competitive reaction to obtain new clients. 
Or, the audit firm could shirk on the quality of the service, reducing its costs. The nature 
of the service good allows for changes in quality to happen undetected. Therefore, if 
collusion occurred, secret price cutting should be rampant (Stigler, 1964). The lack of 
transparency in prices (with no required disclosure on audit fees), in addition to the 
difficulty in defining and assessing the quality aspects of the audit good,75 reduces the 
probability that a group of firms in the industry will collude on price.7 6 Further, 
Stigler suggests that generally, "the price cut will often take the indirect form of 
modifying some non-price dimension of the transaction." Some researchers have 
identified lack of independence as a possible by-product of the production of other 
services by auditors. 
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The Metcalfe Committee, as did others, suggested that accounting firms may have 
substantial market power in specific industry segments. Of course, merger activity may 
assist this progression by concentrating more power into fewer hands. Furthermore, 
some have suggested that auditors may use other services to flex their muscle. For 
example, 
"When consumers value two somewhat related products or services differently, 
such as audit and managerial advisory services, but where these values are 
positively correlated with one another, the strategic bundling of the two services 
can have anti-competitive effects. If large, oligopolistic accounting firms tie their 
auditing services to their managerial advisory services, they can price the bundle 
at a relatively high price and sell only to those consumers who place a high value 
on both services. Smaller, more competitively organized auditing firms are then 
left to split the remaining market, which is highly populated with consumers who 
place little value on their services. This market separation technique may very 
well lead some firms to leave the market or possibly bar entry to potential auditing 
firms" (Shaw, 1991, p. 15). 
Thus by exploiting the cross-price elasticities of two services, a producer can earn greater 
profit from bundling than from pricing and selling them separately. However, I have not 
found any studies that support this anti-competitive view of the audit market. Nor does 
the evidence presented in my thesis support this view. 
However, definitive conclusions about competition in auditing are risky because a 
suitable test of effective competition is difficult to construct from so intangible a service, 
the price of which is unknown, and the limits of the market are changing and difficult to 
LESSENING OR PREVENTING COMPETITION 
Merger can lessen or prevent competition when a competitor is removed from the market. 
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Part 3: Market Definition 
pin down. The following chapter explores more of the unavoidable difficulties 
encountered in assessing the competitive status of audit markets. 
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Nevertheless, the first stage of any merger analysis is to establish whether the proposed 
merger falls within a safe harbour. A safe harbour refers to the market shares and 
concentration levels under which a merger is presumed to be free of anti-competitive 
effects. In short, a merger receives little attention if it is within the structural boundaries 
defined in the Guidelines, which in turn depend on the definition of the relevant market. 
The safe harbours are defined as a post-merger market share under 35% and an industry 
concentration level under 65%. 
Market power refers to the ability of firms to profitably influence price, quality, or other dimensions of 
competition. 
Part 3: Market Definition 
THE UNIQUE DIFFICULTIES IN DETERMINING THE RELEVANT MARKET FOR ACCOUNTING 
SERVICES 
The specification of the relevant market (in product and geographic dimensions) is 
pivotal to the adjudication and outcome of the merger analysis. Though boundaries 
between businesses and industries are necessarily vague, the initial stage of merger 
assessment is largely based on straightforward measures of market share and 
concentration which have no meaning without a prior market definition. The Director's 
Merger Guidelines are clear that a determination to oppose a merger cannot be based on 
structural measures alone. 
"In merger analysis, relevant markets are defined by reference to actual and 
potential sources of competition that constrain the exercise of market power7 7" 
(Director, 1991, p. 7). 
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In Sections 92 and 93 of the Competition Act, the framework is laid out by which a 
merger (or proposed merger) ought to be examined. The key concept is about the 
definition of a relevant market. The relevant market is the smallest geographic area and 
smallest group of products7 8 for which sellers, together, could profitably impose and 
sustain a significant price increase. The market under review is defined by examining 
the product and geographic dimensions of the good under question. The focus for market 
definition therefore is on the industry and not on the merging parties. The conceptual 
approach applied to market definition is typically called the "hypothetical monopolist" 
approach. The Bureau expands the number of firms to the point where if acting in unison 
the group would be able to sustain a 5 percent price increase for at least one year. 
Therefore a "bright line" for the purpose of defining a distinct market is a 'substantial' 
increase in prices expected to last at least one year. 
After the market has been defined, it is in principle straightforward to define the market 
shares of each of the participants and to calculate the several structural measures -
industry concentration both pre and post merger, and the market shares of the merging 
firms, pre and post merger. 
The principle is relatively easy to apply in the analysis of a durable good market. The 
price of inputs would be well known and the price of the output generally transparent to 
the market or at least known to knowledgeable buyers. With respect to a similar 
7 8
 Usually this definition is useful in the context of a single homogeneous product. 
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The availability of information in the public domain, or to experienced buyers is discussed in this 
chapter, under 'Transparency', 
analysis for a service like accounting, useful data is difficult to find, or is unavailable. 
Service markets provide merger analysts with unique analytic problems, and the audit 
market is no exception. The nature of a service makes quantity and quality assessment 
difficult. This in turn makes price determination difficult. The lack of information in the 
public domain on price and quantity impedes analysts79. It is impossible to determine 
precisely a unit of audit service. For example in the case of audits, the wide variety of 
clients makes generalisations and assumptions regarding a unit of an audit problematic. 
One of the primary problems in analysing a service good is the inability to judge its 
quality and hence determine what its price should be. Nelson (1970) concluded that 
information about a good has an influence on the price of the good. He classified two 
groups of product attributes based on how consumers learned about them. Search 
attributes are those that are experienced prior to the purchase. Observation, or a priori 
testing allows the consumer to ascertain the quality and attributes of the product prior to 
purchase. Experience attributes are those that only can be experienced after the purchase. 
After purchase, the evaluation of the good may be instantaneous, or over a period of time 
as with durable goods. A consumer's opinion of the good is created by experience. 
In a later article, Darby and Kami (1973) extended the group of product attributes to 
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Nagel (1984) states: 
"The importance of these classifications lies in their relationship to the cost of 
consumer information acquisition. Information about price itself can be obtained 
directly for all types of products. But as one moves from the search to the 
experience and on to the credence category, information about brands' 
differentiating attributes becomes more costly. The greater the cost of information, 
the less of it people try to obtain. Consequently, other things equal, consumers 
should choose to inform themselves about the differentiating characteristics of 
fewer brands, and inform themselves less completely, in categories with high 
costs of collecting such information." (p . S-4 ) 
Information is expensive, but increasingly so for goods --or services- that have credence 
qualities.80 Therefore, fewer firms may exist in the market, because users face high costs 
and are unable to obtain information which in turn raises the costs to the firm of 
establishing brand name and maintaining reputation81. As a consequence market 
concentration82 may be higher in industries characterised by credence attributes. 
80In fact the industry may have only asymmetrical information. Information may be impossible to get. 
8
"The high costs of acquiring and maintaining reputation, is considered a 'barrier to entry' by some 
economists. Some industrial organization economists suggested that the costs involved with establishing 
and keeping a firm's reputation (ie. knowledge of business, advertising) impeded other firms from entering 
the market. Most economists now agree that investments and sunk costs in reputation are the costs of 
doing business, and should not be viewed as a mechanism of keeping competitors out of a market. 
^Concentration is defined earlier in the introduction. 
include credence attributes. Credence attributes belong to those goods whose quality 
cannot be evaluated even after repeated purchases. Many goods in this category are in the 
service sector, and require specialized knowledge, training and possibly accreditation to 
provide, let alone assess. Goods with credence attributes include car repairs, medical 
services, accounting services and audits. 
Additionally, according to Nelson, the price sensitivity of the consumer is dampened by 
the lack of information available. It is more difficult for the buyer to make an accurate 
assessment about price, so its use as a determining factor in product choice is lessened. 
Nelson analysed the markets for search and experience goods and found that experience 
good markets are significantly more concentrated than search good markets.83 If this 
analysis were extended to credence good markets like accounting services, one expects a 
similar finding. 
In many service industries the quality of the product is not observable84. Accounting 
services are no different, although there is physical proof of an audit engagement as 
evidenced by the auditor's report, or of a report from a management consultant. The 
quality of those services is inferred from other factors, namely; credibility (which often is 
proxied by the brand name of the audit firm), specialized training which would include 
the accounting designations (and possibly professional development), peer review, firm 
size, firm experience in the industry, and the number of audits to represent learning 
effects. Any or all of these 'other' factors may be important to the client85. 
Nelson initially used experience and search goods as categories, rather than attributes. See Nelson 
(1978, 1980) for this change. 
8 4This issue is discussed by Dopuch and Simunic (1980). 
"This appears to be evidenced by the lack of switching encountered in the Canadian market in 
regulated industries, which I provide evidence for in the section on Specialization, under the subheading 
Regulated and Non-Regulated Industries. Danos and Eichenseher (1982) provide evidence for this in the U.S. 
audit market. 
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Information asymmetry is a divergence from perfect information -an assumption in perfect competition 
models. In this industry, the asymmetry is the lack of information on the buyer side and the more complete 
information available to the supplier. 
8 7
 A search cost is the cost attributed to finding information. 
Another consequence of the high costs of information and information asymmetry86, is 
the use of brand names and reputation as a proxy for quality. As a consumer, it makes 
little sense to attempt to obtain information at high cost when these other signals are able 
to convey information at a lower search cost8 7. Because of the high costs of information 
in a service industry (such as accounting) it would likely be concentrated, have 
differentiated products and brand names would be an important commercial advantage. 
Buyers of credence goods have problems evaluating the quality and quantity of the 
service provided and therefore also determining whether the fee charged is reasonably 
related to the cost of the service. The buyer of the service is always uncertain about 
whether a lower fee represents lower costs of delivery or instead lower service quality. 
Therefore, if an audit firm offers to undercut an incumbent, the buyer is forced to assess 
the offer in terms of the potential reduction in quality. As quality is not transparent, 
especially for a new (untested) auditor, it follows that switching will be resisted. As is 
well known in economics, when quality is measured by price, a market equilibrium may 
not exist (Diamond, 1987). In short, demand may respond upwards to a price increase in 
the possibly mistaken belief that the price increase reflects higher service quality. 
Therefore, price provides little information to the buyer. 
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Zeff and Fossum (1967) used audit information in their seminal paper on the concentration of large U.S. 
public accounting firms. The Metcalf Committee (U.S. Senate, 1977) alleged large accounting firms 
impaired competition based on audit data. 
If the professional buyer of the service faces these dilemmas, the problem for the merger 
analyst is surely magnified. The merger analysts will find it difficult to apply a 
manufacturing product market definition to structure the analysis of a merger among 
accounting firms. Among the problems the analyst will face is how much of the 
accounting firms' activities should be included within the definition of the product 
market. Modem accounting firms are multi-product service suppliers. 
Unfortunately, there is little additional information available in Canada about any of the 
accounting services other than for audits. Even the information on audits is meager. Yet, 
using information about audit services has become the means by which the bundle of 
accounting service is typically assessed.88 
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89Bruton (1989) provides evidence that large accounting firms constitute a separate market, whereas 
Zind and Zeghal (1989) suggest that these firms operate in a separate sub-market. I think that the difference 
between the use of 'market' by Bruton and of Zind and Zeghal's use of 'sub-market' may be a matter of 
semantics. 
T o reiterate, the square root of the assets of the client firm is a linear proxy for the audit fee (Korpi 
and Elliot, 1979). 
THE PRODUCT DEFINITION 
I define the product market to be comprised of all accounting service firms listed under 
SIC 773 8 9 . At the initial level, I include all the revenues and expenses of the firm 
regardless of the type of service provided. I separate auditing by basing market share on 
the quantity of audit services measured by the square root of the assets of the audited 
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This group contained SIC categories 60,61,62, and 63. 
CHAPTERS: METHODS 
In this chapter I describe the data, present the methodology, and refer the reader to the 
more detailed tables in the appendices. I have broken the methodology into seven 
sections to better manage the large volume of data. They are: Concentration, Number of 
Industry Categories Auditor Participates In, Auditor-Client Ratios, Parental Influence on 
Subsidiary Auditor Choice, Switching, Distribution of Audits based on Location of Client 
Firm Headquarters (by Province), Big Six Bank Auditor Concentration. 
The data was collected from several sources for several years. Documentation comes 
from three databases: The Globe and Mail's ranking of top 500 Non-Financial and top 
1009 1 Financial firms, by total assets, for 1987 and 1992; Special private data runs 
provided by Statistics Canada for SIC categories 773—Accounting and Bookkeeping 
Services, and 777-Management Consulting Services; and, data collected from The 
Bottom Line and The Financial Post 500. 
The list of the top 500 and 100 were obtained from the Globe and Mail Technical 
Services. This list included the name of the firm, the auditor, and the total assets. 
Using the annual reports of each of these 1200 companies and other background 
information, I added the following information: head office location, primary SIC 
(Standard Industry Classification) number, and the parent or subsidiary(ies) of the firm. 
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I then entered the information on a spreadsheet (Quattro Pro 6.0). 
CONCENTRATION DATA 
The data were arranged by auditor to determine how many audits were performed by 
each auditor. Using the number of audits each auditor performed, divided by the 
number of audits performed within each sample group (ie. the top 500 for 1987, the 
top 500 for 1992, the top 100 financial for 1987, the top 100 financial for 1992), 
percentages of audits performed by each auditor were calculated.92 
Similarly, using the square root of the total assets for each client firm93 another 
'percentage of audits performed' calculation was made. The sum of the square roots of 
assets for all the clients of each auditor was calculated within each sample group. 
These sums were divided by the total sum of square roots of assets for the whole 
sample group. This yielded a percentage of audit business based on probable audit 
revenue (Simunic, 1980) 
•"Some clients had two auditors. Two auditors are required by law for Schedule I banks. Other firms 
may have two auditor requirements imposed upon them by shareholders or other stakeholders in the company. 
In these cases, each audit firm was awarded one full audit. Therefore, although my samples are based on the 
top 500 and top 100 firms, the number of audits exceed the number of firms. 
9 JTo reiterate, Korpi and Elliot (1978) and Simunic (1980) determined that the square root of the size 
of the client firm was an accurate proxy for the audit price. 
These two percentage calculations (herein called market share), based on either the 
number of audits or on the square root of assets, were used to calculate concentration 
statistics. Thus, two concentration statistics were generated for each sample group. 
The CR4, is the percent of business conducted by the top four [audit] firms; the 
Herfindahl Index (HHI) indicates both the concentration and market share of firms in a 
market. 
The Herfindahl Index (HHI) is the sum of the percentage of market share squared, and in 
some cases is represented as the sum of market share (not in percentage form) squared. 
Either is acceptable, and my thesis uses the form that Eichenseher and Danos (1981) 
used, where 0<HHI>1. 
The results are reported in the next chapter under Concentration. Appendix 2 presents 
detailed tables of the results. 
NUMBER OF INDUSTRY CATEGORIES EACH AUDIT FIRM PARTICIPATES IN 
Using the industry information, a simple count was made of how many industry 
categories each audit firm participates in by performing an audit. In the case of merged 
firms (Thome and PMM to PMT; DHS and TR to DT), or name changes (CG to EY), or 
affiliations (SB to SBDT), the information for these changed entities is contained on the 
same row for ease of comparison. This information comes from the top 500 samples, and 
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the maximum number of categories is 41. 
The results are reported under Specialzation in the next chapter. Appendix 6 and Table 
14 present these results in table form. 
AUDITOR-CLIENT RATIOS 
The ratio of the number of auditors to clients (or more specifically audits) was 
calculated for each industry category. In simple terms, the number of auditors was 
divided by the total number of audits in each SIC category. This is a new measure 
created for this analysis. 9 4 
A t-test was performed to determine if there was a significant difference between the 
mean of the 1987 ratios and the 1992 ratios. 
The results of this analysis is presented in the next chapter under Auditor-Client ratio. 
Graph 11 presents the data ordered from smallest to largest value for each year. 
Appendix 7 presents a table of the results. 
*If the ratio is equal to one, there is a different auditor for each audit. As the ratio approaches zero, 
either one auditor audits all (or most) or the clients, or there are few clients. The ratio catches dynamics of 
auditor specialization that both the CR4 and HHI miss. The ratio ignores client firm size, as do the 
concentration statistics based on the number of audits (as opposed to the square root of total assets data). The 
ratio is a complimentary measure to the concentration statistics as it indicates how many auditors are involved 
in a industry compared to the number of clients. The ratio is especially helpful in industry categories in which 
there are only a small number of client firms. Instead of focussing on the auditors, this ratio shifts some 
attention to the dynamics of the clients and the industry they participate in. 
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PARENT-SUBSIDIARY FIRM RELATIONSHIPS(1992) & COMPARISONS TO WHOLE DATA SET 
Using the annual reports of the top 500 non-financial firms for 1992,95 both parent and 
subsidiary firms of the firms in my sample were recorded. All subsidiary firms were 
pulled out of the data, and concentration (HHI) statistics were calculated and compared 
to the originals using a t-test. 
Although most of the parent-subsidiary groups were domestic, some Canadian firms 
had internationally based parents. In these cases, the Canadian subsidiary was pulled 
out of my database. 
The subsidiaries were pulled out of the database regardless of which auditor they used. 
A simple calculation of how many parent-subsidiary groups used the same auditor was 
also performed. 
The parent - subsidiary relationships of the client firms were based on ownership, and 
was for the most part easy to determine. Investment in a firm by pension groups and 
investment firms, did not constitute parental status.96 The subsidiaries were pulled 
from the data set, and the concentration statistics were performed on this subset of the 
9 5The 1987 data additional data sources were not sufficiently reliable for this part of the study. 
Therefore I performed the parental concentration only on the 1992 data. 
"Although this influence does beg an interesting question, as to the influence of money and pension 
managers over auditor choice. Studies have examined the influence of bankers and lenders in the auditor 
choice. 
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original data. A t-test was performed to detemine if these two sample means were 
significantly different. 
The results are reported in the next section under Parent Influence on Audit Firm Choice. 
Appendix 8 presents tables of the results. 
SWITCHING BETWEEN 1 9 8 7 & 1 9 9 2 
The data were prepared in the following manner. A list of the firms that appeared in both 
samples was compiled by visually comparing both lists. The firms were then categorized 
by auditor for the 1 9 8 7 year. This created a lists of clients for each auditor. The client's 
1 9 9 2 auditor was then written down beside the client. Totals for retained auditor, and 
new (switched) auditor were then calculated. 
The merged firms were treated as the same firm from 1 9 8 7 to 1 9 9 2 . Therefore, a change 
in auditor because of merger was not considered a switch and the data is 'controlled for' 
merger activity. For simplicity, the 1 9 9 2 auditor name is used rather than the 1 9 8 7 pre­
merger names in the tables below. 
The data does not reflect any changes made in the years between the two samples. It only 
examines the client's auditor in the year 1 9 8 7 and in the year 1 9 9 2 , and determines if 
the client uses the same auditor in both, or if the client uses different auditors for each 
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year. 
In addition, only the Top 500 samples were used in the preparation of this data. 
Switching is mandatory for banks, therefore findings in the top 100 financial firm sample 
may be due to regulatory and not other factors. 
Using four measures of concentration97 in each of 41 non-financial industries in 1987 and 
1992,1 found no significant difference in the means in the two years of data in three out 
of four cases. 
The section Switching in the next chapter presents the results. Appendix 10 presents the 
results of this section in tablular form. 
The industries were categorized into regulated and non-regulated industries. Appendix 13 
lists these categorizations. The number of switches in regulated industries was compared 
to non-regulated industries. The results are reported in the next chapter under Switching. 
"The measures of concentration were the top four firms and the Herfindahl Index, calculated using 
two different measures of market share-the number of audits and the square root of assets of the client firms. 
Thus there are four measures of concentration. A fuller explanation of the concentration measures, and the 
market share measures follow. 
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BIG SIX BANKS' AUDITOR CONCENTRATION 
The Bank Act Requires Schedule I Banks to retain two auditors each year, and substitute 
in a third auditor periodically. Therefore, the 'Big Six' banks retain 12 auditors yearly. 
This data represents the concentration of the auditors of Canada's largest banks, based on 
number of audits only. The percentage of audits is calculated by dividing the number of 
audits the auditor has by 12 (the total number of audits in the sector). 
The 'Effect of Merger' table compares the 1987 and 1992 data. The 1987 data uses the 
sum of the merging firm's audits. In other words, the number of audits Thorne and PMM 
performed in 1987 are added up and listed under PMT in 1987. The sum could be 
considered a potential merger result. The sum is compared to the number of audits in 
1992. 
The results are reported in the section Specialization in the next chapter. Appendix 11 
reports this result in tabular form. 
DISTRIBUTION OF AUDITS BASED ON LOCATION OF CLIENT FIRM HEADQUARTERS (BY 
PROVINCE) 
The number of audits each auditor performed in each province based on the client 
headquarters was noted. The percentage of audits performed by each auditor in each 
province was calculated by dividing the number of audits per auditor by the total number 
of audits in the province. 
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CHAPTER 6: MARKET CHARACTERISTICS 
Recall to this point that I have been discussing the general issues and considerations in 
defining a market for competition analysis and then the difficulties experienced by the 
analyst in examining services and more specifically the audit services market. 
Most economists agree that concentration increases the potential for cartelization by a 
group of leading firms. Yet they have rejected the simplistic notion that market power 
can be easily inferred from the level of concentration, the definition of the market and its 
size, and the existence of entry barriers. A broader analysis which evaluates various 
characteristics of the market is necessary for making a fair assessment. 
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TABLE 4 
Average Client Firm Size In My Sample 
1987-Non-financial Client Firms $ 842,397,963.4 
1992-Non-financial Client Firms $ 1,166,187,350.8 
1987 Financial Client Firms $ 9,357,777,705.5 
1992 Financial Client Firms $ 14,024,636,403.5 
BUYER CHARACTERISTICS 
CLIENT SIZE 
As discussed previously, the two group classification scheme of Big-Eight/ Six non-Big 
Eight/Six has been used extensively in tests of product differentiation. This scheme is 
justified on the basis of the large size difference between the largest Big Eight/Six firm 
and the largest non-Big Eight/Six firm. In fact Simunic and Stein (1987) hypothesize 
that, 
"The probability of a company using a Big Eight auditor increases with the size, 
complexity, and geographic dispersion of the company's operations" (p. 28). 
I explore the characteristics of client firms —the buyer of the audit service— in this 
chapter. 
The client firms in my sample are primarily audited by Big Eight/Six firms. The size of 
the client firms used in my samples are reported in Table 4 below. 
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The average client firm size for each of the auditors is reported below and in Graph 2. 
The 1987 data is reported in Table 5 and the 1992 data is reported in Table 6. Even to the 
naked eye, it is obvious that the Big Six/Eight firms have larger clients. Using a t-test, I 
found that the Big Eight audit firms have significantly different (0.05%) clients than other 
audit firms (1987 data) based on client size in total assets. The same test is also 
significant (to 0.05%) for the Big Six audit firms as compared to other audit firms (1992 
data). 
So 
Average Audit Client Size 1987 &1992 
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ABBREVIATIONS: 
aa- Arthur Anderson 
dr - Doane Raymond 
ey - Ernst & Young 
dhs - Deloitte Haskins Sells 
dt - Deloitte & Touche 
thorne - Thorne Riddell 
cl - Coopers & Lybrand 
eg - Clarkson Gordon 
pw - Price Waterhouse 
tr - Touche Ross 
pmm - Peat MarwickMitchell 
pmt - Peat Marwick Thorne 
Table 5: 1987 Audit Firm's 
C l i e n t Avprnop Tntal A c o t c 
Auditor Average TA ($) 
aa 1055958777 
ay 503769466 
cl 415127602 
dr 346386274 
dhs 99751332 
cg/ey 857685975 
pmm 767292331 
pw 395071808 
thorne 659340400 
tr I667I33984 
be 61052977 
cb 320191333 
cfhc 256608000 
hh 7778464 
lailbert 54112000 
lc 71347000 
mbbr 533165000 
mn 126686666 
pkf 52832000 
pr 1285072666 
rcmp 661664681 
rptr 11212900C 
ruv 62421792 
sb 338080731 
zssl 115518000 
bhhhb 512070C 
dc 43631000 
ew 5795600C 
fn 6086800G 
gc 199048000 
gw 76376000 
lctr 127964000 
lh 146388848 
lhl& 100388412 
Iwga 48974261 
nh 66442559 
sc 7138416 
skrbg 4384700C 
we 4 7 3 8 4 8 6 6 * 
Table 6:1992 Audit Firm's Average 
P l i p i i t S i w (Rv T n t n l A«<rtri 
Auditor Average TA (S) 
aa 100700000C 
cl 534189572 
dr 441239785 
dt 238400000C 
ey 1198000000 
pmt 797587244 
pw 1748000000 
cbey 1063000000 
dfk 56616693 
dw 3760400 
hda 47855484 
hh 95673000 
llcl 5945100C 
mgrgr 147226787 
mm 479140000 
phpmt 795377000 
ptpmt 1338000000 
rcmp 327958803 
ruv 72714559 
sbdt 255805356 
ze 131619000 
zssl 45551618 
aud ab 184300000C 
bhp 103066000 
kd 5484500 
lhlc 124050458 
lilly John 5017600C 
mrr 3652800C 
pm 39290540 
sic 27825.100(1 
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SIZE AND ECONOMIES OF SCALE FOR BOTH CLIENTS A N D AUDIT FIRMS 
Recall that I examined the issues of size and economies of scale in the audit fee 
liturature review. Despite a few conflicting studies, the audit fee research generally 
suggests that there are economies of scale accruing to large audit firms. 
Scale economies in the production of audit services can be achieved in a number of 
areas. Arnett and Danos (1979) suggested that they could arise in recruiting 
employees, developing both general and specialized audit and accounting expertise, 
managing the CPA firm, marketing the firm's services, and providing for partners' 
retirement. The client's size and location or type of industry may allow large auditors 
to exploit economies of scale. Benston (1979) argued that the servicing of large, 
geographically dispersed clients provided economies of scale to large national audit 
firms. Eichenseher and Danos considered client industry-specific auditing and 
accounting experts and hypothesized greater scale effects in 'regulated' industries which 
I have also confirmed for Canada. 
Eichenseher and Danos, in the following quote, relate scale economies and 
specialization. This theory explains a finding (I report later in this chapter) that large 
auditors are not specialists but generalists. 
"Underlying many of these possible sources of scale economies to the CPA firm 
is the lack of 'complete' markets for expertise-related inputs to the audit 
process. That is, an audit firm is typically unable to acquire from outside 
sources the expertise needed to service merely one specialized client. Instead, it 
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hires individuals with the required expertise who are capable of servicing many 
such clients. Hence, the costs and/or institutional prohibitions surrounding 
subcontracting across CPA firms drives many of the potential scale effects in the 
external auditing environment. This factor alone suggests that relatively larger 
firms should experience lower expertise-related production costs. In effect, the 
indivisibility condition creates a critical mass threshold for firms, with firms 
operating below a certain level of production having higher operating costs than 
firms which are large enough to exceed that threshold" (Danos & Eichenseher, 
1982, p. 606). 
In the 1970's, considerable growth in Big Eight auditors prompted the AICPA to study 
the displacement of smaller firms by larger firms for audit services. The AICPA's 
Special Committee on Small and Medium Size firms suggested that smaller firms 
produce the same level of quality audit, and that consumers should be made aware of 
that point. DeAngelo (1981, Size) countered by stating that the AICPA Committee's 
findings assume incorrectly that consumers perceive audit quality to be independent of 
auditor size. I restate it is difficult to link quality and size. I suggest that size, related 
economies of scale and scope, and product differentiation are significant contributors to 
the dominance of Big Six/Eight firms in the market. 
"Structurally, the Big Eight firms are the dominant suppliers of audit services to 
large corporations, but the aggregate market share of these firms decreases 
significantly as the size of buyers decreases. This suggests that auditee-auditor 
pairing may be influenced by economies to auditor size" (Dopuch and Simunic, 
1980). 
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"Regulation has significant impacts on internal auditing. It has been suggested that the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA) in the U.S. caused the significant growth of dedicated internal auditing 
resources and salaries, as their growth was higher than the growth of the company. This growth was higher 
after the regulation (FCPA) went in place. The rate of internal audit salaries to external audit fees increased 
form 0.92 in 1974 to 1.24 in 1981. 
INTERNAL AUDITING 9 8 
If there is an increase in the demand for auditing, managers can be expected to make a 
trade-off between allocating resources to internal vs. external audit based on the relative 
importance of expertise about a company's operations, independence and cost. Wallace 
(1984) found that internal audit can replace and/or augment external audit, and 
therefore can reduce the overall cost of an audit. Chung and Lindsay found the internal 
audit to be a substitute for external audit, whereas Anderson and Zeghal found the 
relationship to be complimentary. 
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PARENT INFLUENCE ON AUDIT FIRM CHOICE 
The influence of the parent client firm on its subsidiaries' choice of auditor may be 
more significant than other factors, such as specialization. I wanted to ensure that this 
'parental influence' did not confound my results on concentration by industry category. 
I examined if parents and their subsidiaries (in the same or other industrial category), 
who were included in my sample, shared the same auditor. I extended this analysis to 
international parent firms, to determine if the influence extended across borders. 
Of the 125 parent-"subsidiary" pairs in the 1992 data, 97 pairs, or 77.6%, shared the 
same auditor. Virtually all international pairs shared the same auditor (only one 
exception). A t-test comparing the top 500's and the parent firm's industry concentrations 
(using the same 41 industry categories) was not significant to 0.05%. The details are 
reported in Appendix 8. 
The Canadian market has many large conglomerate firms that own a large number of 
subsidiaries. The influence of the parent firm on the subsidiary's auditor choice is an 
often made observation, but one not explored in the literature. The impact of parent 
auditor choice on subsidiary auditor choice exists, but proves to be not significant when 
comparing concentration statistics. 
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"Unqualified reports are those that the auditor confirms are acceptable under GAAP. (In Canada 
unqualified reports do not attest to the truthfulness of the information, only its compliance with GAAP.) 
Qualified 'subject to' and 'except for' reports note exceptions, and areas of departure from GAAP. In an 
adverse report, the auditor states that the financial statements do not provide fair representation. 
, 0 0The same auditing company name was used for all the reports, therefore it was not tested if there 
was any brand name or size preference for auditor engaged. 
""Rymer ranked the auditor's report in the following manner: unqualified, qualified "except for", 
qualified "subject to", disclaimer, adverse, review. 
How USERS APPLY INFORMATION 
Despite all the discussion of product differentiation, quality and liability, there is 
evidence that this information is not well used. Hicks (1982) studied the impact of 
various auditor reports on users (commercial loan officers) and found that there was no 
significant difference in lending behaviour. The loan amounts and interest rates (risk 
factor) appeared to be determined independently of the information that the auditor's 
report contained, as there was no correlation between the reliability of the report and 
the amount and interest rate of the loan. 
The lending officers perceived the reliability of unqualified, qualified "subject to", or 
qualified "except for", to be more reliable than statements accompanied by a review or 
adverse report9 9. Additionally, those financial statements accompanied by unqualified 
or qualified "subject to" were found to be significantly more reliable than statements 
without an auditor's report. Statements accompanied by an unqualified report were 
significantly more reliable than statements accompanied by a disclaimer.100 1 0 1 
Unfortunately, Hicks did not test for any brand name preferences. 
Shockley and Holt (1993) examined the ability of bank executives to discriminate among 
Big Eight auditors using several qualitative attributes102. They found that this group can 
systematically differentiate among Big Eight auditors using attributes. Because these 
executives are likely involved in the decision process of which auditor to contract, 
Shockley and Holt suggested their ability to discriminate among them may bear out in the 
contracting process. 
The issue of quality (product) differentitation within groups still eludes researchers. Even 
though users can discriminate between large auditors, this information does not impact 
creditor decision making. Taken together with Simunic and Stein's 1987 study of initial 
public offerings, it is reasonable to conclude that users of information may not pay 
attention to the particular auditor but sharply differentiate between Big Six and non-Big 
Six groups, and they [users] make decisions on that basis. 
, o :These attributes are: Prestigious, professional, expensive, competent, aggressive, conservative, 
independent, reliable, helpful, bureaucratic. 
LITIGATION 
Another surrogate for quality may be measured by legal activity against audit firms. 
Palmrose (1988) reports that activities of independent auditors can be used as a proxy 
for quality assessment by clients. Her results indicate that non-big Eight firms have 
higher activity (measured by number of lawsuits) than Big Eight firms, and this 
negatively correlates with quality rankings. She takes this as evidence for quality 
differentiation in the services between these two groups. 1 0 3 Again, little evidence for 
quality differentials within groups is provided. 
Although this correlation may be true, the probability of a lawsuit being launched is 
related to the business climate. Palmrose (1987) reports that management fraud and 
economic downturns have significant effects on the probability of proceedings being 
launched against auditors. 
Very little evidence has been compiled about the Canadian environment, although 
media reports make it clear that Canada is not immune to proceedings against audit 
firms. The Globe and Mail ($500-million, 1993) reported that over 4000 cases were 
pending against American auditors. The number of cases in Canada is much smaller 
but the rate is increasing significantly. 
, 0 3It has been suggested that plaintiffs may exploit the 'deep pockets' of large auditors. Although I 
have not seen any evidence, lawsuits against large auditors may be larger on average as compared to lawsuits 
against small auditors. This would correspond with Palmrose's finding, with fewer —but larger-lawsuits 
accruing to large auditors. 
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I 0 4 I am unaware of any evidence to support this claim. Recall that this theory based on client 
industry risk is attributed to Simunic by Leslie, as I reported earlier. 
""Savings in both insurance costs, and/or legal costs. 
Competition between auditors for solid (i.e. less-risky) clients should increase under an 
environment of increasing litigation. In this way, auditors minimize their exposure to 
costly lawsuits. 1 0 4 This competition could take place under many forms. I suggest that 
any price cutting or non-price incentives to obtain these clients business is efficient 
behaviour. The reduction in potential lawsuits is a savings to the audit firm105, and it 
will reduce its fee to a sustainable level for the risk exposure in the long run. 
TRANSPARENCY 
As I mentioned previously in my thesis, Canadian law does not require disclosure of audit 
fees, whereas in the U.K., Australia and elsewhere, this information is provided to the 
public. The issue of whether or not transparent fee disclosure would be beneficial to the 
welfare of consumers is contentious. There are pros and cons on both sides of the issue. 
The next two cases provide some insight on transparency. 
The first is about a bidding war for an audit in the U.K. which culminated in a lawsuit. 
The incumbent auditor was not a Big Six firm, but was considered a large, solid 
accounting firm based in London. The client put its audit out to tender, allowing the 
incumbent to bid along with the Big Six firms. The last year's audit fee to the incumbent 
auditor was £304,000. In response to the tender, the incumbent came in with a bid of 
£250,000. Price Waterhouse won the contract with a bid of £160,000. The incumbent 
firm brought the issue to the courts suggesting predatory pricing was being practiced. 
The courts ruled against this allegation (Bruce, 1995). 
Another accusation of predatory pricing was made in the United States against Price 
Waterhouse. The firm was accused of giving away services of up to $25,000, although no 
legal case was built against the firm106 (Jeffrey, Audit Fee, 1991). 
The use of fee information in the U.K. may have provided the winning auditor with 
l 0 6The details on these allegations were brief. 
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enough information to undercut the incumbent auditor. On the other hand, the lack of fee 
information may have made creating a legal case against Price Waterhouse in the U.S. 
impossible. 
The role of experienced buyers is paramount to ensuring a client firm gets value for its 
auditing dollar. Nevertheless, collusion is more difficult to maintain with unknown 
prices. With the absence of fee disclosure in Canada, I would expect knowledgeable 
buyers and a lack of seller collusion, at least with respect to price. 
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SWITCHING 
Switching between functionally interchangeable services may create transaction costs 
which the buyers may prefer to avoid. Examining the number of switches, and from 
whom, to whom the buyer moves gives some insight into these costs. 
Additionally, the ability of the supplier to keep clients is examined. This is why 
switching data has been used in the examination of the independence of the auditor. 
Predatory pricing and using non-price incentives such as other products to keep clients 
have also been explored. (DeAngelo,1986; Johnson & Lys, 1990; Eischenseher & Danos, 
1982,1986) To my knowledge, I provide the first switching evidence on the Canadian 
market, and have found that very little switching of clients goes on among the large 
auditors (approximately 10 percent in five years). Please see Appendix 10. 
Johnson and Lys examined if changes in clients' financing, investing, and operating 
characteristics are related to voluntary auditor switching. They suggested auditor 
switches are not isolated events, but are a result of other changes within the client firm. 
Of 603 audit switches from the years 1973 to 1982 they found switches from big Eight 
auditor to Big Eight auditor comprised 52.9 percent of the sample; from Other 1 0 7 to Big 
Eight, 26.2 percent; Big Eight to other, 12.9 percent; and, Other to Other, 8.0 percent. 
'Other is the same as a non-Big Eight auditor. 
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'Profitability as measured by returns on assets. 
They reported that firms that switch auditors are less profitable108 than those firms 
retaining their auditor. Overall there was an absence of abnormal returns on stock price, 
indicating auditor changes provide little information regarding the pricing of securities. 
Johnson and Lys reported that clients going from an 'other' to Big Eight auditor 
experienced positive abnormal returns over the sixty days preceding realignment. 
Switches in the other direction experienced negative abnormal returns. 
I examined switching, controlling for merged audit firms. The data only examines the 
auditor in the year 1987 and in the year 1992 and determines if they are the same or if 
they are different — in other words switched. Switches between 1987 and 1992 were not 
recorded. Only 10 percent of firms, or twenty five firms switched among Big Six/Eight 
auditors. As reported previously, of these 25 firms only 2 were from regulated industries. 
This confirms Eichenseher and Danos' finding for the Canadian market and suggests that 
auditors can recoup learning-by-doing costs in these industries. 
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Table 7: Switching Data Among Big Six: Top 500 Firms 
Auditor 
1992 
# of audits 
1992 
# of audits 
1987 
# of clients 
audited in 
both years 
number of 
clients lost 
number of 
clients gained 
aa 10 12 10 2 0 
cl 41 39 37 2 4 
dt 38 40 36 4 2 
ey 47 48 43 5 4 
pmt 66 66 58 8 8 
p w 47 44 40 4 7 
Totals 249 249 224 25 25 
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AUDITOR CHARACTERISTICS 
AUDITOR SIZE 
Using two sources of information, audit firm revenues and the payroll information from 
the special runs of Statistics Canada, I found that large firms' (with over 500 employees, 
which is the categorization Statistics Canada uses) ratio of payroll to total revenues is 
considerably smaller than mid-size firms (with between 100 and 499 employees). These 
results are consistent over both years. The largest firms devoted 29.5 % of revenues to 
payroll in 1989, and 31.1% in 1992. Mid-size firms on the other hand allocate nearly half 
of their revenue to payroll. In 1989, they used 48.9% and 48.2% in 1992. 1 0 9 
Since large firms dedicate less revenue to their payroll, they may be paying heavily for 
their brand name, larger corporate size, or the costs of being larger (even though this may 
prove to be efficient). The use of new and expensive technology may be a factor as well. 
I also would suggest that the difference in clients between large and other audit firms may 
introduce entirely different factors in the production of audits 1 1 0. On the other hand, large 
audit firms may be reaping larger profits. 
""Partners' earnings may not be included in payroll information. Statistics Canada does state it uses 
regular, short, and overtime hours. 
"°This possibility emphasises the importance of, and suggests another research angle to, O'Keefe, 
Simunic, and Stein's (1994) examination of audit firm costs. 
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1 1
 'An audit firm is considered indepedent (theoretically) if the probability of issuing an adverse report 
is equal to 1. DeAngelo (1980) provides an excellent review of the issues relating to independence. 
INDEPENDENCE 
Wyatt suggests that small accounting firms must choose whether they really want to do 
attest (audit) work, as it is more suited to a large firm environment and is becoming more 
so with SEC regulatory overload, and standards overload. In addition, he challenges the 
hallmarks of the audit -independence and objectivity. 
"As competition is promoted, [via changes in internal professional regulations] 
questions are being raised by some whether independence and objectivity of the 
profession ought to be replaced by notions of competency and integrity" (Wyatt, 
1989). 
Small auditors are at greater risk of losing their independence.111 Auditors need 
sufficient clientele, so that losing one client would not impair their ability to carry on 
business. It is possible that rational consumers requiring quality audits, will choose 
those auditors perceived to be relatively more independent. Therefore audit firm size 
may affect client choice in an enviroment that holds independence as a valued 
characteristic of an auditor. 
OTHER SERVICES AUDITORS PROVIDE 
Consulting arms at the Big Six have been growing at double digit rates, while auditing 
growth rates are stagnant. (Bell, 1995) The percentage of consulting revenue has grown 
to 60% of total revenues, while auditing has decreased to 40% of the total. This has 
changed rapidly in a short span of just 10 years. 
Anderson Consulting Canada is by far the leader in consulting services. In Canada, its 
presence in audit is minimal, whereas its presence in consulting is significant. For 
example in 1993, Anderson's revenue from information technology was $145 million, 
only $7 million less than the other firms combined (Bell, 1995). See Table 8 below. In 
addition I compare the product mix of two audit firms (Arthur Anderson and Deloitte & 
Touche) in Graph 3. This graph demonstrates the variety of services while pointing out 
how different firms are within the same market. 
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Product Mix of Two Accounting Firms 
Revenue Split Among Products -1995 
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TABLE 8: BIG SIX CONSULTING PRACTICES 
Firm 1994 
Revenues 
worldwide 
(SmillionsUS) 
Worldwide 
growth rate 
(%) 
Number of 
consultants 
worldwide 
Number of 
consultants in 
Canada 
1994 
Canadian 
revenues 
(SmillionsCd) 
Anderson 3 4 5 2 2 0 2 7 5 6 3 9 9 5 1 2 4 
Ernst & 
Young 
1181 1 4 7 9 0 0 4 0 0 4 7 ( 1 9 9 3 ) 
Delotte& 
Touche 
1061 21 7377 480 70 
Coopers & 
Lybrand 
1049 17 7388 495 65 
KPMG 875 17 6779 380 70 
Price 
Waterhouse 
755 4 6700 280 36 
Adapted from: CA Magazine, September 1995, p. 22 
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The Bottom Line (Millan, 1995) reported that some Quebec audit firms may be moving 
to specialize in certain industries to capitalize on 'value-added' services (i.e. non-audit 
products). Several accounting firms cited fierce competition as a reason to become more 
specialized in non-audit products and focussed on growth industries. Members of these 
firms stated that clients expect focussed expertise, not general knowledge, from their 
auditors. As an example, one Quebec firm -Malette Maheu— entered into an formal 
association with Arthur Anderson to provide accounting, tax, and business advisory 
services. 
Other firms approached specialization with some caution. These firms indicated that 
specialization created risks for the audit firm, as they too would be subject to ups and 
downs in the client industry. This coincides with Simunic's untested theory that audit 
firms may not want to expose themselves to undue risk by being too heavily concentrated 
in one or a few industries, and may be more of a concern for small audit firms. 
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"
2This specialized knowledge includes Generally Accepted Accounting Principles(GAAP), Canadian 
Tax System, stock exchange requirements, and other regulatory requirements. 
l l 3Even though NAFTA has come into effect, allowing the 'free' movement of professionals, in 
practice there is still a barrier to entry. For example, Professionals must adhere to various residency rules in 
addition to passing the appropriate exams to practice in Mexico. (Millan, 1995) 
GEOGRAPHIC DEFINITION OF THE PRODUCT MARKET 
The geographic market is confined to Canada because of regulatory limitations on 
international auditing, and specialized national1 1 2 knowledge. However, there are some 
problems for this portion of the market definition because of the special circumstances 
of Quebec which has a different legal code and business environment. Additionally, 
NAFTA provides for the international movement of accountants, which further blurs the 
border boundary. 1 1 3 
There appears to be some regional differences in auditor preference, which are not well 
documented in the Canadian studies, but that are relatively well known in business 
circles. These regional differences are documented here. 
For example, the prevalence of mid-size audit firms in Quebec is unique. Mid-size 
auditors are declining significantly in other areas of the country, but are holding their own 
in Quebec. (Verification of this issue is included in this chapter, under 'Statistics Canada 
Information'.) Of course there may be many reasons for the maintenance of the Quebec 
mid-size market, despite the declines everywhere else. Here I provide evidence that 
changes in clients may be a driving force behind this issue. 
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""I used total assets in this calculation, as I am interested in the characteristic of the client firm, not 
of its audit fee. The t-test was significant to 0.05%. 
I found that there is a significant difference between the means of the client firms" 4 of the 
Quebec mid-size auditors and of the rest of the client firms in the samples. Of even more 
interest, is that there was a significant difference between the clients of the Quebec mid­
size firms and other mid-size firms in 1987, but that this dissipated in the 1992 sample. 
This evidence coupled with the mean size of the clients suggests there have been 
interesting changes to the client makeup of mid-size audit firms. 
The mean client size for a Quebec firm in 1987 was $270,577,354.00 and 
$327,973,707.00 in 1992. The mean client size for a mid-size firm in the rest of Canada 
was $104,142,276.00 in 1987 and $309,939,937 in 1992. The dramatic change in the 
client size of the rest of Canada group could be due to several factors. Either, this group 
is facing a large attrition of their small clients, driving up average client size (of the 
remaining firms); or, they are getting some new large clients. 
I suggest that the evidence supports that the Quebec mid-size firms maintained their 
clientele, while mid-size auditors in the rest of Canada likely lost many bottom end 
clients. The drop in payroll for the rest of Canada firms (which is reported in the 
Statistics Canada chapter) indicates that these firms are not gaining new business. 
Quebec clients have access to larger auditors through local mid-size audit firms because 
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Quebec audit firms have been strengthening their alliances, but not fully integrating, with 
large (Big Six) firms. These alliances have not been pursued to the same degree by other 
mid-size firms in other areas of the country. Political issues in Quebec may encourage 
this comparatively independent behaviour. 
I also performed a breakdown of the top 500 clients by province. I found that the audits 
are well distributed among the large auditors in those provinces with a large number of 
client firms (Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec). Doane Raymond was well 
represented in the Nova Scotia and Newfoundland only, suggesting another regional bias 
not reported elsewhere. The details are reported in Appendix 9. 
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FOREIGN COMPETITION 
The industry is confined to Canadian borders because of domestic regulations for audits 
and securities filing. Yet, the impact of international influence is felt by the industry and 
its clients. For example, I cited two cases in my introduction of the impact of the 
international accounting firm on its Canadian affiliates. The merger activity experienced 
in Canada is a result of international forces. 
In addition to international audit industry influence, client firms influence auditor choice 
across borders. In the evidence presented in the section on Parent-Subsidiary 
relationships, Canadian subsidiaries of international firms often use the same auditor. 
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CHANGES IN THE INDUSTRY: STATISTICS CANADA INFORMATION 
Statistics Canada data compliments the above analysis by providing business number and 
payroll information for all sizes of firms in the accounting and bookkeeping industry and 
management consulting services. The data compares 1989 and 1991. Some very strong 
trends appear in this data."5 
Overall, the accounting and bookkeeping services industry has experienced growth in 
both the number of businesses and in payroll. The number of businesses increased by 
eight percent, while payroll increased by 12 percent. 
Significant changes occurred in several size categories. In the smallest size category, 
firms with fewer than five employees, the number of firms increased 11 percent while the 
payroll increased 40 percent. The Statistics Canada data breaks down the information 
further by separating growing businesses from declining businesses (based on average 
labour units, which are explained in Appendix 12). Small growing firms experienced a 
78 percent increase in payroll over this three year period. Growing firms with 5-19 
employees and 20-49 employees also experienced strong growth in payroll with 45 and 
144 percent increases respectively. 
Dramatic downturns were experienced by mid-size firms (100-499 employees). The 
number of businesses decreased by 29 percent over the 1989-1991 interval. The payroll 
1 , 5
 Appendix 14 contains information about the data and how Statistics Canada manipulated it. 
decreased by 44 percent over the same period. Please see Graph 4. 
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Interestingly, these trends were not experienced in Quebec to the same degree. The 
number of businesses decreased by three, or by twenty percent. (Overall, eight mid-size 
firms were lost.) At the same time, the payroll only decreased by 3.6 percent. 
Large firms (500+ employees) remained relatively constant in number, only decreasing by 
one. The payroll experienced an increase of 20.7 percent. 
The information reveals that entry into the industry is easy, especially in the small 
business category. Of all newly identified firms (there were 3,603), over 96 percent were 
in the five or fewer employee category. There were no new firms identified in the 100-
499, or 500+ employee categories. 
I note that similar trends in small and large firm growth are experienced overall in 
Canada. Table 9 presents this information. 
GRAPH 4 
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Concentration : Canadian Firms of All Industries 
Changes in the Relative Shares of Financial Characteristics of Leading 
Enterprises (1975-1986) 
Ranking Sales Assets Profits 
Leading 25 +1.4 +5.9 +7.6 
26 to 100 -2.0 -1.3 -3.8 
101 to 500 -2.2 -4.1 -6.1 
501 to 1000 -0.9 -3.1 -0.8 
Remaining +3.6 +0.8 +3.2 
Source: W. Krause and J Lothian, Canadian Economic Observer, January 1989. 
"This table may be interpreted in this way: the percentage of assets held by the top 25 
firms in the Canadian economy increased by 5.9 percentage points between 1975 and 
1986, going, in fact from nearly 29% to just over 35%. Some caution should be 
exercised in using this table because the share figures are affected by the business cycle. 
Whether one looks at sales, assets or profits, the same divergent picture emerges: both 
the largest 25 and the smallest firms (those ranked below 1000) have increased their 
shares of sales, assets, and profits, while the percentage shares of the firms ranked 
between 26 and 1000 have declined. How one reacts to this picture depends upon one's 
view of concentration. Concentration has grown at the top, but at the same time there 
has been a relative increase in the economic health of smaller firms. Any tendency 
towards concentration is not uniform and does not seem to have harmed the 
opportunities available for smaller firms." (Jackson and Poshmann, 1989) 
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The changes experienced in Management Consulting Services was similar overall, with a 
gain of 15 percent in businesses, and 12 percent in payroll. Small firms experienced the 
largest growth with a 22 percent increase in businesses and a 77 percent increase in 
payroll. Growing firms in this group yielded a growth in payroll of 187 percent. 
Similarly, growing firms in every category experienced large growth. 
The difference between the two industry categories is that large firms in Management 
Consulting Services did not increase in payroll, whereas the mid-size category is holding 
steady— not experiencing the same drastic declines as mid-size accounting firms. 
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EVALUATIVE CRITERIA 
BARRIERS TO ENTRY AND SUNK COSTS 
In this industry, there are three points where barriers to entry could be erected. One is at 
the professional level, the second is at the basic firm level (if a firm could enter the 
market at all), and the third is between different sizes or qualities of firms (can a firm 
within the market impede another firm in the market from competing?). 
The Concentration Doctrine is meaningless unless one can find entry barriers into a 
market. Traditional barriers such as large capital requirements are no longer considered 
entry barriers. In fact, with the evolution of the Contestability school (Baumol, Panzar, 
and Willig, 1982), the concept of an entry barrier has diminished considerably. In fact, 
the one main remaining market barrier that appears to have some credibility left, is sunk 
costs or fixed, specialized investments with no alternative uses." 6 
Although sunk costs are normally thought of in the context of large buildings and 
machinery, it is more fruitful to think of sunk costs in this industry, as human capital 
investments. A significant amount of that burden is placed on the individual, because of 
the schooling requirements. (Although it could be argued that the education has 
alternative uses.) A secondary burden is placed on the large accounting firms who 
develop accountants through the articling process. 
"
6Sunk costs are considered to be an entry barrier because potential new entrants, would add capacity 
faster than the growth of demand, and would expect incumbent firms to lower prices to maintain the use of 
their sunk capacity. (Von Weizsacker, 1980; Fisher, McGowan and Greenwood, 1983; and Salop, 1986) 
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Even if there are sunk costs for the individual, there is little reason to believe that persons 
are impeded from entering the industry. 
"There appear to be no real barriers to entry of individuals into the profession,.... 
In fact, the education and certification requirements which characterize auditing 
practice are consistent with a market in which quality uncertainty and information 
asymmetry exist" (Dopuch and Simunic, 1980). 
Of course, the profession must maintain its level of competence, and thereby restrict entry 
to those individuals who are not able to perform the required duties. 
Using Statistics Canada data, from the 1986 and 1991 census, there appears to be little 
evidence that there are significant barriers to entry into the accounting profession for 
individuals. The category of 'Accountants, auditors, and other financial officers —1171', 
experienced an increase in membership from 181,025 to 229,730 persons, for an increase 
of 21.5 percent. As a comparison, the category of 'Bookkeepers and accounting clerks — 
4131' experienced a mild increase of 3.4 percent, with a membership change from 
386,700 to 399,820 persons. This suggests that educational requirements and 
employment opportunities are not prohibitive and definitely not a barrier to entry, 
especially if one accepts that it would be easier to enter employment in the bookkeeping 
category by virtue of fewer educational requirements. If they were, the category 
bookkeepers and clerks would grow at a faster rate than the accountants' category, if one 
also assumes individuals would stay in the same line of business."7 1 1 8 [See Graph 5.] 
"'The most interesting piece of information that is revealed here is the superior growth in employment 
opportunities for women in this industry (1171). Over the 1986-1991 period, the number of women 
participating in this category increased 41.5 percent, while men experienced 8 percent growth. The number 
of women and men in this category are almost equal, with 107,970 women and 121,760 men in 1991. 
(continued...) 
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Palmer, does not suggest that these firms are protected from competing for their bread 
and butter work -audits, but he suggests that accounting firms are venturing into areas 
not traditionally serviced by accountants. He suggests further, that the sunk costs that 
accounting firms have put into their reputation, especially the Big Eight, have allowed 
them to make great strides outside of their traditional business line. 
'"(...continued) 
The other interesting, but well known fact, is that the number of women (337,185) in category 4131 far exceeds 
the number of men (62,640) in 1991. The growth is attributed to growth on the women's side. (Statistics 
Canada, The Nation: Occupation, 93-327) 
'"The income levels of category 1171(adjusted for 1990 dollars) were $39,490 (1980); $37,048 
(1985); $37,382 (1990). The income levels of category 4131 (adjusted for 1990 dollars) were $18,452 
(1980); $18,195 (1985); $20,000 (1990). (Statistics Canada, Population and Dwelling Characteristics, 93-116) 
See Graph 6. 
Some suggest that auditors are protected from broader competition because of the 
unique nature of the profession and their legislated mandate. 
"It also should not be forgotten that it is the licence to audit financial statements 
that makes CPAs and their firms unique" (Palmer, p. 86). 
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As mentioned previously in Chapter 4, Demsetz (1974) states that concentration 
increases whenever a better firm outperforms other firms. If this better performance 
leads to higher profits, more investment (sunk costs or otherwise), and faster growth, 
the issues of high concentration and of barriers to entry disappear, as they are simply 
by-products of superior performance. 
It appears in Canada, that there are a small number of large accounting firms which 
have performed in a superior manner. They share the same legal rights as other 
accounting firms in the industry, but are larger, and serve a broader range of clients. 
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""The evidence in Appendix 4 supports this, as client firms within an industry appear to seek out 
different auditors than their competitors retain. 
WHY AUDIT FIRMS USE MERGER: GAINS IN MARKET SHARE AND INDUSTRY CATEGORIES 
Arnett and Danos (1979) report that mergers are generally considered as a means of 
reaping financial and economic benefits for audit firms. These benefits include 
expansion into a new geographic area, economies of scale attributed to centralizing 
operations, gaining a well known brand name, and access to better technology, methods 
and standards (quality improvement). These are hardly a surprize. 
Of course, it is possible that the merger does not reap the benefits the firms expect. It is 
possible that the firms, now merged, lose an important client because of the new 
dynamics of the merged firm. For example, clients may feel threatened if their major 
competitor is suddenly audited by the same auditor.119 
Tonge and Wootton and Copley (1993) both presented some data on potential effects of 
mergers in the United States. I have made similar calculations for the Canadian market. 
In addition, I have incorporated the actual- or realized — result of the mergers on market 
share, which was not presented by either of Tonge and Wootton or Copley. Following 
these data, I present information on the expansion of audit firms into new industry 
categories. Taken together, this information creates a picture of the effect of mergers. 
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The combined market shares of Thorne Ernst Whinney, and Peat Marwick Mitchell using 
1987 square root of assets data, is 22.8%. The merged firm, PMT, had an actual 1992 
market share of 25% using square root of assets data. In 1987, Thorne Ernst Whinney 
performed audits in 23 of 41 SIC categories gaining clients in 3 new categories, while 
Peat Marwick Mitchell performed audits in 18 categories. PMT performed audits in 28 
of 41 categories in 1992, gaining clients in 4 new categories. 
The combined market shares of Deloitte Haskins Sells and Touche Ross using 1987 
square root of assets data, is 23.5%. The merged firm, Deloitte Touche had an actual 
1992 market share of 27% using square root of assets data. In 1987, Deloitte Haskins 
Sells performed audits in 13 of 41 SIC categories, while Touche Ross performed audits in 
22 categories. Deloitte Touche performed audits in 27 of 41 categories in 1992. In both 
merger cases, the realized market share was higher than the added market share, 
suggesting that the merger allowed each new entity to pick up some new business. 
CONCENTRATION 
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"Although information which demonstrates that market share or concentration will be 
high cannot provide a sufficient basis, in and of itself, to justify a conclusion that a 
merger is likely to prevent or lessen competition substantially, it is a necessary condition 
that must exist before such a finding can be made." (Director, p. 21) 
The ability of firms to coordinate their efforts in the joint maximization of profits, is 
increased when a smaller number of firms exist in the market. In the case of audit firms, 
the concentration prior to the mergers exceeded reviewable levels. When a merger took 
place the threat of even higher concentration, which did materialize in the market overall 
(CR4 of 77.3), sends warning signals to policy analysts and others who are concerned 
with the production of audit and accounting services. 
Overall, the top four firms accounted for 61.7 percent of the business in the financial 
sector in 1987. The concentration increased to 88.8 percent in 1992. The respective HH 
Indices are 0.1146 and 0.2097. This data is based on square root of assets data. The top 
four firms accounted for 62.7 percent of the top 500 firms in 1987 and 77.3 percent in 
1992. The HHIs for 1987 and 1992 were 0.1208 and 0.1639. 
To determine if there was a significant increase in concentration, I used the industry 
specific concentration measures (41 industry categories in non-financial sample plus the 
financial sample : both number of audits and square root of total assets data) in a t-test. 
There was no significant difference between the means of the 1987 and 1992 data using 
either of the square root of assets or audit data when reported as Herfindahl Indices. 
When reported as CR4 measures, the square root of assets in a t-test over the two years 
yielded a significant difference (a =0.05), whereas the number of audits data was also 
nearly significant at this level. This confirms Wootton, Wolk and Tonge's finding that 
the type of measure may influence the result. All the concentration indices are reported 
in Appendices 4,5, and 6. 
The concentration in many industry segments is extremely high. But, the changes from 
pre-merger to post-merger stage were in-determinant in direction when analyzed on a 
case by case basis which confirms the statistical test reported above. 
I note that there are differences in using number of audits and square root of assets as a 
measure of market share. This in turn affects the concentration ratios. If the relevant 
market contained an undifferentiated product, and the suppliers are operating at full 
capacity, any measure of market share should yield a relatively similar result. This 
market does not afford the analyst the luxury of straightforward analysis, especially if one 
considers the minimal amount of information available. 
Nonetheless, the concentration levels are so high, that any measure of concentration 
would provide enough evidence to meet the necessary, yet not sufficient, requirement of 
high concentration for merger review. 
COMPARING CANADIAN CONCENTRATION STUDIES TO M Y FINDINGS 
There are a small number of published studies on the Canadian audit market. Shaw and 
Archibald (1970) provided the first set of information on the market, following up Zeff 
and Fossum's U.S. study using Canadian data. Chung and Lindsay (1988), Zind and 
Zeghal (1989), and Anderson and Zeghal (1994) performed audit fee studies (Simunic 
replications) on the Canadian market. Here, I compare my findings with the information 
they provided on the Canadian market in different time periods. 
Overall 
Shaw and Archibald report that in 1968 based on total assets audited Price Waterhouse 
and Clarkson Gordon were strong leaders in the audit industry. At the time, the number 
of audits appears to be well distributed among the top eight firms (with 409 audits split 
up among eight audit firms), while 73 mid-size and small firms split the remaining 176 
audits. A persistent trend in Canada which still plagues the firm, has been the absence of 
Arthur Anderson from the top audit firm ranking —based on number of audits. In 1968, 
AA did not make the top eight by number of audits (only auditing 9 firms), but auditing 
large client firms as evidenced by the total assets it audited. In the United States at the 
same time, AA was the fourth largest firm by both audits and assets. Tables 10 and 11 
present two years of audit firm rankings. 
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TABLE 9 Canada's Top Accounting ] Firms-1987 
Auditor Revenue (S'OMt) PMfcuknil StefT 
Fv tncn EmpWyca Offlca 
1. Thome Ernst & Whinney* 250,000 2,968 483 3,818 55 
2. Clarkson Gordon 217,000 2,411 391 3,183 25 
3. Deloitte Samson 176,566 2,267 328 2,968 56 
4. Touche Ross 175,000 2,125 375 2,700 47 
5. Coopers & Lybrand 170,900 1,908 265 2,571 21 
6. Price Waterhouse 146,000 1,725 218 2,287 22 
7. Peat Marwick 135,104 1,579 244 2,006 27 
8. Doane Raymond Associates 119,800 1,601 298 2,036 96 
9. Ward Mallette 89,000 1,333 233 1,563 76 
10 Collins Barrow Maheu Noiseux 69,200 965 181 1,212 41 
Raofchwh—imwulHtk imHUlu n « i , » « K h w J b y t h r t k m . * Ertfanxtat. 
Adapted From: The Financial Post 500. Summer 1988. 
TABLE 10 Canada's Top Accounting Firms-1992 
Auditor Pnftuteml Staff Offlctm 
1. Peat Marwick Thome 483,429 3,956 720 5,173 71 
2. Delotte & Touche 427,000 3,391 607 3,936 65 
3. Ernst & Young 352,000 2,996 540 4,031 41 
4. Coopers & Lybrand 257,780 1,917 430 2,327 26 
5. Price Waterhouse 244,000 1,783 289 2,412 26 
6. Doane Raymond Grant Thornton 212,000 1,963 419 2,552 112 
7. BDO Dunwoody Ward Mallette 192,000* 1,983 422 2,534 120 
8. Arthur Anderson & Co. 165,838 1,199 87 1,538 9 
9. Richter, Usher & Vineberg 42,120 266 56 398 3 
10. HLB Fuller Jenks Landau/MacKay 22,000* 234 52 252 12 
Rurfrtny b w d MI wdtt Ann trtal w w — , m JIKIWMI by the ftm * EfttntataL 
Adapter! From: The Financial Post 500. 1993. 
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Shaw and Archibald also list which of 25 industries each auditor participates in. Each of 
the top audit firms participate in a majority of these industries. 
The number of audits each audit firm has in each industry category is not given, which 
means I cannot compare my auditor-client ratios with their data. But, I can surmise that 
each industry has at least several auditors, indicating that market power through industry 
specialization may have been elusive in 1968 as it is in 1992. 
Chung and Lindsay report that in 1979 PMM was the largest auditor based on number of 
audits, while PW was number one based on assets. It appears that PW audited large 
client firms based on the average assets of the clients. Unfortunately no industry 
breakdown was performed by these researchers. 
Zind and Zeghal report that in 1981 PW was the leader in both number of audits and total 
assets audited. Their rankings demonstrate a sharp demarcation between the top eight 
firms and the remaining firms based on number of audits and assets audited, but that the 
Canadian market is more appropriately called the Big Seven. Unfortunately no industry 
breakdown was performed by these researchers either. 
Anderson and Zeghal used Zind and Zeghal's data, and updated it with further 
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l20Their sample contained 75 firms for 1980,136 firms for 1982, and 163 firms for 1984. The small 
sample size may have not allowed for fine industry breakdowns. 
,2lAnderson and Zeghal used the location of the auditor as their location variable. My thesis uses the 
location of the client as the location variable. 
information.120 Anderson and Zeghal report that no firm audits more than 38% of the 
observation in a particular industry, based on six broadly based industry categories. 
(These categories are reported elsewhere in my thesis.) Unfortunately no information 
about the market share of each auditor is presented on an industry basis. In addition, 
Anderson and Zeghal present some regional information, such as 45 percent of their 
observations were audited by Ontario firms.121 
126 
Total Assets Audited by each Auditor in Sample -
1987 Non-Financial Firms 
Auditor Total Assets Audited ($) 
AA 15839381660 
AY 1511308400 
CG 71187935927 
CL 27813549364 
DHS 10274385732 
DR 1385545097 
PMM 34528154912 
PW 113780676396 
Thome 50109870466 
TR 90025235186 
In my sample the total assets audited by each of the large auditors is as follows: 
TABLE 12 
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TABLE 13 
Total Assets Audited by each Auditor in Sample -
1992 Non-Financial Firms 
Auditor Total Assets Audited ($) 
AA 22154489677 
CL 32051374350 
DT 185969389114 
EY 82694382936 
PMT 93278417051 
PW 145075326266 
PMM 34528154912 
I provide this information only as a comparison to the other studies. The average client 
size tables, provide a better indication of the differences between auditors, and perhaps a 
better ranking system than total assets audited. Market share information of each of the 
top auditors is presented in Graphs 7 to 10. 
Market Share of Auditors 
1987 - Non-Financial Firms 
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pw 
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Industrials 
Shaw and Archibald report that in 1968 Price Waterhouse was the dominant firm by 
assets audited, and Clarkson Gordon (now Ernst & Young) had the largest number of 
audits. 
My research shows that in the construction industry there are two major auditors, DT, and 
PMT. Price Waterhouse holds approximately 11 percent of the business (on both 
measures), while EY has a negligible amount. 
In the food manufacturing industries, four firms share most of the market. They are CL, 
EY, PMT, and PW. The market in 1992 was better diversified than it was in 1987, as 
there were only three main auditors serving the market at that time. 
In textiles, the number of clients is small, but there are a variety of auditors among them, 
with only one auditor holding more than one audit. The market is less concentrated in 
1992 than it was in 1987. 
In furniture manufacturing, the five clients have retained five different auditors, 
suggesting that auditor specialization does not exist in this sector. 
In printing and publishing, there are a wide variety of auditors. In fact, based on square 
root of assets data, six of seven auditors each have at least 10 percent of the market. 
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In chemicals, there are three dominating auditors (DT, PMT, and PW), and three lesser 
auditors. This is one sector where the measure of the market share is influential, as the 
market share of the client firms influences the market share of the auditors. 
In rubber and plastics manufacturing, there appears to be some auditor specialization, as 
one firm has maintained and increased its market share through the merger. Yet, there are 
three other auditors with at least 10 percent market share. 
In the stone, glass and clay products, the market is evenly divided among four auditors. 
Similarly in machinery, the market is divided among four strong competitors. 
Eight auditors service the electrical and electronic machinery manufacturing sector. 
Firms that merged have held on to their market share. 
In transportation equipment manufacturing, EY has maintained market share holding the 
largest firms in the industry as clients. 
In the transportation sectors, the audits are divided among auditors, as very few auditors 
hold more than one audit in each sector. Several forces may be acting to create this 
scenario. These industries are highly competitive, and clients may wish to use auditors 
that are not involved with any of their competitors. Additionally, these industries are 
highly regulated and have been found by Eichenseher and Danos to resist switching. The 
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auditors may be pouring in extra resources into these audits, to maintain their competitive 
advantage. 
In communications, a quickly growing and changing industry, DT is the primary auditor 
with 32 percent of the audits and 52 percent of the market based on square root of assets. 
Prior to its merger, DT had a significant portion of the business in this sector. Since then 
it has gained clients. There are seven other auditors in the industry, with three having 
more than 10 percent market share. 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 
In the wholesale-durable market, there are a wide variety of auditors. Deloitte Touche 
gained its market share considerably over the merger period. In the non-durable market, 
PMT maintained its strong hold on the market from 1987 to 1992, but there are six other 
auditors in the market. 
In the retail —general merchandise market, the auditors are well dispersed, with one audit 
apiece. The same situation exists in the retail-food, apparel, furniture, eating 
establishments, and miscellaneous markets. 
Utilities 
Shaw and Archibald report that in 1968 Clarkson Gordon [Ernst & Young] were the 
leading auditors in the sector of publicly and privately owned utilities. 
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My results show that the utilities industry is served primarily by four auditors, which 
divide the market up evenly. It is less concentrated in 1992 than in 1987, based on a 
Herfindahl index. 
Mines 
Shaw and Archibald report that in 1968 Thorne, Gunn, Helliwell & Christenson, a 
forefather of current day KPMG Peat Marwick Thorne, had a significant portion of this 
market. 
My findings indicate that the mining and refining sector is served by four strong 
competitors, CL, EY, PMT, and PW who together hold about eighty percent of the 
market. 
Oil 
Shaw and Archibald report that in 1968 Clarkson Gordon [Ernst & Young] audited the 
most by assets, but that by number of audits CG shared top billing with Peat Marwick & 
Mitchell [KPMG], Price Waterhouse, and Thome, Gunn, Helliwell & Christenson 
[KPMG]. 
My study finds that resource based industries, such as oil and forestry, are dominated by 
Price Waterhouse when measured with either market share measure (square root of assets 
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or number of audits). 
Services 
All industries under the service umbrella, are widely dispersed, with each client retaining 
a different auditor. The sample size is small [but growing from 1987 to 1992], so I 
decline to make any generalizations about the demand for and supply of audit services in 
this sector. I do think though, that the supply and demand dynamics will be interesting to 
follow as the service sector continues to grow. 
Finance 
Shaw and Archibald report that in 1968 PMM, CG, and PW shared top auditor billing. 
Among holding companies, my findings indicate there are a large number of auditors, and 
many of them have several audits. The largest change between 1987 client firm numbers 
and 1992 client firm numbers exists in this category, which makes me hesitant to make 
any conclusions about the audit market for this group of firms. I present a discussion of 
concentration in this industry category in the next subsection, Specialization. 
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'"Although the new firm has a broader scope, this does not mean that it has lost its specialization. 
The sunk costs in specialization still remain with the firm, but from outward appearances may appear to be lost 
because of the increased size and scope of the firm. 
Additionally, it is possible that the merger has allowed the auditor to gain a client in an entirely different 
industry category because the audit firm now has expertise (or sunk costs) in several areas, which the audit firm 
could not afford to invest in prior to the merger. 
SPECIALIZATION 
Specialization by an audit firm is examined by three measures in my thesis. First, I 
report the concentration of an audit firm by industry categories. Second, I examine the 
role of regulated client industries and how this affects audit firm specialization. This 
examination also includes information about the Estey Commission, which commented 
on the need for expertise and specialization in delivering audit services. I also present 
data on concentration of audit firms for Big Six banks, which are considered to be a 
special case because of industry specific regulations. Third, I report my findings on a 
ratio created for this analysis, the Auditor-Client ratio. It presents information that has 
previously been ignored in other studies of audit firm concentration. 
SPECIALIZATION OR GENERALIZATION: GAINS IN INDUSTRY CATEGORIES 
Mergers may allow audit firms to expand their operations by increasing the breadth, or 
scope, of their operations. Mergers between two different firms, could create a diverse 
(seemingly unspecialized122) firm. Therefore, I have examined the effects of merger 
based on the number of industry categories each auditor is engaged in. The information 
is presented in Table 14 below. 
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TABLE 14: Numbei 
Auditor has at leas 
r of SIC Ca 
t one And 
itegories each 
t: 1987-1992 
Auditor 1 9 8 7 1 9 9 2 New Categories 
aa 8 13 5 
cg/ey 21 23 2 
cl 20 19 -1 
pw 17 24 7 
rcmp 8 13 5 
sb/sbdt 12 14 2 
dhs 13 — 
tr 22 — — 
dt — 27 3* 
thorne 23 — — 
pmm 18 — --
pmt — 28 4* 
'The new SIC categories for dt and pmt are those that neither of the 
predecessor firms were engaged in. 
**The s y m b o l ' - ' means that the firm did not exist that year. 
Gains of business outside the combined firms may be due to several factors. If gains 
were only found in the merged firms, new business may be attracted to the increases in 
size and scope. If all firms had increased business, the industry on the whole may be 
experiencing some competitive changes. From the evidence above, it appears that audit 
firms are expanding in scope overall. The large merger activity may have been a way for 
the involved firms to enter other industry categories, but this did not appear to hinder 
other firms from entering other industry categories. 
This evidence suggests that auditors are expanding their services across product lines, not 
specializing as expected. There is, although, some evidence to counter this finding. 
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In general, 
"Markets are inherently dynamic as resources are re-allocated in response to 
new investment opportunities. Competitive pressures cause firms to specialize 
their productive skills and resources, which in turn leads to increased 
concentration whenever the resulting cost-advantage increases optimal firms 
size. In this view, the process of industry concentration is driven by 'healthy' 
competition, with some of the efficiency gains passed on to consumers. Thus, 
one can view the degree of industry concentration as an index of competition 
(through resource specialization) as well as of monopoly power, in which case a 
deconcentration policy forces a costly, suboptimal duplication of otherwise 
efficiently allocated corporate resources" (Eckbo, 1991). 
Further, 
"Competition among auditors, both for the initial audit and at the recontracting 
interval, will govern the extent to which an incumbent auditor can benefit from 
learning-by-doing advantages" (DeAngelo, 1980). 
The lack of switching in regulated markets suggests that the incumbent audit firm has 
significant advantages due to the expertise it has gained by providing [an] audit in a 
particular market. In non-regulated markets, audit firms jostling for audit contracts as 
evidenced by the switching. Audit firms are also expanding the number of markets they 
As I mentioned the subsection on Switching, Eichenseher and Danos (1986) found that 
over time, auditors in regulated industries maintained their market share compared to 
auditors in non-regulated industries. I found that in my sample of firms that were 
constant over time (see Appendix 10) that auditors in non-regulated industries were more 
likely to be replaced. Of twenty-five switches, only two occurred in regulated industries. 
If I use Eichenseher and Danos' reasoning, there is competition in the market for non-
regulated audits among large firms. 
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service. These three findings, taken in light of other research and the above quotes 
suggests to me that the Canadian market is competitive in non-regulated markets. In 
addition, regulated markets require some investment in acquiring expertise. It is unknown 
if rent accrues to audit firms in these regulated markets. 
ESTEY: THE CASE FOR SPECIALIZATION 
After the failure of the Northland Bank and Canadian Commercial Bank (CCB), their 
auditors were chastised by the Estey Commission for failing in their duties as auditors 
("Canadian Auditors," 1986). The following quote from the Estey Commission Report 
suggests, mildly, that experience may have prevented some of the problems encountered 
with the audits of these two banks. 
"As was the case with the auditors of CCB, Northland's auditors, as individuals, 
had never undertaken a bank audit before their engagement with this bank. They 
communicated with other offices within their firm where bank audits were 
performed to obtain information and to build up an experience base" (Canadian 
Auditors, 1986, p. 4). 
In a short 10 years, governments have moved from worrying about auditor 
concentration, to worrying about a lack of experience. Without some experience in an 
industry an auditor may produce a poor audit. To gain experience requires some 
persistent market share, although this does not necessarily imply that market share 
equates market power. 
The statements by the Estey Commission emphasize the importance of Eichenseher and 
Danos's and my finding of the persistence of market share in regulated industries. In 
some industries auditor experience may be of value, and policy analysists should be 
willing to concede market as a trade-off for improved quality. 
Large banks in Canada are required to retain two auditors each fiscal year and switch 
auditors periodically. In the light of the Estey Commission findings which suggest that 
experience is of paramount importance to a proper audit, the legislation is an inefficient 
use of resources for banks that must take on an audit of which they must acquire new 
knowledge. The regulatory burden placed on the banking industry is considered to be 
high. Costs attributed to the regulations are passed on to the bank and therefore the 
consumer. Thereby, the consumer is paying for the inefficient use of audit. 
I found that there is considerable concentration in auditing in the large Canadian banks 
with one firm auditing five of six banks. (As reported in Appendix 11.) I suggest given 
the regulations, the number of audit firms employed by the large banks should approach 
three. Evidence in 1992, suggests that this level is nearly being reached. 
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AUDITOR-CLIENT RATIO 
To balance the concentration and specialization information I presented earlier in this 
chapter, I devised a ratio which gives some indication to the lack or prevalence of 
specialization of audit firms within an industry. It reports the number of auditors 
compared to client firms there are in each industry. These findings give further evidence 
to my claim that audit firms have little ability to exercise market power. In regulated 
industries, auditors seem to have greater persistence in keeping specific clients, yet the 
auditor-client ratios seem to be constant over time over all industry categories. The 
specific details are reported in Appendix 9. 
To demonstrate the interesting dynamics of this ratio, I ordered the ratio from smallest to 
largest for each of 1987 and 1992 and graphed them. The considerable closeness of these 
two distributions is remarkable, suggesting that over time an equilibrium ratio of auditors 
to clients exists. In addition, it appears that clients will seek out audit firms that have 
nothing to do with their industry competitors. This suggests that there may be a limit on 
the amount of merger the audit market could withstand, as at some point clients may 
choose to engage mid-size audit firms to avoid using the same auditor as their 
competitors. These findings suggest that audit specialization is not as important as other 
factors to the majority of clients. Please see Graph 11. 
Auditor-Client Ratios: 1987 & 1992 
Ordered from Smallest to Largest Value 
42 Industries 
CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
• The audit market is concentrated overall, with over 70% of audits in the non-financial 
sector and 75% of the audits in the financial sector being performed by the top four 
firms. 
• The audit market reports extremely high concentration measures for industry 
categories. 
• After a period of massive mergers, the concentration level increased overall. Based on 
a t-test using two different measures of market share and two different concentration 
measures in 41 non-financial industries, concentration did not differ significantly 
from the pre-merger levels. 
• The high concentration of audit firms is largely due to a similar high concentration 
of client firms within those industry categories. 
• Apparently, dominant audit firms generally handle one or two clients in an industry, 
of which one client is sufficiently large to create an illusion of market power. 
• Within each industry group, a number of auditors each handle a small number of 
clients. 
• Large audit firms' have significantly larger clients than other audit firms. 
• Merged firms are not different from other firms on the basis of total audit firm 
revenue divided by total client fees (as measured by the sum of the square root of the 
client assets) over the 1987- 1992 period. 
Among client firms that are in each sample (1987 & 1992), only 10 percent of Big 
Eight clients switched to different auditors. 
Of the client firms that have switched, the majority were in non-regulated industries. 
The accounting profession, measured by employment levels, has experienced growth 
over 1986-1991. 
The majority of that growth is represented by women entering the industry. 
Income for individuals in this sector had dropped from 1980 to 1985, but has since 
levelled off. 
Small accounting firms experienced robust growth in both number of businesses (11 
percent), and payroll (40 percent) in the period between 1986 and 1991. 
Large audit firms experienced an 20.7% increase in payroll. 
Mid-size audit firms are decreasing at a rapid rate, measured by number of firms and 
by payroll. This trend does not extend to Quebec, where mid-size firms are 
maintaining their presence. 
There are large differences between large and midsize firms based on the proportion 
of revenue used on payroll. 
Mid-size Quebec firms handle clients that are different in size than clients of large 
and other mid-size audit firms. 
Each province has a leading audit firm based on the number of audits performed, 
although in larger provinces several auditors are well represented in terms of market 
share. 
Parent and subsidiary firms retain the same auditor over 70 percent of the time. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
My thesis results point to the conclusion that the market for accounting services in 
Canada is competitive. 
This analysis incorporated several databases The Globe and Mail top 500 Non-Financial 
and top 100 Financial firms ; Special private data runs provided by Statistics Canada for 
SIC categories 773-Accounting and Bookkeeping Services, and 777—Management 
Consulting Services; and, data collected from The Bottom Line and The Financial Post 
500. 
The industry is highly concentrated, and was so prior to the significant merger activity 
examined in the period between 1987 and 1992. Even if one were to accept the 
Concentration Doctrine, the evidence does not indicate that the changes in the market 
structure have increased the market power of the remaining firms. 
In fact, there is more evidence to suggest that competition is increasing in the audit 
industry, based on the number of auditors operating in each industry segment, the growth 
in business in both the large and small industry segments, which indicate a lack of 
barriers to entry for firms into the industry. 
There are also indications that clients have considerable power to make choices, which 
the suppliers must be subservient to. These indications include the prevalence of regional 
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preferences in auditor choice, the lack of specialization of auditors within each industry 
segment, and the influence of parent firms-even across international borders—in auditor 
choice. 
The regional prevalence of mid-size firms is unique to Canada. Mid-size firms are in 
severe decline across the country, with the one exception of Quebec. These mid-size 
firms have affiliated themselves with national firms to provide a broader mix of products 
for their clients, and given the current political climate, it seems unlikely that this group 
of mid-size regional firms will disappear. 
In addition, the industry specialization by auditors appears to be completely negligible in 
non-regulated industries. This is in contrast to the numerous claims of industry 
specialization by audit firms. What is demonstrated is the dominance of an auditor in an 
industry category is dependant on the method employed of generating the statistic. In 
other words, the finding of auditor industry specialization is most likely confounded with 
client firm dominance in an industry category. 
In fact, based on the auditor-client ratios, it appears that client firms go out of their way to 
contract with auditors that do not already have a contract in the industry. This finding 
suggests that there is a limit to the level of specialization, and market power in an 
industry category. This finding also suggests that audit firms may not reap additional 
market share with additional merger activity. 
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The significant growth of small firms is an indication of healthy competition existing at 
the small server level. This growth may be attributed to various factors in the economy 
such as the growth in the service industry, significant downsizing by large corporations, 
the increased availability and price decline of technology, and minimal barriers to entry. 
The last reason, the low barrier to entry, is important to this study as it provides evidence 
of competition within the industry, especially for small auditors. This lends support to 
Simunic's (1980) assumption of competition for small client firm audits. 
Concerns regarding the erosion of independence for audits because of the change in the 
product mix being offered by accounting firms, appears to have minimal weight in 
Canada. One firm, Arthur Anderson, has few audits but many other clients. It appears, 
although this is not confirmed, this firm has not relied on its audit work to obtain 
consulting, information technology and other contracts. 
On the whole, there appears to be a difference in the clients that the large firms audit, as 
large client firms are more likely to contract large auditors in my sample. Mid-size audit 
firms' clients are significantly smaller than the large audit firms' clients. 
One area of interest is the exceedingly high concentration of auditors for the Big Six 
banks, despite the regulatory requirement of auditor switching. If concentration does 
correlate with market power, which I do not accept to be the case anyway, the switching 
requirement should mitigate the market power. A more important issue is the 
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specialization of an auditor in this industry, the only substantial case in all the industries 
I examined. There may be reason to examine this issue in further depth (bank auditors 
have received considerable attention through the Estey Commission, which examined two 
bank failures) as the potential for big bank mergers is high in the very near future. 
What may have to be considered in the future, if further mergers take place, is the role 
and ability of Canadian regulators to decide 'our own destiny' in the face of international 
changes. After all, it cannot be assumed that what is good for the international company 
or the country(ies) it operates in, is welfare enhancing in Canada. On the other hand, 
impeding Canadian firms from participating in strategic alliances worldwide may be more 
of a detriment and could prevent Canadian firms from being global competitors. 
To restate Demsetz, if high market share is achieved through superior performance in 
open competition with other firms, the successful competitor should not be penalized for 
his success. My findings lead me to conclude that the accounting industry, and the 
merged audit firms, should be respected for their achievements. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Legend: Abbreviations 
aa Arthur Anderson 
ag Auditor General of Alberta 
ay Arthur Young 
be Berger Blais Greene 
bhhhp Burrington, Heywood, Holms, Hills & Blair 
bhp Burrington, Heywood & Partners 
cb Collins Barrow 
cbcg Caron Belanger—Clarkson Gordon 
cbey Caron Belanger—Ernst & Young 
cbmn Collins Barrow—Maheu Noiseux 
cfhc Charette, Fortier, Hawey & Cie 
eg Clarkson Gordon 
cl Coopers & Lybrand 
dc Dunwoody & Co. 
dfk Dionne Forest Kirouac 
dhs Deloitte Haskins Sells 
dt Deloitte & Touche 
dr Doane Raymond 
drp Doane Raymond Pannell 
dw Dunwoody & Co. 
ew Ernst & Whinney 
ey Ernst & Young 
gc Gaviller & Co 
gw Geo. A. Welch & Company 
hda Harel, Drouin & Associes 
hel Hillborn Ellis Grant 
hh Hyde Houghton 
Ictr Lippman Leebosh April & Partners 
Ihlc Langois, Hauck, Lettner & Co 
lilly Lilly, Johannesson, McWilliams, Pallone 
lh Laventhol & Horwath 
11 Lalibert Lanctot 
llcl Lalibert Lanctot-Coopers & Lybrand 
hvga Lipton, Wiseman, Greenspoon & Altbaum 
mbbr Mallette, Benoit, Boulanger, Rondeau & Associes 
mhrgr Miller, Hersh, Rabinovitch, Goldsmith & Rosenthal 
mm Malette Maheu 
mn Maheu Noiseux 
mrr Millard, Rouse & Rosebrugh 
nh Nemeth Hoymeyer & Thody 
phpmt Poissant Thibault—Peat Marwick Thorne 
pkf Pannell Kerr Forester 
pmm Peat Marwick Mitchell 
pmt Peat Marwick Thorne 
pr Poissant Richard 
pw Price Waterhouse 
rcmp Raymond, Chabot, Martin, Pare & Associes 
rptr Roleau Potvin Pellerom Gagnon 
ruv Richer, Usher & Vineberg 
sb Samson Belair 
sbdt Samson Belair —Deloitte Touche 
sc Steele & Co. 
sic Soberman, Isenbaum & Columby 
skrbg Starkman, Kraft, Rothman, Berger & Grill 
slf Schwartz Levitsky Feldman 
thorne Thorne Riddell 
tr Touche Ross 
we Wm. Eisenberg & Co. 
zssl Zittrer, Siblin, Stein, Levine 
APPENDIX 2 
Data and Methodology on the Sample of Top 5 0 0 and Top 1 0 0 Financial Firms for 
1 9 8 7 and 1992: Overall Concentration Statistics 
METHODOLOGY 
I compiled data for the top 500 non-financial firms and top 100 financial firms1, based 
on total assets, for 1987 and 1992. The list of the top 500 and 100 were obtained from 
the Globe and Mail Technical Services. This list included the name of the firm, the 
auditor, and the total assets. 
Using the annual reports of each of these 1200 companies and other background 
information, I added the following information: head office location, primary SIC 
(Standard Industry Classification) number, and the parent or subsidiary(ies) of the firm. 
I then entered the information on a spreadsheet (Quattro Pro 6.0). 
The data were arranged by auditor to determine how many audits were performed by 
each auditor. Using the number of audits each auditor performed, divided by the 
number of audits performed within each sample group (ie. the top 500 for 1987, the 
top 500 for 1992, the top 100 financial for 1987, the top 100 financial for 1992), 
percentages of audits performed by each auditor were calculated.2 
This group contained SIC categories 60,61,62, and 63. 
Some clients had two auditors. Two auditors are required by law for Schedule I banks. Other firms may 
have two auditor requirements imposed upon them by shareholders or other stakeholders in the company. 
Similarly, using the square root of the total assets for each client firm3 another 
'percentage of audits performed' calculation was made. The sum of the square roots of 
assets for all the clients of each auditor was calculated within each sample group. 
These sums were divided by the total sum of square roots of assets for the whole 
sample group. This yielded a percentage of audit business based on probable audit 
revenue (Simunic, 1980) 
These two percentage calculations (herein called market share), based on either the 
number of audits or on the square root of assets, were used to calculate concentration 
statistics. Thus, two concentration statistics were generated for each sample group. 
The CR4, is the percent of business conducted by the top four [audit] firms; the 
Herfindahl Index (HHI) indicates both the concentration and market share of firms in a 
market. 
The Herfindahl Index (HHI) is the sum of the percentage of market share squared, and in 
some cases is represented as the sum of market share (not in percentage form) squared. 
Either is acceptable, and my thesis uses the form that Eichenseher and Danos (1981) use 
where 0<HI>1. Its use in concentration studies is discussed in the body of my thesis. 
Both concentration statistics for each subject group are reported below. 
In these cases, each audit firm was awarded one full audit. Therefore, although my samples are based on 
the top 500 and top 100 firms, the number of audits exceed the number of firms. 
3Korpi and Elliot (1978) determined that the square root of the size of the client firm was an 
accurate proxy for the audit price. A detailed account of the use of this proxy is contained in the 
body of my thesis, under pricing studies. 
DATA 
Market Share - T O D 5 0 0 - 1 9 8 7 
Auditor # of audits % based on 
number of 
audits 
% Based on 
Square Root 
of Assets 
aa 15 2.9 3.6 
ay 3 0.6 0.5 
be 1 0.2 0.1 
bhhhb 1 0.2 0 
cb 3 0.6 0.1 
cflic 1 0.2 0.1 
eg 83 16.1 16.4 
cl 67 13.0 9.9 
dc 1 0.2 0.1 
dhs 25 4.8 3.3 
dr 4 0.8 0.1 
ew 1 0.2 0.1 
gw 1 0.2 0.1 
fn 1 0.2 0.1 
gc 1 0.2 0.1 
hh 1 0.2 0.1 
II 1 0.2 0.1 
Ic 1 0.2 0.1 
Ictr 1 0.2 0.1 
Ih 5 1.0 0.4 
Ihl 1 0.2 0.1 
Iwga 1 0.2 0.1 
mbbr I 0.2 0.2 
mn 3 0.6 0.2 
nh I 0.2 0.1 
pkf 1 0.2 0.1 
pmm 45 8.7 8.1 
pr 3 0.6 3.0 
pw 73 14.1 18.7 
rcmp 12 2.3 2.5 
rptr 1 0.2 0.1 
ruv 7 1.4 0.5 
sb 16 3.1 2.2 
sc 1 0.2 0.1 
M a r k e t Share - T O D 5 0 0 - 1 9 8 7 
skrbg 1 0.2 0.1 
thorne 75 14.5 13.9 
tr 54 10.5 13.7 
we 3 0.6 0.1 
zssl 1 0.2 0.1 
1 9 8 7 Concentration Statistics-Square Root of Assets: C R 4 : 62.7 H H I : 0.1208 
Data Concentration Statistics -Number of Audits: C R 4 : 57.7 H H I : 0.1074 
Market Share -TOD 5 0 0 - 1 9 9 2 
Auditor # of audits % based on 
number of 
audits 
% based on 
Square Root 
of Assets 
aa 22 4.4 4.5 
bhp 1 0.2 0.09 
cbey 3 0.6 0.6 
cl 60 12 9.4 
dfk 1 0.2 0.06 
drp 5 1.0 0.7 
dt 78 15.6 19.5 
ey 69 13.8 15.2 
hda 1 0.2 0.05 
hh 1 0.2 0.08 
Ihlc 1 0.2 0.09 
lilly 1 0.2 0.06 
ilcl 1 0.2 0.06 
mhrgr 1 0.2 0.1 
mm 3 0.6 0.55 
sbdt 19 3.8 2.1 
phpmt 1 0.2 0.24 
pmt 119 23.8 21.4 
pw 83 16.6 21.2 
rcmp 20 4.0 2.3 
ruv 5 1.0 0.3 
sic 1 0.2 0.14 
zssl 1 0.2 0.06 
dw 1 0.2 0.05 
kd 1 0.2 0.06 
ze 2 0.4 0.2 
1 9 9 2 Concentration Statistics-Square Root of Assets CR4: 77.3% HHI: 0.1639 
Data Concentration Statistics-Number of Audits CR4: 69.8% HHI: 0.1473 
Market Share-Financial Firms-1987 
Auditor # of audits % based on 
number of 
audits 
% based on 
Square Root 
of Assets 
aa 1 0.9 .7 
alta 1 0.9 .7 
que 2 1.8 1.5 
can 2 1.8 1.5 
ay 1 0.9 .3 
eg 16 14.2 18.0 
cl 7 6.2 4.4 
dhs 8 7.1 8.1 
dr 2 1.8 1.7 
ey 1 0.9 .7 
llcl 1 0.9 1.0 
mbra 1 0.9 .4 
pkf 1 0.9 .4 
pkmg 1 0.9 .3 
pmm 14 12.4 14.9 
pw 14 12.4 13.4 
rcmp 5 4.4 3.9 
rf 1 0.9 .4 
sb 2 1.8 1 
sic 1 0.9 .4 
thorne 12 10.6 7.9 
tr 16 14.2 15.4 
g & CO 2 1.8 2.1 
t>r_ 1 Q,9 .6 
1987 Concentration Statistics -Square Root of Assets: CR4: 61.7% HHI: 0.1145 
Data Concentration Statistics -Number of Audits: CR4: 53.2% HHI: 0.0957 
Market Share—Fin iancial Firms--1992 
Auditor # of audits % of audits MarketShare 
aa 1 0.9 0.06 
cl 11 9.8 4.9 
dt 33 29.5 27.0 
ey 25 22.3 18.9 
gc 1 0.9 1.7 
heg 2 1.8 0.3 
llcl 1 0.9 1.6 
pmt 17 15.2 25.0 
pw 12 10.7 17.9 
rcmp 6 5.4 5.4 
slf 1 0.9 0.1 
fa­ 1 0.9 0.2 
sh 09 o.s, 
1992 Concentration Statistics -Square Root of Assets 
Data Concentration Statistics -Number of Audits 
CR4:88.8% HHI: 0.2097 
CR4:77.7% HHI: 0.1847 
APPENDIX 3 
SIC Categories* : Top 500 Non-Financial Firms 
Forestry and Forest Products (SIC 8,24,26) 
Metal (SIC 10,33,34) 
Oil and Gas (SIC 13,29,46,55) 
Construction, development and real estate (SIC 15,16,17,65) 
Food Manufacturing (SIC 20) 
Tobacco (SIC 21) 
Textile Mill Product Manufacturing(SIC 22) 
Apparel Manufacturing (SIC 23) 
Furniture and Fixture Manufacturing (SIC 25) 
Printing and Publishing Manufacturing (SIC 27) 
Chemical Manufacturing (SIC 28) 
Rubber and Plastics Manufacturing (SIC 30) 
Stone, Glass, Clay Product Manufacturing (SIC 32) 
Machinery Manufacturing (SIC 35) 
Electrical and Electronic Machinery Manufacturing (SIC 36) 
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing (SIC 37) 
Measuring, Analysing, Controlling Instruments Manufacturing (SIC 38) 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing (SIC 39) 
Railroad Transportation (SIC 40) 
Interurban Transportation (SIC 41) 
Motor Freight Transportation and Warehousing (SIC 42) 
Water Transportation (SIC 44) 
Air Transportation (SIC 45) 
Transportation Services (SIC 47) 
Communications (SIC 48) 
SIC Categories* : Top 500 Non-Financial Firms 
Utilities (SIC 49) 
Wholesale Trade - Durables (SIC 50) 
Wholesale Trade - Non-durables (SIC 51) 
Retail - Building Supplies (SIC 52) 
Retail - General Merchandise (SIC 53) 
Retail - Food (SIC 54) 
Retail - Apparel (SIC 56) 
Retail - Furniture (SIC 57) 
Retail - Eating and Drinking Places (SIC 58) 
Retail - Miscellaneous (SIC 59) 
Holding Companies (SIC 67) 
Hotels (SIC 70) 
Personal Services (SIC 72) 
Business Services (SIC 73) 
Motion Pictures (SIC 78) 
Health Services (SIC 80) 
* SIC's 60,61,62,63 (Banking and Financial Services) are separate from this list. The 
sample of top 100 financial firms contained the 60,61,62,63 categories. 
APPENDIX 4 
CONCENTRATION DATA AND METHODOLOGY: BROKEN DOWN BY INDUSTRY 
CATEGORY 
METHODOLOGY 
One thousand annual reports were examined to determine the primary industry category 
for each of the top 500 non-financial [client] firms in 1987 and 1992. (These two 
sample groups were discussed in Appendix 2.) Each [client] firm was placed in only 
one Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) to ensure no overlap was encountered. 
As I was recording this primary industry information, I also noted secondary industries 
that the client firm participated in. The secondary industry information allowed me to 
group SIC categories together. It was readily apparent from the client firms that many 
firms in one category participated in several other industries, which often were 
vertically integrated. Often, [client] firms that were considered to be competitors in an 
industry, for example, oil and gas, listed different SIC categories as their primary 
industry. This prompted me to group SIC categories based on client participation. 
This grouping is noticeable in areas of forestry, oil and gas, metals, and construction 
for example. Where firms did not organize themselves in a vertically integrated 
fashion, I made no attempt to combine SIC categories.1 
Many of the concentration studies list the assignment of client firms to an industry as a difficulty and likely 
downfall to their study. By examining the dynamics of the client, this technique of grouping SIC categories 
based on vertical integration of the client firms does not make artificial industry groupings. More 
importantly, the issue under examination is the specialization of the auditor in industry groups, and this 
technique provides a more direct test of specialization. This technique is novel to this study. 
Client firms in each of the 1987 and 1992 data sets were classified in the same SIC 
category for each period, unless there was evidence that a reclassification was necessary 
due to [client] firm restructuring. 
The data were arranged by auditor within each industry category to determine how 
many audits were performed by each auditor. The number of audits each auditor 
performed, divided by the number of audits performed within each industry group, 
yielded the percent of audits performed by each auditor in each industry category. 2 
Similarly, using the square root of the total assets for each client firm another 
'percentage of audits performed' calculation was made. The sum of the square roots of 
assets for all the clients of each auditor was calculated within each industry group. 
These sums were divided by the total sum of square roots of assets for the whole 
industry group. 
These two market share calculations, based on number of audits and on square root of 
assets, were used to calculate concentration statistics for each industry group. Thus, 
two alternative market share and two alternative concentration statistics were generated 
for each SIC category in the top 500 non-financial sample for each year [1987 & 1992]. 
As noted in Appendix 2, the CR4 represents the percent of business conducted by the 
2As noted in Appendix 2, some clients had two auditors. Each auditor was awarded one full audit for these 
calculations as well. 
top four [audit] firms; the Herfandahl Index (HHI) indicates both the concentration 
and market share of firms in a market. A t-test was performed to determine if there 
was a significant difference between the mean of the concentrations between 1987 and 
1992. 
Below is the information on each of the industry categories. The concentration 
statistics are reported in Appendix 5. 
DATA 
Forestry and Forest Products (SIC 8,24,26) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
aa 1 3.7 3.1 
cb 1 3.7 1.8 
mn 1 3.7 1.8 
eg 3 11.1 17.9 
cl 4 14.8 9.7 
dhs 1 3.7 4.4 
ew 1 3.7 1.1 
pmm 1 3.7 3.1 
pw 4 14.8 22.4 
rcmp 2 7.4 9.1 
sb 2 7.4 5.6 
thorne 5 18.5 16.6 
tr 1 3.7 3.4 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
aa 1 3.4 3.7 
cl 4 13.8 14.9 
dt 3 10.3 2.8 
phpmt 1 3.4 3.5 
pmt 6 20.7 17.6 
pw 9 31.0 38.7 
rcmp 2 6.9 7.3 
sbdt 1 3.4 1.0 
ey 2 6.9 16.9 
Metal (SIC 10,33,34) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
aa 2 2.3 1 
eg 19 21.8 26.3 
cl 24 27.6 21.3 
dhs 5 5.7 3.1 
lh 1 1.1 .9 
nh 1 1.1 .4 
1 1.1 .4 
pmm 6 6.9 6.7 
pw 9 10.3 16.9 
rcmp 2 2.3 1.2 
sb 1 1.1 .4 
thorne 12 3.8 12.5 
tr 4 4.6 9 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
aa 3 3.8 1.8 
cl 21 26.6 21.1 
dt 5 6.3 8.8 
ey 14 17.7 20.8 
pmt 20 25.3 22.5 
pw 12 15.2 22.3 
rcmp 3 3.8 2.2 
ruv 1 1.3 0.6 
Oil and Gas (SIC 13,29,46,55) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
aa 6 7.6 9.8 
ay 1 1.3 .9 
bhhhb 1 1.3 .4 
cb 1 1.3 .4 
eg 9 11.4 12.6 
cl 8 10.1 6.7 
dhs 4 5.1 2.8 
pmm 7 8.9 8.3 
pw 16 20.3 28.7 
thorne 18 22.8 16.9 
tr 6 7.6 6.6 
rcmp 1 1.3 2.7 
pw 1 1.3 3.1 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
aa 7 8.6 13.7 
cl 9 11.1 8.2 
dt 12 14.8 11.9 
ey 9 11.1 15.7 
pmt 21 25.9 19.1 
pw 21 25.9 31.9 
bhp 1 1.2 0.6 
sbdt 1 1.2 2.5 
Construction, development and real estate (SIC 15,16, 17, 65) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits % of 
market 
ay 1 2.9 1.5 
eg 5 14.7 9.3 
cl 2 5.9 3.8 
dhs 3 8.8 3.7 
dr 2 5.9 3.6 
111 2 5.9 3.3 
Iwga 1 2.9 .9 
pmm 5 14.7 23 
pw 2 5.9 9.4 
rcmp 1 2.9 1.1 
thorne 3 8.8 6.0 
tr 7 20.6 34.4 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits % of 
market 
ab 1 2.8 5.2 
aa 1 2.8 1.3 
dr 2 5.6 3.7 
cl 2 5.6 2.3 
dfk 1 2.8 0.9 
dt 8 22.2 38.3 
ey 2 5.6 3.4 
pmt 10 27.8 28.7 
sbdt 1 2.8 0.9 
ptpmt 1 2.8 0.9 
pw 4 11.1 11.4 
zssl 1 2.8 0.8 
rcmp 1 2.8 1.2 
lilly 1 2.8 0.9 
Food Manufacturing (SIC 20) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
eg 5 20 23.4 
cl 6 24 25.2 
pram 2 8 5.0 
pw 6 24 32.5 
ruv 1 4 1.4 
sb 1 4 1.6 
thorne 3 12 9.6 
tr 1 4 1.4 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
cl 5 22.7 20.8 
dt 1 4.5 1.2 
ey 4 18.2 20.4 
pmt 6 27.3 20.3 
pw 4 18.2 31.4 
rcmp 1 4.5 4.2 
sbdt 1 4.5 1.7 
Tobacco(SIC 21) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
dhs 1 50 75.7 
pw 1 50 24.3 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
cl 1 50 8.2 
dt 1 50 91.8 
Textile Mill Product Manufacturing(SIC 22) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
pmm 1 16.6 15.4 
pw 3 50 38.2 
tr 2 33.3 46.5 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
cl 1 20 12.5 
dt 1 20 40.5 
pw 2 40 33.2 
rcmp 1 20 13.8 
Apparel Manufacturing (SIC 23) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
pw 1 33 24 
tr 1 33 18 
we 1 33 58 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
dt 3 75 86.4 
ze 1 25 13.6 
Furniture and Fixture Manufacturing (SIC 25) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
pw 1 20 41.5 
sb 1 20 13.9 
skkbg 1 20 13.6 
thorne 1 20 17.1 
we 1 20 13.8 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
kd 1 20 14.2 
mhrgr 1 20 23.2 
pmt 1 20 13.9 
pw 1 20 35.6 
rcmp 1 20 13.1 
Printing and Publishing Manufacturing (SIC 27) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits % of 
market 
aa 1 8.3 16.7 
eg 3 25 19.8 
cl 1 8.3 4.4 
pw 1 8.3 14.1 
prichard 1 8.3 10.3 
sb 2 16.6 6.2 
thorne 3 25 28.4 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
cbey 1 7.1 1.7 
cl 2 14.2 12.8 
ey 4 28.6 24.1 
pmt 3 21.4 26.3 
ptpmt 1 7.1 12.5 
pw 1 7.1 12.3 
sbdt 2 14.2 10.3 
Chemical Manufacturing (SIC 28) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
eg 1 12.5 4.6 
cl 2 25 13.6 
pram 1 12.5 7.8 
thorne 3 37.5 60.5 
tr 1 12.5 13.5 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
cl 1 9.1 2.1 
dt 2 18.2 23.0 
ey 1 9.1 4.2 
pmt 4 36.4 26.8 
pw 2 18.2 40.6 
sbdt 1 9.1 3.4 
Rubber and Plastics Manufacturing (SIC 30) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
cl 1 14.3 9.3 
pmm 2 28.6 25.7 
pw 2 28.6 40.3 
gc 1 14.3 16.7 
thorne 1 14.3 8 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
cl 1 12.5 9.4 
ey 1 12.5 20.5 
pmt 4 50 48.0 
sbdt 2 25 22.2 
Stone, Glass, Clay Product Manufacturing (SIC 32) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits % of 
market 
aa 1 20 15.9 
pw 1 20 10.9 
thorne 1 20 33.2 
tr 2 40 40.0 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits % of 
market 
aa 1 25 15.0 
dt 1 25 30.6 
pmt 1 25 41.3 
pw 1 25 13.0 
Machinery Manufacturing (SIC 35) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
aa 1 10 10.3 
eg 1 10 23.0 
dhs 1 10 3.3 
pmm 2 20 35.9 
pw 2 20 8.1 
tr 3 30 19.3 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
cl 1 9.1 6.1 
dt 3 27.3 20.9 
ey 2 18.2 7.6 
mrr 1 9.1 3.2 
pmt 2 18.2 55.1 
pw 2 18.2 7.2 
Electrical and Electronic Machinery Manufacturing (SIC 36) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
be 1 5.3 1.8 
cb 1 5.3 6.4 
eg 4 21 17.8 
cl 3 15.8 7.6 
dhs 1 5.3 1.6 
pmm 4 21 15.5 
pw 1 5.3 4.1 
ruv 1 5.3 1.8 
thorne 1 5.3 2.1 
tr 2 10.5 41.3 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
cbey 1 7.1 17.4 
cl 1 7.1 5.7 
dr 1 7.1 2.1 
dt 3 21.4 40.3 
ey 3 21.4 12.3 
pmt 3 21.4 13.0 
pw 1 7.1 6.1 
rcmp 1 7.1 3.0 
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing (SIC 37) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
eg 3 42.9 70.6 
cl 2 28.6 13.4 
sb 1 14.3 8.5 
tr 1 14.3 7.5 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
dt 1 20 6.7 
ey 3 60 80.9 
sbdt 1 20 12.4 
Measuring, Analysing, Controlling Instruments Manufacturing (SIC 38) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
eg 2 50 36.4 
dhs 1 25 21.1 
thorne 1 25 42.4 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits % of 
market 
ey 2 50 37.8 
pw 1 25 52.5 
rcmp 1 25 9.7 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing (SIC 39) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
Ictr 1 33 38.5 
tr 2 66 61.5 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
dt 1 33 25.9 
pmt 2 66 74.1 
Railroad Transportation (SIC 40) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
pw 1 50 78.3 
cl 1 50 21.7 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
cl 1 50 20.4 
pw 1 50 79.6 
Interurban Transportation (SIC 41) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
tr 1 100 100 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
dt 1 100 100 
Motor Freight Transportation and Warehousing (SIC 42) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
dhs 1 50 54.2 
cl 1 50 45.8 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
aa 1 20 9.8 
cl 2 40 23.6 
dt 1 20 51.5 
rcmp 1 20 15.1 
Water Transportation (SIC 44) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
dhs 1 50 71.8 
sb 1 50 28.2 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
dt 1 25 30.7 
ey 1 25 23.0 
pmt 1 25 34.0 
sbdt 1 25 12.3 
Air Transportation (SIC 45) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
dr 1 50 13.4 
thorne 1 50 86.6 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
aa 1 20 4.5 
cbey 1 20 5.6 
dr 1 20 10.0 
pmt 1 20 33.3 
pw 1 20 46.6 
Transportation Services (SIC 47) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
eg 1 100 100 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
dt 1 33 38.2 
pmt 1 33 26.5 
rcmp 1 33 35.3 
Communications (SIC 48) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
aa 2 7.1 11.4 
eg 7 25 19.0 
dhs 2 7.1 3.4 
mn 1 3.6 1.7 
pmm 1 3.6 1.5 
pw 3 10.7 6.1 
sb 2 7.1 6.4 
thorne 3 10.7 8.0 
tr 5 17.9 38.1 
cfhc 1 3.6 2.4 
zssl 1 3.6 1.6 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
cl 1 3.6 2.0 
dt 9 32.1 52.1 
sbdt 3 10.7 5.5 
ey 5 17.9 11 
pmt 5 17.9 13.7 
pw 2 7.1 2.8 
rcmp 1 3.6 0.7 
aa 2 7.1 12.3 
Utilities (SIC 49) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
eg 4 25 31.3 
cl 1 6.3 7.5 
pw 5 31.2 33 
sb 1 6.3 5.7 
pr 1 6.3 5.7 
thorne 2 12.5 10.3 
tr 2 12.5 6.6 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
aa 1 4.3 1.8 
dt 4 17.4 13.8 
ey 6 26.1 36.0 
pmt 5 21.7 24.1 
pw 7 30.4 24.4 
Wholesale Trade -Durables (SIC 50) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
aa 1 5 9 
cl 2 10 17.7 
hh 1 5 3.3 
11 1 5 2.7 
pmm 3 15 11.5 
pw 1 5 5.6 
rcmp 3 15 13.6 
rptr 1 5 3.9 
tr 2 10 18 
ruv 2 10 6.6 
sb 1 5 3.7 
thorne 2 10 8.1 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
aa 1 4.5 8.4 
cl 2 9.1 20.7 
dt 6 27.3 33.1 
hda 1 4.5 1.9 
hh 1 4.5 2.6 
pmt 5 22.7 16.0 
pw 1 4.5 3.8 
rcmp 3 13.6 8.1 
ruv 1 4.5 3.2 
sbdt 1 4.5 2.3 
Wholesale Trade - Non-durables (SIC 51) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
cl 1 11.1 4.5 
mbbr 1 11.1 10.9 
mn 1 11.1 4.9 
pw 1 11.1 8.8 
sb 1 11.1 4.7 
thorne 3 33.3 60.5 
tr 1 11.1 5.7 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
ey 1 7.7 4.9 
mm 2 15.4 16.3 
pmt 4 30.8 55.1 
pw 2 15.4 10.0 
rcmp 1 7.7 3.4 
ruv 1 7.7 2.3 
sbdt 2 15.4 8.0 
Retail - Building Supplies (SIC 52) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
tr 1 100 100 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
dt 2 50 56.1 
llcl 1 25 11.2 
mm 1 25 32.7 
Retail - General Merchandise (SIC 53) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
cl 1 16.7 14.9 
dhs 2 33.3 13.6 
pmm 1 16.7 31.3 
tr 1 16.7 26.6 
we 1 16.7 13.5 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
aa 1 20 19.7 
dt 1 20 30.7 
pmt 1 20 35.6 
pw 1 20 9.7 
ruv 1 20 4.3 
Retail - Food (SIC 54) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
cl 1 14.3 18.7 
eg 1 14.3 19.2 
rcmp 1 14.3 19.2 
dr 1 14.3 13.6 
Ihl 1 14.3 4.9 
pmm 1 14.3 15.5 
thorne 1 14.3 8.9 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits % of 
market 
drp 1 25 38.4 
ey 1 25 10.8 
lhlc 1 25 11.3 
rcmp 1 25 39.6 
Retail - Apparel (SIC 56) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
cl 1 20 31.8 
Ih 1 20 12.7 
pmm 1 20 25.2 
ruv 1 20 14.9 
thorne 1 20 15.3 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
pw 2 28.6 22.1 
cl 1 14.3 29.8 
dw 1 14.3 9.5 
pmt 1 14.3 18.7 
ruv 1 14.3 9.5 
sbdt 1 14.3 10.4 
Retail - Furniture (SIC 57) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
eg 1 50 58.6 
ruv 1 50 41.4 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
ey 1 33 37.7 
pmt 1 33 27.9 
sbdt 1 33 34.4 
Retail - Eating and Drinking Places (SIC 58) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
eg 1 50 67.1 
cl 1 50 32.9 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
cl 1 50 41.2 
ey 1 50 58.8 
Retail - Miscellaneous (SIC 59) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
eg 1 50 
thorne 1 50 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
ey 1 50 12.4 
pmt 1 50 87.6 
Holding Companies (SIC 67) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
eg 6 15.4 8.9 
fn 1 2.6 1.1 " 
cl 1 2.6 1.0 
dc 1 2.6 .9 
dhs 2 5.1 3 
lh 1 2.6 1.1 
pmm 2 5.1 4.4 
pw 8 20.5 40.5 
rcmp 1 2.6 1.0 
ruv 1 2.6 1.1 
sb 1 2.6 5.2 
pr 1 2.6 5.2 
sc 1 2.6 1.2 
thorne 6 15.4 8.5 
tr 6 15.4 24 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
dt 2 66 48.3 
pw 1 33 51.7 
Hotels (SIC 70) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
gw 1 33 28.6 
pram 1 33 45.8 
rcmp 1 33 25.6 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits % of 
market 
cl 1 25 33.5 
dt 1 25 17.2 
pmt 1 25 37.0 
rcmp 1 25 12.3 
Personal Services (SIC 72) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
pmm 1 100 100 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
ey 1 SO 26.3 
pmt 1 50 73.7 
Business Services (SIC 73) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
eg 2 33.3 26.9 
pmm 2 33.3 24.1 
thorne 1 16.7 41.5 
tr 1 16.7 7.5 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
aa 1 10 4.0 
dt 2 20 7.9 
ey 1 10 12.7 
pmt 4 40 18.2 
pw 2 20 57.2 
Motion Pictures (SIC 78) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
thorne 1 100 100 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of 
market 
aa 1 33 15.5 
pmt 1 33 56.9 
ze 1 33 27.6 
Health Services (SIC 80) 
1987 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of market 
eg 1 100 100 
1992 
auditor #of audits % of audits %of market 
dt 1 20 11.3 
ey 1 20 32.4 
pmt 1 20 9.0 
pw 1 20 25.6 
sic 1 20 21.7 
APPENDIX 5 
Concentration Ratio Top Four Firms (CR4) - By Number of Audits 
SIC Category 1987 1992 
Forestry and Forest Products (SIC 8,24,26) 59.2 75.8 
Metal (SIC 10,33,34) 66.6 84.8 
Oil and Gas (SIC 13,29,46,55) 64.6 77.7 
Construction, development and real estate(SIC 15,16,17,65) 58.8 66.7 
Food Manufacturing (SIC 20) 80.0 86.4 
Tobacco (SIC 21) 100 100 
Textile Mill Product Manufacturing(SIC 22) 100 100 
Apparel Manufacturing (SIC 23) 100 100 
Furniture and Fixture Manufacturing (SIC 25) 80.0 80.0 
Printing and Publishing Manufacturing (SIC 27) 74.9 78.4 
Chemical Manufacturing (SIC 28) 87.5 81.8 
Rubber and Plastics Manufacturing (SIC 30) 85.7 100 
Stone, Glass, Clay Product Manufacturing (SIC 32) 100 100 
Machinery Manufacturing (SIC 35) 80.0 81.8 
Electrical and Electronic Machinery Manufacturing (SIC 36) 68.3 71.3 
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing (SIC 37) 100 100 
Measuring, Analysing, Controlling Instruments Manufacturing 
(SIC 38) 
100 100 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing (SIC 39) 100 100 
Railroad Transportation (SIC 40) 100 100 
Interurban Transportation (SIC 41) 100 100 
Motor Freight Transportation and Warehousing (SIC 42) 100 100 
Water Transportation (SIC 44) 100 100 
Data and Methodology on the Sample of Top 500 Non-Financial Firms for 1987 
and 1992: Industry Concentration Data Summary 
Concentration Ratio Top Four Firms (CR4) - By Number of Audits 
Air Transportation (SIC 45) 100 80 
Transportation Services (SIC 47) 100 100 
Communications (SIC 48) 64.3 78.6 
Utilities (SIC 49) 81.1 95.7 
Wholesale Trade - Durables (SIC 50) 50.0 72.7 
Wholesale Trade - Non-durables (SIC 51) 66.6 77.0 
Retail - Building Supplies (SIC 52) 100 100 
Retail - General Merchandise (SIC 53) 83.3 80.0 
Retail - Food (SIC 54) 57.2 100 
Retail - Apparel (SIC 56) 80.0 71.4 
Retail - Furniture (SIC 57) 100 100 
Retail - Eating and Drinking Places (SIC 58) 100 100 
Retail - Miscellaneous (SIC 59) 100 100 
Holding Companies (SIC 67) 66.7 100 
Hotels (SIC 70) 100 100 
Personal Services (SIC 72) 100 100 
Business Services (SIC 73) 100 90 
Motion Pictures (SIC 78) 100 100 
Health Services (SIC 80) 100 80 
Herfindahl Index — Number of Audits 
SIC Category 1987 1992 
Forestry and Forest Products (SIC 8,24,26) 0.1109 0.1816 
Metal (SIC 10,33,34) 0.1474 0.1962 
Oil and Gas (SIC 13,29,46,55) 0.1393 0.1884 
Construction, development and real estate(SIC 15,16,17,65) 0.1176 0.1546 
Food Manufacturing (SIC 20) 0.1808 0.1984 
Tobacco (SIC 21) 0.5 0.5 
Textile Mill Product Manufacturing(SIC 22) 0.3884 0.28 
Apparel Manufacturing (SIC 23) 0.3267 0.625 
Furniture and Fixture Manufacturing (SIC 25) 0.2 0.2 
Printing and Publishing Manufacturing (SIC 27) 0.1801 0.1830 
Chemical Manufacturing (SIC 28) 0.25 0.2236 
Rubber and Plastics Manufacturing (SIC 30) 0.2249 0.3436 
Stone, Glass, Clay Product Manufacturing (SIC 32) 0.28 0.25 
Machinery Manufacturing (SIC 35) 0.2 0.1905 
Electrical and Electronic Machinery Manufacturing (SIC 36) 0.1410 0.1626 
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing (SIC 37) 0.3067 0.44 
Measuring, Analysing, Controlling Instruments Manufacturing 
(SIC 38) 
0.375 0.375 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing (SIC 39) 0.5445 0.5445 
Railroad Transportation (SIC 40) 0.5 0.5 
Interurban Transportation (SIC 41) 1 1 
Motor Freight Transportation and Warehousing (SIC 42) 0.5 0.28 
Water Transportation (SIC 44) 0.5 0.25 
Air Transportation (SIC 45) 0.5 0.2 
Transportation Services (SIC 47) 1 0.3267 
Communications (SIC 48) 0.1377 0.1912 
Herfindahl Index - Number of Audits 
Utilities (SIC 49) 0.2030 0.2398 
Wholesale Trade - Durables (SIC 50) 0.1 0.1650 
Wholesale Trade - Non-durables (SIC 51) 0.1848 0.1838 
Retail - Building Supplies (SIC 52) 1 0.375 
Retail - General Merchandise (SIC 53) 0.2224 0.2 
Retail - Food (SIC 54) 0.1431 0.25 
Retail - Apparel (SIC 56) 0.2 0.1840 
Retail - Furniture (SIC 57) 0.5 0.3267 
Retail - Eating and Drinking Places (SIC 58) 0.5 0.5 
Retail - Miscellaneous (SIC 59) 0.5 0.5 
Holding Companies (SIC 67) 0.1245 0.5445 
Hotels (SIC 70) 0.3267 0.25 
Personal Services (SIC 72) 1 0.5 
Business Services (SIC 73) 0.2776 0.26 
Motion Pictures (SIC 78) 1 0.3267 
Health Services (SIC 80) 1 0.2 
Concentration Ratio Top Four Firms (CR4) - By Square Root of Total 
Assets 
SIC Category 1987 1992 
Forestry and Forest Products (SIC 8,24,26) 66.6 88.1 
Metal (SIC 10,33,34) 77.0 86.7 
Oil and Gas (SIC 13,29,46,55) 68.0 80.4 
Construction, development and real estate<sic is, i6,17,65) 76.1 83.6 
Food Manufacturing (SIC 20) 90.7 92.9 
Tobacco (SIC 21) 100 100 
Textile Mill Product Manufacturing(SIC 22) 100 100 
Apparel Manufacturing (SIC 23) 100 100 
Furniture and Fixture Manufacturing (SIC 25) 86.3 86.9 
Printing and Publishing Manufacturing (SIC 27) 79.0 75.7 
Chemical Manufacturing (SIC 28) 82.4 94.5 
Rubber and Plastics Manufacturing (SIC 30) 92.0 100 
Stone, Glass, Clay Product Manufacturing (SIC 32) 100 100 
Machinery Manufacturing (SIC 35) 88.5 90.7 
Electrical and Electronic Machinery Manufacturing (SIC 36) 82.2 83.0 
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing (SIC 37) 100 100 
Measuring, Analysing, Controlling Instruments Manufacturing 
(SIC 38) 
100 100 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing (SIC 39) 100 100 
Railroad Transportation (SIC 40) 100 100 
Interurban Transportation (SIC 41) 100 100 
Motor Freight Transportation and Warehousing (SIC 42) 100 100 
Water Transportation (SIC 44) 100 100 
Air Transportation (SIC 45) 100 95.5 
Transportation Services (SIC 47) 100 100 
Concentration Ratio Top Four Firms (CR4) - By Square Root of Total 
Assets 
Communications (SIC 48) 76.5 89.1 
Utilities (SIC 49) 82.1 98.2 
Wholesale Trade - Durables (SIC SO) 60.8 78.2 
Wholesale Trade - Non-durables (SIC 51) 85.9 89.4 
Retail - Building Supplies (SIC 52) 100 100 
Retail - General Merchandise (SIC 53) 86.4 95.7 
Retail - Food (SIC 54) 72.6 100 
Retail - Apparel (SIC 56) 87.2 81.0 
Retail - Furniture (SIC 57) 100 100 
Retail - Eating and Drinking Places (SIC 58) 100 100 
Retail - Miscellaneous (SIC 59) 100 100 
Holding Companies (SIC 67) 81.9 100 
Hotels (SIC 70) 100 100 
Personal Services (SIC 72) 100 100 
Business Services (SIC 73) 100 96.0 
Motion Pictures (SIC 78) 100 100 
Health Services (SIC 80) 100 91.0 
Herfindahl Index — By Square Root of Total Assets 
SIC Category 1987 1992 
Forestry and Forest Products (SIC 8,24,26) 0.1366 0.2403 
Metal (SIC 10,33,34) 0.1725 0.1967 
Oil and Gas (SIC 13,29,46,55) 0.1548 0.2032 
Construction, development and real estate(SIC 15,16,17,65) 0.1979 0.2481 
Food Manufacturing (SIC 20) 0.2359 0.2268 
Tobacco (SIC 21) 0.6325 0.8489 
Textile Mill Product Manufacturing(SIC 22) 0.3852 0.3089 
Apparel Manufacturing (SIC 23) 0.4262 0.7643 
Furniture and Fixture Manufacturing (SIC 25) 0.2587 0.2374 
Printing and Publishing Manufacturing (SIC 27) 0.1842 0.1852 
Chemical Manufacturing (SIC 28) 0.4110 0.2925 
Rubber and Plastics Manufacturing (SIC 30) 0.2714 0.3298 
Stone, Glass, Clay Product Manufacturing (SIC 32) 0.3075 0.3041 
Machinery Manufacturing (SIC 35) 0.2377 0.3626 
Electrical and Electronic Machinery Manufacturing (SIC 36) 0.2392 0.2335 
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing (SIC 37) 0.5296 0.6738 
Measuring, Analysing, Controlling Instruments Manufacturing 
(SIC 38) 
0.3574 0.4282 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing (SIC 39) 0.5264 0.6161 
Railroad Transportation (SIC 40) 0.6600 0.6748 
Interurban Transportation (SIC 41) 1 1 
Motor Freight Transportation and Warehousing (SIC 42) 0.5035 0.3536 
Water Transportation (SIC 44) 0.5946 0.2778 
Herfindahl Index — By Square Root of Total Assets 
Air Transportation (SIC 45) 0.7677 0.3434 
Transportation Services (SIC 47) 1 0.3407 
Communications (SIC 48) 0.2118 0.3219 
Utilities (SIC 49) 0.2335 0.2665 
Wholesale Trade - Durables (SIC 50) 0.1226 0.1953 
Wholesale Trade - Non-durables (SIC 51) 0.3959 0.3507 
Retail - Building Supplies (SIC 52) 1 0.4341 
Retail - General Merchandise (SIC 53) 0.2280 0.2709 
Retail-Food (SIC 54) 0.1616 0.3282 
Retail - Apparel (SIC 56) 0.2267 0.2015 
Retail - Furniture (SIC 57) 0.5147 0.3383 
Retail - Eating and Drinking Places (SIC 58) 0.5587 0.5155 
Retail - Miscellaneous (SIC 59) 0.6072 0.7829 
Holding Companies (SIC 67) 0.2457 0.5006 
Hotels (SIC 70) 0.3267 0.25 
Personal Services (SIC 72) 1 0.6126 
Business Services (SIC 73) 0.3081 0.3841 
Motion Pictures (SIC 78) 1 0.4243 
Health Services (SIC 80) 1 0.2386 
APPENDIX 6 
Total Number of Industry Categories each Auditor 
Auditor 1987 1992 Changes 
aa 8 13 5 
cg/ey 21 23 2 
cl 20 19 -1 
pw 17 24 7 
rcmp 8 13 5 
sb/sbdt 12 14 2 
dhs/dt 13 27 
tr/dt 22 3 
thorne 23 28 
pmm 18 4 
Data and Methodology on the Number of SIC Categories each Auditor Audits 
METHODOLOGY 
Using the industry information, a simple count of how many industry categories each 
audit firm had an audit was made. In the case of merged firms (Thorne and PMM to 
PMT; DHS and TR to DT), or name changes (CG to EY), or affiliations (SB to SBDT), 
the information for these changed entities is contained on the same row for ease of 
comparison. This information comes from the top 500 samples, and the maximum 
number of categories is 41. 
DATA 
APPENDIX 7 
Data and Methodology on Auditor Client Ratios 
METHODOLOGY 
The ratio of the number of auditors to clients (or more specifically audits) was 
calculated for each industry category. In simple terms, the number of auditors was 
divided by the total number of audits in each SIC category. This is a new measure 
created for this analysis. 
If the ratio is equal to one, there is a different auditor for each audit. As the ratio 
approaches zero, either one auditor audits all (or most) or the clients, or there are few 
clients. 
The ratio catches dynamics of auditor specialization that both the CR4 and HHI miss. 
The ratio ignores client firm size, as do the concentration statistics based on the number 
of audits (as opposed to the square root of total assets data). The ratio is a 
complimentary measure to the concentration statistics as it indicates how many auditors 
are involved in a industry compared to the number of clients. The ratio is especially 
helpful in industry categories in which there are only a small number of client firms. 
Instead of focussing on the auditors, this ratio shifts some attention to the dynamics of 
the clients and the industry they participate in. 
A t-test was performed to determine if there is a significant difference between the 
mean of the ratios between 1987 and 1992 . 
DATA 
Auditor-Client Ratio 
SIC Category 1987 %1987 1992 %1992 
Forestry and Forest Products (SIC 8,24,26) 13/27 0.48 9/29 0.31 
Metal (SIC 1 0,33,34) 13/87 0.15 8/79 0.1 
Oil and Gas (SIC 13,29,46,55) 13/79 0.16 8/81 0.1 
Construction, development and real estate(SIC 15, 
16,17,65) 
12/34 0.35 14/36 0.39 
Food Manufacturing (SIC 20) 8/25 0.32 7/22 0.32 
Tobacco (SIC 21) 2/2 1 2/2 1 
Textile Mill Product Manufacturing(SIC 22) 3/6 0.5 4/5 0.8 
Apparel Manufacturing (SIC 23) 3/3 1 2/4 0.5 
Furniture and Fixture Manufacturing (SIC 25) 5/5 1 5/5 1 
Printing and Publishing Manufacturing (SIC 27) 7/12 0.58 7/14 0.5 
Chemical Manufacturing (SIC 28) 5/8 0.625 6/11 0.55 
Rubber and Plastics Manufacturing (SIC 30) 5/7 0.71 4/8 0.5 
Stone, Glass, Clay Product Manufacturing (SIC 
32) 
4/5 0.8 4/4 1 
Machinery Manufacturing (SIC 35) 6/10 0.6 6/11 0.55 
Electrical and Electronic Machinery 
Manufacturing (SIC 36) 
10/19 0.53 8/14 0.57 
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing (SIC 
37) 
4/7 0.57 3/5 0.6 
Measuring, Analysing, Controlling Instruments 
Manufacturing (SIC 38) 
3/4 0.75 3/4 0.75 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing (SIC 39) 2/3 0.66 2/3 0.66 
Railroad Transportation (SIC 40) 2/2 1 2/2 1 
Interurban Transportation (SIC 41) 1/1 1 1/1 1 
Auditor—Client Ratio 
Motor Freight Transportation and Warehousing 
(SIC 42) 
2/2 1 4/5 0.8 
Water Transportation (SIC 44) 2/2 1 4/4 1 
Air Transportation (SIC 45) 2/2 1 5/5 1 
Transportation Services (SIC 47) 1/1 1 3/3 1 
Communications (SIC 48) 11/28 0.39 8/28 0.29 
Utilities (SIC 49) 7/16 0.44 5/23 0.22 
Wholesale Trade - Durables (SIC 50) 12/20 0.6 10/22 0.45 
Wholesale Trade - Non-durables (SIC 51) 7/9 0.78 7/13 0.54 
Retail - Building Supplies (SIC 52) 1/1 1 3/4 0.75 
Retail - General Merchandise (SIC 53) 5/6 0.83 5/5 1 
Retail - Food (SIC 54) 7/7 1 4/4 1 
Retail - Apparel (SIC 56) 5/5 1 6/7 0.86 
Retail - Furniture (SIC 57) 2/2 1 3/3 1 
Retail - Eating and Drinking Places (SIC 58) 2/2 1 2/2 1 
Retail - Miscellaneous (SIC 59) 2/2 1 2/2 1 
Holding Companies (SIC 67) 15/39 0.38 2/3 0.67 
Hotels (SIC 70) 3/3 1 4/4 1 
Personal Services (SIC 72) 1/1 1 1/1 1 
Business Services (SIC 73) 4/6 0.67 5/10 0.5 
Motion Pictures (SIC 78) 1/1 1 3/3 1 
Health Services (SIC 80) 1/1 1 5/5 1 
APPENDIX 8 
Parent-Subsidiary Firm Data and Methodology on the Sample of Top 500 Non-
Financial Firms 1992: HHI Comparisons 
METHODOLOGY 
Using the annual reports of the top 500 non-financial firms for 1992,1 both parent and 
subsidiary firms of the firms in my sample were recorded. All subsidiary firms were 
pulled out of the database (the database described in Appendix 2), and concentration 
(HHI) statistics were calculated and compared to the originals. 
Although most of the parent-subsidiary groups were domestic, some Canadian firms 
had internationally based parents. In these cases, the Canadian subsidiary was pulled 
out of my database. 
The subsidiaries were pulled out of the database regardless of which auditor they 
used. A simple calculation of how many parent-subsidiary groups used the same 
auditor was also performed. 
The parent - subsidiary relationships of the client firms were based on ownership, and 
was for the most part easy to determine. Investment in a firm by pension groups and 
investment firms, did not constitute parental status.2 The subsidiaries were pulled 
from the data set, and the concentration statistics were performed on this subset of the 
original data. 
The 1987 data additional data sources were not sufficiently reliable for this part of the study. Therefore I 
performed the parental concentration only on the 1992 data. 
Although this influence does beg an interesting question, as to the influence of money and pension 
managers over auditor choice. Studies have examined the influence of bankers and lenders in the auditor 
choice. 
DATA 
Comparing Parent to Regular Data (using HHI) —By Square Root of 
Total Assets 
SIC Category 1992 1992P 
Forestry and Forest Products (SIC 8,24,26) 0.2403 0.2112 
Metal (SIC 10,33,34) 0.1967 0.2059 
Oil and Gas (SIC 13,29,46,55) 0.2032 0.1802 
Construction, development and real estate(SIC 15,16,17,65) 0.2481 0.2362 
Food Manufacturing (SIC 20) 0.2268 0.2343 
Tobacco (SIC 21) 0.8489 — 
Textile Mill Product Manufacturing(SIC 22) 0.3089 0.3193 
Apparel Manufacturing (SIC 23) 0.7643 0.7291 
Furniture and Fixture Manufacturing (SIC 25) 0.2374 0.2374 
Printing and Publishing Manufacturing (SIC 27) 0.1852 0.1785 
Chemical Manufacturing (SIC 28) 0.2925 0.3059 
Rubber and Plastics Manufacturing (SIC 30) 0.3298 0.3298 
Stone, Glass, Clay Product Manufacturing (SIC 32) 0.3041 0.3041 
Machinery Manufacturing (SIC 35) 0.3626 0.2603 
Electrical and Electronic Machinery Manufacturing (SIC 36) 0.2335 0.2335 
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing (SIC 37) 0.6738 0.6137 
Measuring, Analysing, Controlling Instruments Manufacturing 
(SIC 38) 
0.4282 0.4282 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing (SIC 39) 0.6161 0.6161 
Railroad Transportation (SIC 40) 0.6748 0.6748 
Interurban Transportation (SIC 41) 1 — 
Motor Freight Transportation and Warehousing (SIC 42) 0.3536 0.4225 
Water Transportation (SIC 44) 0.2778 0.2778 
Comparing Parent to Regular Data (using HHI) —By Square Root of 
Total Assets 
Air Transportation (SIC 45) 0.3434 0.3434 
Transportation Services (SIC 47) 0.3407 0.3407 
Communications (SIC 48) 0.3219 0.4298 
Utilities (SIC 49) 0.2665 0.3065 
Wholesale Trade - Durables (SIC 50) 0.1953 0.2178 
Wholesale Trade - Non-durables (SIC 51) 0.3507 0.2406 
Retail - Building Supplies (SIC 52) 0.4341 0.4341 
Retail - General Merchandise (SIC 53) 0.2709 0.3678 
Retail-Food (SIC 54) 0.3282 0.3282 
Retail - Apparel (SIC 56) 0.2015 0.2015 
Retail - Furniture (SIC 57) 0.3383 0.3383 
Retail - Eating and Drinking Places (SIC 58) 0.5155 1 
Retail - Miscellaneous (SIC 59) 0.7829 0.7829 
Holding Companies (SIC 67) 0.5006 1 
Hotels (SIC 70) 0.25 0.2937 
Personal Services (SIC 72) 0.6126 0.6126 
Business Services (SIC 73) 0.3841 0.3966 
Motion Pictures (SIC 78) 0.4243 0.5395 
Health Services (SIC 80) 0.2386 0.2386 
indicates that there are no firms left in the industry category. 
APPENDIX 9 
Alberta 
Auditor % of audits 
aa 5.7 
ab 1.0 
bhp 1.0 
cl 7.6 
dt 17.1 
ey 12.4 
pmt 26.7 
pw 28.6 
British Columbia 
aa 8.8 
cl 21.1 
dr 1.8 
dt 14.0 
ey 8.8 
lilly 1.8 
pmt 29.8 
pw 14.0 
DISTRIBUTION OF AUDITS BASED ON LOCATION OF CLIENT FIRM HEADQUARTERS 
(BY PROVINCE) 
METHODOLOGY 
The client firm's headquarters were added to the data described in Appendix 2. The 
number of audits each auditor performed in each province was noted, and the percentage 
of audits performed by each auditor was calculated by dividing the number of audits per 
auditor by the total number of audits in the province. 
DATA 
Province: 
Manitoba 
c! 30 
dt 40 
pmt 10 
pw 20 
Newfoundland 
dr 20 
dt 60 
pmt 20 
Nova Scotia 
cl 12.5 
dr 37.5 
ey 50 
Ontario 
aa 3.6 
cl 13.8 
dt 16.3 
ey 19.9 
pmt 29.1 
pw 14.8 
kd .5 
Ihlc .5 
mrr .5 
ruv .5 
sic .5 
Prince Edward Island 
ey 50 
pw 50 
Quebec 
aa 2.7 
cl 8.0 
dt 8.9 
ey 3.6 
pmt 10.7 
pw 11.6 
dw 0.9 
ze 1.8 
cbey 2.7 
dfk 0.9 
hda 0.9 
hh 0.9 
llcl 0.9 
mhrgr 0.9 
mm 2.7 
sbdt 17.0 
ptpmt 2.7 
rcmp 17.8 
ruv 3.6 
zssl 0.9 
Saskatchewan 
dt 50 
ey 25 
pmt 25 
APPENDIX 10 
Data on Clients changing auditor ('switching') over 1987-1992 period 
METHODOLOGY 
The data were prepared in the following manner. A list of the firms that appeared in both 
samples was compiled by visually comparing both lists. The firms were then categorized 
by auditor for the 1987 year. This created a lists of clients for each auditor. The client's 
1992 auditor was then written down beside the client. Totals for retained auditor, and 
new (switched) auditor were then calculated. 
The merged firms were treated as the same firm from 1987 to 1992. Therefore, a change 
in auditor because of merger was not considered a switch and the data is 'controlled for' 
merger activity. For simplicity, the 1992 auditor name is used rather than the 1987 pre­
merger names in the tables below. 
The data does not reflect any changes made in the years between the two samples. It only 
examines the client's auditor in the year 1987 and in the year 1992, and determines if 
the client uses the same auditor in both, or if the client uses different auditors for each 
year. 
In addition, only the Top 500 samples were used in the preparation of this data. 
Switching is mandatory for banks, therefore findings in the top 100 financial firm sample 
may be due to regulatory and not other factors. 
DATA 
Table: Switching Data Among Big Six: Top 500 Firms 
Auditor 
1992 
# of audits 
1992 
# of audits 
1987 
# of clients 
audited in 
both years 
number of 
clients lost 
number of 
clients gained 
aa 10 12 10 2 0 
cl 41 39 37 2 4 
dt 38 40 36 4 2 
ey 47 48 43 5 4 
pmt 66 66 58 8 8 
pw 47 44 40 4 7 
Totals 249 249 224 25 25 
APPENDIX 11 
Big Six Banks1 Auditor Concentration 
METHODOLOGY 
The Bank Act Requires Schedule I Banks to retain two auditors each year, and substitute 
in a third auditor periodically. Therefore, the 'Big Six' banks retain 12 auditors yearly. 
This data represents the concentration of the auditors of Canada's largest banks, based on 
number of audits only. The percentage of audits is calculated by dividing the number of 
audits the auditor has by 12 (the total number of audits in the sector). 
The 'Effect of Merger' table compares the 1987 and 1992 data. The 1987 data uses the 
sum of the merging firm's audits. In other words, the number of audits Thome and PMM 
performed in 1987 are added up and listed under PMT in 1987. The sum could be 
considered a potential merger result. The sum is compared to the number of audits in 
1992. 
The gain/loss of only one audit is due to a bank using two auditors that were about to 
merge. The legal requirement to retain two auditors, forced this bank to obtain another 
auditor. 
DATA 
1987 
Auditor # of audits % of audits 
eg 2 16.7 
to- 2 16.7 
dos 1 8.3 
pmm 3 25 
pw 2 16.7 
thorne 1 8.3 
rcmp 1 8.3 
1992 
Auditor # of audits % of audits 
dt 2 16.7 
ey 2 16.7 
pmt 5 41.7 
pw 2 16.7 
rcmp 1 8.3 
Effect of Merger 
Auditor Gain (loss) 
dt (1) 
ey 0 
pmt 1 
pw 0 
rcmp 0 
APPENDIX 12 
STATISTICS CANADA METHODOLOGY 
"This report is one of the elements of Statistics Canada's Small Business Program. 
....This report is a longitudinal assessment of T4 data that classifies business according 
to their life statuses based on an initial year and a terminal year. It displays the number 
of businesses, [and] total payroll of these business, calculated in average labour units 
(ALU's) for the initial year of the study and for the terminal year. In addition, the tables 
reflect the life status of those businesses which were continuously identified over the 
period covered (and further divided into those recording an increase in ALU's and those 
recording a decrease), those which were newly identified during the period and those 
which were no longer identified for each ALU size group. 
COVERAGE 
The report covers all employees who are issued T4 tax records. Employees earning less 
than $500 a year may be excluded as this is the cut off for mandatory issuance of T4 tax 
records. 
DEFINITIONS 
AVERAGE LABOUR UNITS (ALU's) 
Average labour units (ALU's) are calculated by dividing annual payroll (as reported to 
Revenue Canada through the T4 system) for each province a business operates in by an 
estimate of average annual earnings derived from Statistics Canada's Survey of 
Employment, Payrolls and Hours (SEPH) for the same three-digit industry, province and 
size group of the firm. These SEPH derived averaged annual earnings reflect the annual 
mix of workers and earnings (regular, short, and overtime hours) found in each 
particular province x three-digit 1980 SIC combination over the year. The ALU concept 
converts a firm's payroll synthetically into the amount of labour units this payroll would 
typically represent if its labour force were paid the average earnings of its industry in 
that province for a given firm size. 
BUSINESS SIZE 
Business size is calculated by the number of ALU's in a business. Businesses operating 
in more than one province are sized according to their ALU total across Canada. As 
well, these multi-provincial businesses are classified industrially independently for each 
province and at the Canada level. The assignment is based on the business's leading 
industry and can differ from province to province. Nationally, since the assignment is 
based on the leading industry across Canada, the provincial components may not add to 
their Canada total on an industry basis. 
INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION 
Businesses that alter their major industry of activity over time are classified according to 
the latest 1980 SIC reported. The industrial classification is derived from Statistics 
Canada's Central Frame Database. This data base is a central repository of the names, 
addresses and various industrial characteristics of businesses in Canada. Its coverage is 
the universe of employers and hence the universe of business entities having paid 
employees." 
Replicated from Statistics Canada, Employment Dynamics Business Size and Life 
Status: 1989-1992 (Sic 861 & 867), Small Business and Special Surveys Division. 
APPENDIX 1 3 
Regulated and Non-RegulatedSIC Categories 
* indicates regulated SIC category 
Forestry and Forest Products (SIC 8, 24,26) 
Metal (SIC 10,33,34) 
Oil and Gas (SIC 13, 29,46,55) 
Construction, development and real estate(SIC 15, 16, 17, 65) 
Food Manufacturing (SIC 20) 
Tobacco (SIC 21) 
Textile Mill Product Manufacturing(SIC 22) 
Apparel Manufacturing (SIC 23) 
Furniture and Fixture Manufacturing (SIC 25) 
Printing and Publishing Manufacturing (SIC 27) 
Chemical Manufacturing (SIC 28) 
Rubber and Plastics Manufacturing (SIC 30) 
Stone, Glass, Clay Product Manufacturing (SIC 32) 
Machinery Manufacturing (SIC 35) 
Electrical and Electronic Machinery Manufacturing (SIC 36) 
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing (SIC 37) 
Measuring, Analysing, Controlling Instruments Manufacturing (SIC 
38) 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing (SIC 39) 
*Railroad Transportation (SIC 40) 
•Interurban Transportation (SIC 41) 
*Motor Freight Transportation and Warehousing (SIC 42) 
*Water Transportation (SIC 44) 
*Air Transportation (SIC 45) 
* Transportation Services (SIC 47) 
Regulated and Non-RegulatedSIC Categories 
* indicates regulated SIC category 
Communications (SIC 48) 
•Utilities (SIC 49) 
Wholesale Trade - Durables (SIC 50) 
Wholesale Trade - Non-durables (SIC 51) 
Retail - Building Supplies (SIC 52) 
Retail - General Merchandise (SIC 53) 
Retail - Food (SIC 54) 
Retail - Apparel (SIC 56) 
Retail - Furniture (SIC 57) 
Retail - Eating and Drinking Places (SIC 58) 
Retail - Miscellaneous (SIC 59) 
•Banks, Credit Unions, Trust Companies, Insurance Companies 
(SIC 60,61, 62,63) 
•Holding Companies (SIC 67) 
Hotels (SIC 70) 
Personal Services (SIC 72) 
Business Services (SIC 73) 
Motion Pictures (SIC 78) 
Health Services (SIC 80) 
